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Abstract
As the business world is neither linear nor static, the mastery of its "chaotic" nonlinear dynamics lies at
the heart of finding high-leverage policies that return uncommon benefits for marginal costs. Today's
global enterprises are dynamically complex socio-technical systems where cause and effect of
management's strategies and policies are distant in space and time. Spatial complexity recognizes that
correctly defining the limits of the extended enterprise is essential in maximizing shareholder value via
stakeholder management. Temporal complexity recognizes that policies, decisions, structure and delays
are interrelated to influence growth and stability. An enterprise's long-term success therefore is a
function of management's ability to control this "dynamic complexity".
The goal of this thesis is to develop management insights into "enterprise design", i.e. to create more
successful management policies and organizational structures. Enterprise design can be decomposed into
the science and art, or engineering and architecting. Using the heretofore-separate academic fields of
system dynamics and structural dynamics, an attempt is made to define the scientific "laws" of enterprise
physics that will then be used to construct non-obvious, often counter-intuitive enterprise architectures.
The goal is to combine the methodologies from the "business of building" with the "building of
business", in an attempt to draw lessons from the design of high-rise buildings for the design of high-
rising enterprises.
Throughout this thesis, examples of a variety of socio-technical enterprises are discussed in order to
explore and test the principles and insights developed herein. There is however a unifying case study
used throughout of one of the world's most dynamically complex socio-political-technical enterprises: the
Commercial Airplanes enterprise of The Boeing Company. This thesis uses the approaches of system and
structural dynamics to explore Boeing's stability, growth, market share and profitability.
Thesis Supervisors:
Professors Charles Fine, Sloan School ofManagement and Deborah Nightingale, School ofEngineering
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Part I: Enterprise Engineering
"The next two decades may well be a period of transition from the era when society has
focused its pioneering attention on science to the era in which we will turn priority
attention to understanding the dynamic behavior of our social systems. Wars, revolutions,
economic stagnation, inflation, corporate bankruptcies, and the multiple sufferings,
insecurities, and frustrations of the individual all proclaim that we fail to understand these
systems... we might consider management of the future as 'enterprise engineering'"2
Professor, Engineer,
Jay W. Forrester
Enterprise Designer
2 Jay W. Forrester, "Common Foundations Underlying Engineering and Management", IEEE Spectrum 1, No. 9
(September 1964), pp. 66-77.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Objectives
Can enterprises be predictively architected?3 Can value chains be predictively roadmapped? 4
How can enterprise design achieve stability and growth?5 How does one architect/design future "lean"
enterprises?6 How does an enterprise's clockspeed define its dynamic performance?7 How can "dynamic
complexity" be controlled to solve this class of "wicked problems"?8
This thesis attempts to answer such questions by bringing new interdisciplinary knowledge to
existing disciplines - by building bridges between social and technical sciences. In the process, this
thesis aims to present some counter-intuitive insights about world-class enterprises that seem to defy the
laws of organizational physics.
1.2 Principia Dynamica: Isaac Newton's Guide to Business
This exploration begins with a simple hypothetical question: "If humanity's greatest minds were
around today, and they applied their intellect to solve some of the most complex business problems of the
2 1' century, what would they come up with?" For example, if Sir Isaac Newton had not discovered the
laws of motion in his Principia Mathematica in 1687, but had instead discovered the laws of business
over 300 years later, what might he have come up with? As Newton himself bemoaned after losing his
savings in the South Sea Bubble of 1720:
"I can predict the movements of the universe, but I will never understand the madness of men."
3 One of the MIT Engineering System Division 's academic research thrust questions.
4 From Professor Charles H. Fine's current research.
- From the preface of Jay W. Forrester's classic 1961 book, Industrial Dynamics, from which much of the
methodological inspiration for this work is derived.
6 From the MIT Lean Aerospace Initiative's August 2003 research vision statement.
7 From Charlie Fine's 1998 Clockspeed: Winning Industry Control in the Age of Temporary Advantage.
" From Peter Senge's Systems Thinking approach.
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This thesis attempts to revisit that challenge: as shown in figure 1.1 below, how might the laws
governing the dynamics ranging from the orbits of the heavenly bodies to the proverbial falling apple,
apply to the dynamics of complex human enterprises?
Figure 1.1: Newton's Laws of Motion applied to Business?
I will begin by examining the dynamic motion of two "enterprises". Figure 1.2 below compares
the dynamic oscillations of one of the simplest dynamic systems, a pendulum (on the left), with the
dynamic oscillations of one of the most complex dynamic macro-economic human enterprise systems, the
US automotive industry9 (on the right).
Whether a human hand is shaking the physical pendulum on the left, or Adam Smith's "invisible
hand"'1 is shaking the macro-economy on the right, I note that the response in both enterprises has a
similar "sinusoidal" oscillation. This oscillation has a notable "clockspeed" - inversely known as a
"natural period of vibration" (i.e. mean time between successive peaks), which for the automotive
industry on the right is in the region of 6-8 years.
While the automotive "value system" is a complex system of interacting value chains represented
as a "Multi-Degree of Freedom" (MDOF) pendulum, the dynamic response can apparently be
approximated by a single mass and string pendulum, known as a "Single Degree of Freedom" (SDOF)
system". This greatly simplifies the assessment of the industry, provided that one can estimate the size of
the mass and the length of the string, which will be discussed in Chapter 2.
9 The Machine that Changed the World, Womack, Jones and Roos, Free Press, 1990, pg. 248.
10 The Wealth ofNations, Adam Smith, The University of Chicago Press, 1976.
" This well-known property of "modal superposition" in engineering dynamics is directly applicable to linear
systems, and can be extended without significant loss of accuracy to mildly nonlinear systems which includes a
significant class of social dynamic systems.
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Figure 1.2: Mapping Physics to Enterprises
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Eberhardt Rechtin, an expert on systems architecting notes that
describe all of these phenomena as an oscillation of a quasi-stable system
needing a delicate balancing to keep it from destroying itself"12
"an architect-engineer would
- like a pendulum, perhaps -
1.3 Enterprises and Systems Theory
Before we proceed, it is important that we understand the potential impact and limitations of
attempting to use physical-social analogies. Classical General Systems Theory13 makes a significant
distinction between the two systems in figure 1.2, the physical pendulum and the complex
macroeconomic industrial system. As shown in figure 1.3 below, systems can be classified as a spectrum
of different levels. At one end of the systems spectrum lie static and simple dynamic systems (like the
pendulum and the motion of the solar system), while at the other end of the systems spectrum lies human
social systems (like the automotive industry).
1 Systems Architecting of Organizations: Why Eagles Can't Swim, Eberhardt Rechtin, 2000, pg. 7 1.
13 Kenneth E. Boulding, "General Systems Theory - The Skeleton of a Science," Management Science, April 1956,
pp. 202-5.
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Systems theory also notes that all systems have goals of stability, growth and interaction. The
spectrum of system levels can also be characterized by cascading combinations of these goals as shown in
figure 1.3. For example, the primary goal of static, dynamic and cybernetic systems is to seek stability.
While the primary goal of open, living systems is growth and stability.14 In fact, the more dynamically
complex the system, the more sophisticated the goal. Close examination of figure 1.2 reveals that the
automotive industry exhibits a subtle long-term trend growth coupled with the oscillatory instability,
while the standard physical pendulum exhibits instability without growth.
As shown in figure 1.4 below, much of this thesis is an exploration of the underlying nonlinear
dynamic causes and effects of the pursuit of various system goals ranging from stability to growth to
interaction. It is search for the strategic architecture which produces long-term competitive advantage.15
14 Scott, William G. and Mitchell, Terence R., Organization Theory: A Structural and Behavioral Analysis, Irwin-
Dorsey Press, 1972, pg. 60.
15 © The Economist, December 17', 2003, pg. 77.
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Figure 1.4: Strategic Architecture underlying Stability, Growth & Interaction
0 The Economist
Whether I use the terms, "mechanistic" vs. "organic"16, "mass" vs. "lean", "higher-faster-farther"
vs. "better-faster-cheaper", this work contends that there are fundamental architectures that perform better
that others given environmental constraints.
Although by definition, the physical pendulum and the social enterprise have radically different
levels of dynamic complexity, Scott points out that "a good deal of insight could be thrown on social
systems if structurally analogous elements could be found in simpler systems. It is usually easier to study
the less complex and generalize to the more complex."17 Scott also quickly points out however that, "care
should be taken that analogies used to bridge system levels are not mere devices for literary enrichment.
For systems to be analogous, they must exhibit inherent structural similarities or implicitly identical
operational principles.""
This thesis therefore seeks to walk the fine line between capturing the true complexity of human
enterprises while conveying meaningful understanding through the use of appropriate simple analogies
and metaphors.
25
16 From the General Systems Theorists.
" Ibid. pg. 54.
18 Ibid. pg. 54.
1.4 Dynamic Complexity and "Wicked Problems"
This project attempts to wrestle with complex socio-political-technical systems or enterprises. As
shown in figure 1.5 below, a distinguishing characteristic of these systems is the presence of a high
degree of dynamic complexity (i.e. cause and effect are distant in space and time).' 9 The solution to a
current problem (the creation of more space, by pushing aside an obstruction) may seem helpful in the
short-term, however or "side-effects" may lead to "unintended consequences"20 or undesirable results in
the long-term.
Figure 1.5: Dynamic Complexity in Action
As shown in figure 1.6 below, Senge defines the space of socio-technical problems by
considering another dimension of human complexity. 2 1 Conventional engineering systems, even those
having a high degree of detail complexity like a commercial airplane, fall into the category of "tame"
problems. Traditional corporations however have much more human and dynamic complexity, making
them political or "negotiated" problems or "messy" structural dynamics-type of problem. Enterprises,
with their focus on longer time scales and a broader set of stakeholders, by definition has the highest
degree of both human and dynamic complexity, making them "wicked". I will discuss the dynamic
complexity of enterprises in Part I, and the human complexity of enterprises in Part II of this report.
19 © Cartoonbank.com (by Arnie Levin, The New Yorker, December 27,1976). Idea borrowed from John Sterman's
lectures in 15.874.
20 From John D. Sterman's, Business Dynamics.
21 Peter Senge, lecture in "Organizations as Enacted Systems", MIT course, Fall 2002. See also PA Consulting
Group paper, "Putting Complexity Thinking into Practice", 2003.
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"Enterprise design" therefore in this context means a rethinking of the logic of cause and effect.
The problem with such complex socio-political-technical enterprises, however is that most managers
embedded in them tend to operate in the world of linear, direct cause-and-effect and conventional
curricula at most business schools does not cover this class of business problem.
The good news is that there are methodologies to deal with this class of problem. The bad news
is that most methodologies deal with dynamic complexity in a complex way - a way that most managers
don't have the time and/or interest to master. As the old saying goes, "the hard part is making it look
easy." One of my objectives therefore is to identify the methodologies appropriate to solving this class
of problem and to transform them into more simple or usable terms. This work then is an attempt to act
as a "management filter", which I will argue in later chapters of the design of enterprises with appropriate
"organizational filters" to successfully deal with this dynamic complexity.
This thesis builds off of the research of a number of MIT faculty in different sub-fields ranging
from engineering systems to management science to organizational behavior. In particular, it furthers
their general hypotheses which posits that the enterprise solutions with the highest leverage often lie at the
27
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greatest depths of enterprise structures and architectures. As a case in point, Nightingale et al.22 put forth
a model which show that greatest architectural leverage lies in the underlying leadership processes which
then support the enabling and life-cycle processes (see figure 1.7 below).
Figure 1.7: Enterprise Process Architecture
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Building on this theme, I synthesize three other MIT models (shown in figure 1.8 below) which
support this view: Ancona et al's "three lenses" of organizational analysis 23 , Schein's "three levels" of
organizational culture2, and Senge/Sterman's "three levels" of systemic change. We will return to
Senge/Sterman's three notions of "reactive", "responsive" and "generative" in chapter 2 when we derive
the physics of organizational dynamics.2 1 While this thesis begins with the surface phenomena of
business, it attempts to uncover the architectures of deeper causality associated with Systemic Structure,
Leadership, Culture, and the Invisible Assumptions or enterprise DNA.
22 
. Murman et al., Lean Enterprise Value, 2002.
23 D. Ancona et al., Managing for the Future: Organizational Behavior & Processes, 1999.24 E. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 2 "d ed., San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 1992.
25 P. Senge, "The Leader's New Work: Building Learning Organizations", MIT Sloan Management Review, 7 Fall
1990. J. Sterman, Executive Education System Dynamics course - the Beer Game.
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Figure 1.8: Highest Leverage increases with Enterprise Depth
"Three Levels" of
Enterprise Processes
D. Nightingale(et al.)
"Three Lenses" of
Organizational Analysis
D. Ancona(et al.)
"Three Levels" of
Organizational Culture
E. Schein
"Three Levels" of
Systems Thinking
P. Senge I J. Stermn
1. Life-Cycle 1. Strategic 1. Observable 1. Events
Processes Design Lens Artifacts (Reactive)
(Building) (Visible Layer)
In order to arrive at these deeper systemic architectural or structural truths, this thesis will attempt
to move beyond first-order learning in which data, facts and analyses of the real world are fed-back into
the cognitive process to update future managerial decisions. Instead, (as shown in figure 1.9 below) we
hope to secure a deeper second-order learning in which knowledge about the real world is fed-back to
challenge the mental models of our understanding about the underlying dynamic structure of the
enterprises that we are responsible for designing and delivering. 26
26 From Chris Argyris' "double-loop learning", in Strategy, Change and Defensive Routines, 1985.
29
MMMMMMMMINNG -RAIRS P, '97-- _ - - - - - - - -------
Figure 1.9: "Double-Loop Learning" Required to Master Dynamic Complexity
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Regarding appropriate methodologies to deal with dynamic complexity, researchers at MIT and
elsewhere have been developing frameworks and/or "lenses" to begin to tackle this problem. For
example, Professor Ancona has recently developed the notion of the "temporal lens" through which to
study the evolution of organizations27 , and Professor Fine 21 is developing a lens through which to capture
this dynamic complexity. He has identified a series of interacting dynamic forces which he represents as
interlocking cogs in a mechanical metaphor as shown in figure 1.10 below. In a way, "Fine's Five Cogs"
aims to supplement other static models like "Porter's Five Forces" 2 9 to gain a deeper understanding of the
dynamic equilibrium of technologies, firms and value chains.
27 Ancona et al., "Time: A New Research Lens", Academy ofManagement Review, 2001.
28 Professor Charles Fine, MiT Sloan School of Management course 15.795 "Technology and Industry
Roadinapping", Fall 2002. See also PA Consulting Group's 'planes analysis', from "Towards Better Government".
29From Michael E. Porter's Competitive Strategy, 1980.
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Figure 1.10: "Fine's Five dynamic Forces"
One of the things that this thesis aims to accomplish is to recommend one (of many possible)
underlying frameworks for the articulation of the interaction of the multiple dynamic forces acting on an
enterprise. As shown in figure 1.11 below, one such representation of "Fine's Five Forces" is to arrange
them as a multi-tiered pendulum, with each mass corresponding to a different cog. This concept will be
developed over the first half of the thesis.
Figure 1.11: Pendulum Representation of "Fine's Five Forces"
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Therefore, returning to Rechtin's previous observation about the architect-engineer observing a
stability-seeking pendulum embedded in various systems, I might add that the enterprise architect-
engineers seeks stability, growth and interaction in his/her pendulum designs.
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1.5 Architecting & Engineering
As Jay Forrester, the father of system dynamics pointed out in the preface to his seminal 1961
work, Industrial Dynamics: "The goal is 'enterprise design' to create more successful management
policies and organizational structures. ,30 To that end, I will approach design from its two constituent
parts: the art and science, or in applied terms, architecting and engineering. I begin with a discussion of
architecting. As Rechtin noted: "Architecting, the planning and building of structures, is as old as
human societies - and as modern as the exploration ofthe solar system. "31
In this work, I hope to bring this entire range of "architectural metaphors" (from buildings to the
solar system) to bear on the design of the most complex enterprises - human organizations3 2. As
metaphors are a technique to educate through similarity, I will also invoke other more generalizable
heuristics or insights from system architectmig.
As every system and organization has an architecture, or "structure" which largely defines what
the system can and can't do33, I propose to develop a physics-based model that is rooted in the disciplines
of structural dynamics and system dynamics. While this approach is based in the realm of "enterprise
engineering", (i.e. meeting requirements to ensure performance) its focus is on "enterprise architecture"
(i.e. designing forms to follow function). From this methodology, I will attempt to derive a physics-based
expression for an organization's clockspeed and use it to predict the response of organizations to
competition, etc. In addition, I will attempt to derive a physics-based definition of a "lean" enterprise and
use it to develop a new organizing principle - "Organic Architecture", giving examples of
architect/engineers of physical enterprises like Frank Lloyd Wright as well as architects of human
enterprises like Taiichi Ohno (see figure 1.12 below).
30 Industrial Dynamics, Jay W. Forrester, Pegasus Press, 1961, pg. vii.
31 Systems Architecting, Creating & Building Complex Systems, Eberhardt Rechtin, 1991, preface.
32 In the use of metaphor, I take my cue from the Italian economist, Vilfredo Pareto, who was described by
Mirowski (1989) pg. 221 as "the most ruthless proponent of the physical metaphor."
33 Rechtin, 2000, pg. v.
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Figure 1.12: Artifacts of "Organic" Enterprise Architecture
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The approach will try to embrace both worlds: the incremental, analytical, optimization-based
world of engineering, as well as the breakthrough, intuitive, systems thinking based world of architecting.
As Rechtin notes: "The world of an engineer is one offacts and figures, science and mathematics, and
the world of an architect is one of ideas, insights, and inspiration.""
Therefore, while this work will present a number of conventional engineering-based analyses, I
hope that its value will lie equally in the architecting insights. As Rechtin notes: "An insight is worth a
thousand analyses, " or more directly: "Architectural insights are worth far more than ill-structured
engineering analyses. ,3
With respect to what emphasis of problem solving (analysis or design) I will use in this thesis, I
rely on Albert Einstein's belief that "the best analysis is the simplest that will do the job". The job in this
case is to deliver compelling and powerful enterprise designs. A deep understanding of the underlying
enterprise structure and its environment is obviously necessary - and acquiring such knowledge will
undoubtedly require some sophisticated analysis techniques, both quantitative computational and
qualitative heuristic. I will however try to maintain balance by having analysis as the complementary
servant of design - in other words, one can always design oneself out of a difficult analysis problem.
Figure 1.13 below summarizes the differences between architecting and engineering in the overall
process of enterprise design. In distinguishing between architecting and engineering, it is helpful to note
33
3 4 Rechtin, 2000, pg. 139.
3 Rechtin, 2000, pg. ix.3 6 Rechtin, 2000, pg. x.
that the architect is more than a generalist - she is a specialist in simplifying complexity 7 , while the
engineer is a specialist in managing complexity.
Figure 1.13: Enterprise Architecting & Engineering
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1.6 Architectonics: The Science of Architecture
In order to achieve excellent enterprise designs, I draw inspiration from the surprisingly similar
fields or economics and seismology. Thurow points out that economists like seismologists have a deep
and reasonably reliable understanding of the mechanics of markets and plate tectonics respectively.38
Both can predict with reasonable accuracy what will happen as well as how, where and why it will
happen. Market bubbles and crashes, like earthquake faults and epicenters are understandable. The
trouble for both professions is answering the crucial when - the problem of dynamics of timing. In the
-Professor Ed Crawley, Systems Architecting class.
8 Thurow, Lester, Fortune Favors the Bold, The MIT Press, 2003.
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face of such uncertainty, enterprise designers who (knowingly or otherwise) build on top of active fault
lines will either suffer economic collapse or serious damage to their enterprise if precautions are not
taken. But the conventional enterprise design options are often not economically viable. Those few who
do take precautions often employ the expensive yet ineffective strategy of "fail-safe" designs. That is, "I
don't know when or how big the (economic) earthquake will be, so I will make sure that my enterprise
won't fail no matter what."
Skillful enterprise design for dynamic complexity is not interested in answering the questions of
"when" or "how big" will the next economic earthquake be? Instead, the objective is inverted - that is, it
takes as a given that my enterprise is in a volatile environment and that it will "fail". However, I want it
to "safe-fail", 3 9 that is in the way that I the designer intend it to. I will define how the environment
defines my enterprise. This safe-fail design (a.k.a. "damage-tolerant design") can be highly robust and
economical, and it takes significant enterprise leadership to pull it off. By the end of this thesis, I will
demonstrate however that this is precisely what world-class enterprises do. In the process, this thesis
aims to present some counter-intuitive insights that demonstrate that traditionally accepted organizational
theories** do not capture exceptionally high-performing enterprises. In these enterprises, organizational
form does not necessarily follow the environment, but rather enterprise leadership defines how it allows
the environment to shape the organization (see figure 1.14 below).
Figure 1.14: Enterprise Leadership
Traditional View Proposed View
Organization Environment Organization Environment
39 Linstone, H.A., Decision Making for Technology Executives: Using Multiple Perspectives to Improve
Performance, Artech House Boston, 1999.40 From "contingency theory". Examples include: Child, J. (1973), Galbraith, J. (1973), Lawrence, P., and Lorsch, J.
(1967) and Thompson, J. (1967), and Steiner G. (1979).
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As an international structural designer of high-rise buildings and an earthquake engineering
specialist, I was interested to note first-hand in the 1995 Great Hanshin (Kobe, Japan) earthquake that
although 15 seconds of strong ground motion caused direct and indirect economic losses exceeding $200
billion, some of the only buildings standing amidst stretches of destruction were the ancient Japanese
pagodas (see figure 1.15 below).
Figure 1.15: "Safe-Fail" "Damage-Tolerant" Enterprises
In fact these structures or "physical enterprises" have endured the relentless attack of these
devastating earthquakes for over 2,000 years, while "modern" buildings suffer excessive damage or
collapse. I pose the question, "what did the ancient architects and engineers know that we have somehow
forgotten today?" I believe that the answer lies in understanding the physics of the physical enterprise
and its environment. In fact, in chapter 9, I shall attempt to uncover the mystery behind the Japanese
pagodas and offer suggestions as to how lessons can be extended to the design of human enterprises.
1.7 Research Methodologies
But what methodologies can be applied to solve such a complex problem? For this I turned to the
vast array of knowledge that permeates an institute like MIT, academic-industry partnership programs
like the Leaders for Manufacturing program and the industry-consortium, Lean Aerospace Initiative,
where bi-lingual management and engineering principles are cross-fertilized. The structure of this
academic collaboration is shown in figure 1.16 below.
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Both the LFM and LAI programs are part of the Engineering Systems Division (ESD), an
innovative new research and education vision at MIT that aspires to "be a leader in understanding,
modeling, predicting and affecting the structure and behavior of technologically enabled complex
systems".4 ' One of the ESD's seminal questions is, "Can enterprises be predictively architected?" 42 This
challenge lies at the core of my thesis work that I will attempt to resolve by studying the system at the
artifact, enterprise and societal levels.
I propose therefore to use the latest thinking from Charlie Fine on Industry Evolution/Dynamics
and Deborah Nightingale on Architecting Lean Enterprises. This project takes the work of Fine in
Clockspeed 3 and the work of Nightingale and her colleagues in Lean Enterprise Value44 as points of
departure and inspiration as shown in figure 1.17 below.
41 "ESD Message", Dan Hastings, June 4, 2003.
42 Ibid.
43 Clockspeed: Winning Industry Control in the Age of Temporary Advantage, Charles H. Fine, 1998.
44 Lean Enterprise Value, Earl Murman, Deborah Nightingale, et al., Palgrave, 2002.
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Figure 1.17: Basis of the Knowledge Pyramid
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In short, this work attempts begin where Fine's challenges left off in the epilogue to Clockspeed,
namely that "social systems and public institutions have clockspeeds too."4A In addition, I attempt to pick
up Fine's challenge in the appendix to Clockspeed - namely, that "the measurement of clockspeed is
fraught with complexity at all levels... but (my work) is, I hope, sufficiently suggestive that it will
stimulate such research."4
As shown in figure 1.18 below, I use methodologies from a management science perspective in
the research and teachings of Professor Charlie Fine and his colleagues at the Sloan School of
Management. These include the notions of the "Bullwhip" 47 '", "Clockspeed" 49, and the "Five Cogs"50 .
In addition, I will supplement these with the research and teachings that are borne out of the LFM joint
45 Clockspeed, pg. 225.
46 Clockspeed, pgs. 237-238.
4 Clockspeed, pg. 89.
48 "Industrial Dynamics: A Major Breakthrough for Decision Makers", Harvard Business Review, 36 No. 4, 1958.
49 Clockspeed, pg. 6-7.
50 Professor Charles Fine, MIT Sloan School of Management course 15.795 "Technology and Industry
Roadinapping", Fall 2002. See also PA Consulting Group's 'planes analysis', from "Towards Better Government".
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degree program's engineering disciplines: Structural Dynamics51 and Newton's "Laws of Motion"
5 2
, and
the management discipline of System Dynamics. 3 '54
Figure 1.18: Enterprises "Re-Fined"
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In addition, this work was inspired by Professor Jay Forrester's call for "enterprise design... to
influence growth and stability"" and John Sterman's challenges to use system dynamics to understand the
structure and behavior of dynamic socio-technical systems. As Forrester's original work could be
described as building a "techno-social" management systems bridge from the deep academic knowledge
of engineering science to management science, this work attempts to close the feedback loop via building
another bridge of "socio-technical" engineering systems from the mature academic knowledge of
management science back toward complex technical domains as shown in figure 1.19 below.
51 Dynamics of Structures: Theory andApplications to Earthquake Engineering, Anil K. Chopra, 1993.
5 2 Principia Mathematica, Isaac Newton, 1687.
5 3 Industrial Dynamics, Jay W. Forrester, Pegasus Communications, 1961.
54 Sterman, John D.; Business Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex World, McGraw-Hill,
2001.
5 5 Industrial Dynamics, Jay W. Forrester, Pegasus Communications, 1961, pg. vii.
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Figure 1.19: From Techno-Social Management Systems to Socio-Technical Engineering Systems
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The academic / scientific systems landscape spans more than 50 years and covers the spectrum
from Techno-Social systems to Socio-Technical systems as shown in figure 1.20 below.
Figure 1.20: Genealogy of Socio-Technical Systems Theory
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Regarding the use of system dynamics, there is a spectrum of complexity that one could introduce
as shown in figure 1.21 below. Lyneis notes that system dynamics could range from "systems thinking"
on the one hand to small policy-based models, to large detailed calibrated models on the other extreme56 .
In the aforementioned spirit of insight over analysis, I intend this work to focus on the space from the
systems thinking to the small policy-based models, with brief mention, summary and extended
application of other researcher's large detailed calibrated models.
Figure 1.21: Range of Dynamic Modeling Approaches for System Dynamics
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1.8 The Dynamics of Structure, Conduct and Performance
These dynamics-based methodologies allow us to rethink the classical performance paradigm in
industrial economics, namely the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm5 7 . Unlike Porter's
Five Forces methodology58 , which is a static analysis of the structure of an industry, system dynamics
explicitly considers feedback richness of the dynamic interactions of all three components (structure,
conduct and performance) together as shown in figure 1.22 below.
56 "System Dynamics in Consulting: the PA Perspective", Jim Lyneis presentation to MIT 15.874, May 8, 2003.
57 Competitive Strategy Dynamics, Kim Warren, John Wiley Press, 2003, pg. 12.
58 Competitive Strategy, Michael Porter, the Free Press, 1980.
41
Figure 1.22: "Structure-Conduct-Performance" Feedback Dynamics
Beyond the use of the SCP method, I propose to evaluate the strategic options streaming
dynamically from the "structure" of the industry as well as from the "conduct" of the firm that is taking a
"resources-based view". However, I wish to look at resources not statically but dynamically as various
researchers have proposed.59' 60 This attempt in the field of strategic management to tie together structure,
conduct and performance, was also tackled by system dynamicists to understand the explicit links
between structure and behaviorl as shown in figure 1.23 below.
Figure 1.23: "Structure-Conduct-Performance" Feedback Dynamics for Airplane Manufacture
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' Clockspeed, Charles Fine.
60 Competitive Strategy Dynamics, Kim Warren, 2002.
61 "Principles on the Relationship between Structure and Behavior of Dynamic Systems", Alan K. Graham, MIT
PhD Thesis, 1977.
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In the search for deeper understanding in the realm of business and management I attempt to look
beyond the correlation-based view linking business attributes with business performance. Under this
methodology, success is not guaranteed, and searching for truths can sometimes be like groping in the
dark (see figure 1.24 below).
Figure 1.24: Current Research Environment
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Instead, I propose to establish causality-based research searching for "laws" of business to
provide heuristics and insights on what one should look for and what one should expect to find, as shown
in figure 1.25 below.)
Figure 1.25: Proposed Research Methodology
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While this approach is not new, it is a path not often traveled. Mirowski quotes economist Paul
Samuelson, who noted that Irving Fisher's 1892 doctoral thesis is "the best of all doctoral dissertations in
economics" as it was the first (and last) published work to explore the physical metaphor in great detail62.
Although this approach is infrequently used, some of the more innovative insights have come from the
attempt to view the world through the lenses of existing "scientific" fields63 ,64.
In fact recently, researchers have begun to use the physical laws of "turbulence" (arising from
high velocity fluid flow) to understand turbulence in the business world. Robertson writes, "If we view
the business world to be complicated, it is inappropriate to consider models developed under paradigms
of equilibrium, stability, and linearity to produce an analysis of a turbulent environment. Just as non-
linear mathematics is required when studying turbulence within engineering, we too must adopt models
and tools that capture the non-linearity of afirm's environment. "Y6S
With this quest for causality, I will attempt to uncover the often counter-intuitive architectures
behind world-class enterprises like Toyota (in the manufacturing sector) and Southwest Airlines (in the
service sector), whose market performance is truly extraordinary (see figure 1.26 below.)
Figure 1.26: Architecture drives Extraordinary Performance
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Toyota Motors Southwest Airdines
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62More Heat than Light: Economics as Social Physics, Physics as Nature's Economics, Philip Mirowski,
Cambridge University Press, 1989, pg. 222.
63 Clockspeed, Charles Fine, 1998.
64 The Natural Laws ofBusiness, Richard Koch, Currency and Doubleday, 2000.
6 5 Robertson, Duncan A., "Agent-Based Models of a Banking Network as an Example of a Turbulent Environment:
The Deliberate vs. Emergent Strategy Debate", Managing the Complex IV; Naples, Italy; December 2002, pg. 8.
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1.9 Case Study: Boeing and Commercial Airplanes
While the primary purpose of this work is to attempt to develop new insights in enterprise
architecting via "laws of physics", a number of varied examples will be used throughout to anchor the
development of these insights. However, this thesis will focus on one particularly complex enterprise
architecture: the commercial aviation industry.
The commercial aviation industry is currently a duopoly in commercial airplane design and
manufacture, with two global competitors: The Boeing Company and Airbus Industrie. This thesis will
therefore compare and contrast the architectures of both enterprises in order to discover and generalize the
successful architectures that give competitive advantage in complex enterprises. While approximately
equal time will be devoted to the study of each enterprise, the primary client and audience is The Boeing
Company. One could ask the obvious question, "Why would Boeing, the world's premier aerospace
company, at the top of its game and named one of the world's "visionary companies" in James Collins'
recent multi-year research project66 bother to be interested evaluating its current competitive position?
The answer appears to lie in the company's desire to move from good to great or even great to greater.
This work therefore is borne out of Boeing's fabled "Working Together" mandate to "celebrate our
problems...get them out in the open so that we can work on them". Boeing recognizes that today's
competitor has a different architecture from yesterday's competitors, and that staying on top requires a
continual re-evaluation of the enterprise competencies needed in a new competitive environment. Boeing
appears to want to move forward with great pride in its past and great aspirations for its future.
This thesis will explore the underlying laws and dynamics that are causing the dynamic behavior
(or "reference mode") shown in figure 1.27 below.
6 6 Built To Last, James C. Collins and Jerry I. Porras, Harper Business Essentials, 1994.
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Figure 1.27: Boeing - Airbus Competitive Dynamics
% Market Share in
Airplane Deliveries
A
100%
1970
Boeing
Losing an average o
market share per
Airbus for 30 years
I I I I
1980 1990 200
f 1.7%
year
2010
Time
In order to frame this question and understand the possible context for its resolution, I take as a
point of departure Boeing's Vision 2016 which defines goals and objectives for its enterprise which
encompass all three business processes6 7: Customer Relationship Management, Product Innovation and
Infrastructure Management (see figure 1.28 below).
Figure 1.28: Boeing's Vision 2016
E.E.E.E.E.E
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67 From Hagel III, John and Singer Marc, "Unbundling the Corporation", Harvard Business Review, August 2000.
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In developing the research topic with Boeing that led to this work, there was a concerted effort to
focus on those "thought leadership" pieces that were both unique to Boeing's partnership with MIT, and
more importantly would reveal a source of competitive advantage that Airbus had leveraged and is using
to deliver the market share dominance that is shown above. As shown in figure 1.29 below, the field of
System Dynamics, invented at MIT and used extensively by Boeing's competitor Airbus68, airline
customers like Lufthansa69, and regulatory bodies like the FAA 's National Airspace System model70 forms
one of the core methodologies that this research has intended to bring to Boeing and demonstrate its
potential value.
Figure 1.29: Use of System Dynamics in the Commercial Aerospace Industry
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1.10 Scope of Work
With the methodologies in place, I hope to begin to explore and understand the range of dynamic
enterprises ranging from the firm, to a value chain, to an industry, to a macro-economy (as shown in
figure 1.30 below). Each enterprise being a simple "superposition" of pendulums allowing us to use
simple "laws" for extremely complex "architectural" forms.
68 Weil, Henry Birdseye, "Conunoditization of Technology-Based Products and Services: A Generic Model of
Market Dynamics", 11 March 1996.
69 Liehr, Martin; Grossler, Andreas; Klein, Martin; Milling, Peter M.; "Cycles in the Sky: Understanding and
Managing Business Cycles in the Airline Market", System Dynamics Review, Volume 17, Number 4, Winter 2001,
pg. 311-332.7 0 Federal Aviation Administration website and Ventana Systems website.
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Figure 1.30: Range of Dynamic Enterprises
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Finally, (as shown in figure 1.31 below) I will propose that the principles of enterprise physics
can be used to provide a "microscope" to view the dynamics of small-scale complex "enterprises" like
individual humans as proposed by Fine . In addition these same principles can be used as well as to
provide a "telescope" to view the dynamics large-scale complex "enterprises" like global trade.
Figure 1.31: Extending the Range of Enterprises
Individuals
as Enterprises
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10 Entem ses
Clockspeed, Charles Fine, pg. 225.
48
Previously, the goals of systems or enterprises were introduced as being stability, growth and
interaction. I will focus in the short term on describing how enterprises can secure the first two goals of
stability and growth before they can achieve the higher goals of interaction or emergence. As shown in
figure 1.32 below, this thesis therefore takes physics as the point of departure, demonstrating the link
between enterprise structure and its behavior. I will then move into the realm of biology and theories of
evolutionary or emergent behavior of complex adaptive systems, which will demonstrate the way in
which enterprise behaviors can adapt and evolve over time to shape new enterprise structures.
Figure 1.32: Enterprise Physics and Biology
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1.11 Layout of Report
The structure of this report is laid out in two parts covering essentially the theory and
applications, i.e. the science and art, or the engineering and architecting of enterprises.
Part I will cover the basic principles of enterprise engineering which are based on the "laws of
enterprise physics". This is the first step in mastering "dynamic complexity" - namely the quantification
of the dynamic behavior of enterprises or the exploration of the temporal distance or disconnection of
cause and effect. Engineering can be thought of as mapping the enterprise properties and structure to its
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form, and in management terms it is similar to defining the enterprise tactics - that is, the how.
Engineering establishes the secondary enterprise requirements, sometimes known as the "ilities" (e.g.
stability and flexibility).
Part II will focus on the principles of enterprise architecting which are rooted in the "heuristics of
enterprise design". This is the second part of mastering "dynamic complexity" - namely the
quantification of the complexity embedded in the enterprise or the exploration of the spatial distance or
disconnection of cause and effect. Architecting can be thought of as mapping the enterprise form to its
function, and in management terms it is similar to defining the enterprise strategy - that is, the what.
Architecting establishes the primary enterprise requirements, like the creation of value or profitability.
Regarding the design of this report, I would like to note that this work takes a "spiral
development" approach to defining enterprise design as shown in figure 1.33 below. That is, the
architecturalforms define the engineering structures which again feedback to iterate on the architectural
forms, etc. In this way, one could conceive of a report layout starting either with enterprise architecting
or enterprise engineering. I have chosen however to begin with the how, (i.e. the enterprise engineering)
in order that the reader is exposed to the tactical mechanics of how to achieve an elegant architectural
design. In a sense, I have saved the "fun" for the end after the reader has developed a sense of
appreciation for the journey towards high-performance, elegant architectural forms.
Figure 1.33: Spiral Development
Enterprise Architecting - Strategy Enterprise Engineering - Tactics
"What?"(mapping Form to Function) "How?" (mapping Structure to Form)
72 ESD Symposium Committee, "ESD Symposium Committee Overview", Proceedings ofthe ESD Internal
Symposium, May 29-30, 2002, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Engineering Systems Division, pp. 1-30.
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Please note therefore that Part I covers some of the more technical aspects of this work. While
attempts have been made to make these parts as readable as possible, some general understanding of
engineering and systems is assumed. Examples and heuristics then resume in Part II, and it is hoped that
the reader will still gain insights from these even with a cursory skimming of Part I.
Finally, although care is taken to use vocabulary common to general managers, there are some
technical terms used with definitions (including synonyms and antonyms) given in the glossary in
Appendix A.
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Chapter 2: "Physics 101"
In this chapter, we will define the three dynamic properties which define the dynamic structure of
enterprises, both physical and organizational. We will see that these three properties have both "bad" and
"good" qualities, depending on what the enterprise designer wants to do with them. For example, one
property, inertia can be useful in maturing, capital-intensive environments where "massive" enterprises
have competitive advantage. However in new and growing markets with high uncertainty, inertia or
resistance to change can be a competitive disadvantage.
Also in this chapter, from theses dynamic properties we will define an important dynamic
quantity of an enterprise called its clockspeed or speed of movement. Again, we will see that this derived
property can have both "bad" and "good" qualities, depending on what the enterprise designer's strategy
is. For example, Dell's inherently fast clockspeed allows it to attack growth via rapid customer order-to-
fulfillment cycle. However, Airbus' relatively slow clockspeed may be due to its more massive and
damped enterprise which allows it slow, steady growth in an international socio-political-technical
market. Finally, I will argue in chapter 9 that world-class enterprises understand and manipulate their
enterprise dynamic properties for competitive advantage. We begin with a brief refresher of high-school
"Physics 101", and the dynamics of a simple pendulum.73
2.1 The Generic Structure of the Pendulum
The physics of a pendulum is one of the simplest dynamic systems. As seen in figure 2.1 below,
a string74 supporting a mass represents the physical model of the pendulum. When the mass is displaced
it oscillates back and forth, with the position and velocity of the mass "trading-off', that is when the
position is maximum, the velocity is zero, and when the position is zero, the velocity is at its maximum.
In fact, the velocity is simply the first derivative of the displacement with respect to time. This
13 Other equivalent physical metaphors could be used ranging from hydro-electro-mechanical systems. See
Appendix B for a brief summary of these equivalent systems.
74 Note that the "string" could synonymously be thought of as a rope, chord, cable, chain or even rigid rod without
the loss of metaphorical accuracy.
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relationship leads to "out-of-phase" response that can be seen at the bottom of figure 2.1, where the
position curve leads the velocity curve.
Figure 2.1: Generic Structures: "Oscillating Pendulum"
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From a system dynamics formulation, position and velocity are the two "state variables" which
describe the system. Each feeds back information to the other in a "balancing loop" with the "goal" being
the vertical at-rest position. The pendulum is a 2 nd order (two stock) system balancing loop system with
delays, which cause the oscillation. The embedded "delays" in the system that cause the oscillation are
the length of the string and the magnitude of the gravitational field. Therefore the equation of natural
period of vibration is a function of both delays. If you make the string longer, or put the pendulum on the
moon (where the gravitational field is smaller), the natural period intuitively should slow down. Sparing
the reader the mathematical derivation 76, the natural period (T) of vibration of a pendulum is simply:
T= 2n 4 (length of string/gravity)
A brief introduction to System Dynamics is given in Appendix C.
76 Dynamics of Structures: Theory andApplications to Earthquake Engineering, Anil K. Chopra, 1993.
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We could interpret this period of vibration as it applies to organizations as Fine's "clockspeed",
and the path that the dynamic enterprise charts over time (shown in green and yellow in figure 2.1) as the
"double helix".7 In the Fine's double helix (which will be discussed in more detail later, an enterprise
oscillates back and forth between two "architectural" states, namely integral product and supply chain
architectures or modular product and supply chain architectures.
Another example of this pendulum structure leading to oscillatory behavior is the classic
"Predator-Prey" model. The behavior of this ecosystem can be characterized by its two state variables or
populations (e.g. the wolf and rabbit populations). The wolves control the death rate of the rabbits and
the rabbits control the net birth rate of the wolves, in a balancing loop with a delay. The resulting
behavior is oscillation as shown below in figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Generic Structures: Predator- Prey
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" Clockspeed, Charles Fine, 1998.
78 Note: the classic predator-prey dynamic which has an oscillatory dynamic with a phase shift of one-quarter cycle,
assumes that evolutionary change is slow relative to ecological dynamics. Recent research in evolutionary biology
however indicates that in some populations, rapid evolution can impact the dynamics of the system by elongating
the period of oscillation and shifting the phase between the predator and prey to one-half cycle. See Turchin 2003
for example. Sterman notes that this may have interesting implications for organizational dynamics.
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In fact, the underlying structure of a pendulum is so basic and fundamental that one can find it in
a variety of social and technical systems. It is therefore known alternatively as a "System Archetype"79 or
"Generic Structure" 0 or "Strategic Architecture"8' and in fact the general form of this structure is shown
in figure 2.3 below.
Figure 2.3: Generic Structures: 2 "d Order Balancing Loop with Delays
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From this observation, one can now look for more examples of this "Generic Structure". One of
the simplest business production models is of the classic, "Input-Output" or "Workforce-Inventory"
relationship. It is interesting to note in figure 2.4 below, that the structure and dynamics of this system is
identical to the simple pendulum with Input equating to Workforce (or Velocity) and Output equating to
Inventory (or Position). In this case, the delays that cause oscillation are actually the hiring delay (like the
pendulum length) and the time needed to close the inventory gap between desired and real.
79 The Fifth Discipline: The Art & Practice of the Learning Organization, Peter M. Senge, 1990, pg. 94.80 
"Generic Structures in Oscillating Systems I, Celeste Chung, MIT Education in System Dynamics Project, 1994.
8' Competitive Strategy Dynamics, Kim Warren, John Wiley & Sons, 2002, pg. 57-58 and 89-90.
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Figure 2.4: Generic Structures: "Workforce-Inventory Oscillation"
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In fact, from this simple model of production system as pendulum analogy, one can draw some
interesting counter-intuitive conclusions. As shown in figure 2.5 below, if a company produces a steady-
state output of 100 widgets/week, it will have stable growing cumulative profits (red line). However,
once there is an order rate change, the system starts to oscillate as is shown in the blue line for a 50%
increase in sales. However, when one includes the costs of hiring & firing in the system equation (green
line), it is noted that selling 50% more product, can result in making less money!12
It is important to note that this simple two-stock model is intended to generate insights, not
predict or forecast actual behavior. A more detailed treatment of the finances of enterprises under
dynamic demand is given by Lyneis"3, in which he demonstrates that profitability can diminish in the
short run due to a step increase in demand. It is interesting to note that the financial measures of cash
82 It is interesting to note that this result is made worse if the demand is not an increasing step function, but a
sinusoidal function as is the case in the cyclic nature of capital-intensive durable goods like aircraft.
8 Corporate Planning and Policy Design, James Lyneis, pg. 298, 1980.
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flow and profitability do not exhibit the same dynamic response due the delays embedded in the ways
they are accounted for4.
Figure 2.5: Counter-Intuitive Insights
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Not only can the locally (or "boundedly") rational policy of reducing short-term labor costs when
market demand drops result in lower profitability when the hidden costs of hiring & firing are included,
but there are also "hidden" costs associated with losing and acquiring worker experience known as the
"rookie-pro" problem. As shown in figure 2.6 below, this effect may be more dominant than the
beneficial effects of the reduction in costs due to the learning curve (shown on the right of figure 2.6)
which I will discuss later."
Comparing the relative importance of the hire-fire cycle on the stock of experience is clearly an
area for further research that I recommend, especially in industries with high dynamic complexity
84 Analysisfor Financial Management, Robert C. Higgins, 7h edition, McGraw-Hill, 2004, pg. 5.
1s This type of system dynamics analysis has been done before in the commercial airplane industry. (From a
personal communication with Tom Fiddaman, July 2003.)
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Figure 2.6: Dominant Cost Dynamics
"Rookie-Pro" "Learning Curve"
(Hire-Fire) (Cumulative Production)
Cost Dynamic Cost Dynamic
Profit
200,000
80,000
-40,000
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Time (Week)
(80% LOWT5s C--,)
250
CuniaS,. Prod=Wnof
Finally, it might be tempting to think that it is more efficient (in fact it could be seen as a "core
competency") to react more quickly to the changing conditions of the market, and therefore it might be a
virtue to have the ability to hire and/or fire more rapidly. Figure 2.7 below demonstrates for the fictitious
widget manufacturer that this may not be a correct assumption in all situations. When we include the
costs of hiring and firing into the model, and in fact speed up the hiring/firing time by say a factor of four,
we can see that the company can lose even more money by being even more reactive! Therefore
considering rapid reactivity to be a core competency, may in fact be a core "in-competency" in which
case, doing the wrong things "righter" is worse. This ability to grow and shrink rapidly, which I term,
"corporate bulimia" after its binge and purge characteristics, will be revisited in more detail in chapter 9.
Figure 2.7: Doing the Wrong things "Righter"
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It is important to note that the above discussion is based on a generic model with non-specific
values for costs, revenues etc. The amount of profits and losses is dependent on a number of variables
including the costs of hiring and firing, the ratio of between labor costs and material costs, etc.
Such "core incompetencies" are not uncommon in the business world and are often the result of a
functionally oriented organization in which visibility of the overall enterprise is limited. As noted by
Sterman16 , decision-making in these circumstances is equivalent to seeing the tip of the causality iceberg.
As figure 2.8 below illustrates, the local decision policy to layoff workers is often in response to the direct
causal relationship resulting in control of variable costs in the short term. This results in a balancing loop.
This is the part of the decision dynamic that the decision-maker sees and is rewarded for. However there
are "unintended side-effects" which are the result of decision-makers treating other enterprise metrics and
variables as exogenous or outside their control or interest.87
Figure 2.8: Tip of the Iceberg of "Unintended Side-Effects"
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86 Prof. John Sterman's 15.874 class lecture, Fall 2003.
87 Ibid
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There is a whole host of reinforcing loops that are "hidden" beneath the water level which act as
"policy resistance" to thwart the primary decision above the water." These range from ignoring the costs
of layoffs to making the remaining staff work harder to draining the enterprise of its embedded learning
network to developing a reputation as a poor place for a career. All these act to reduce market demand,
resulting in more layoffs.
2.2 From System Dynamics to Structural Dynamics
Having presented the case for simple pendulum-based generic structures using system dynamics, I
will now search for the lessons learned in the sister discipline of structural dynamics. Structural
dynamics developed from the field of vibrations in mechanical engineering and is largely restricted to
vibrations in the linear regime (e.g. high-rise building vibrations due to wind loading and automobile
vibrations). However, nonlinear structural dynamics grew out of the field of earthquake engineering and
blast-loading on civil engineering structures like buildings and bridges.
In structural dynamics, the pendulum is known as an approximate "single-degree-of-freedom"
(SDOF) system, with the dynamic degree of freedom being the horizontal displacement of the swinging
mass. A SDOF system has one mode of vibration; a two-degree-of-freedom system has two modes of
vibration etc. The mode with the largest modal participation factor (typically with the longest period of
vibration) is called the "fundamental" mode of vibration and the associated period is called the
"fundamental" period of vibration.89
Likewise, in system dynamics the pendulum is a 2 nd order, two-stock system having one major
feedback loop (a balancing loop). I observe therefore that the number of major feedback loops in a
system dynamics model is equal to the number of dynamic D.O.F., or the number of modes of vibration.
See figure 2.9 below.90
88 Ibid.
89 "Modal analysis" arises from the solution of the "eigenproblem" in linear algebra, which determines the
eigenvalues (i.e. frequencies) and eigenvectors (i.e. modeshapes).
90 Nathan Forrester's 1982 PhD dissertation was one of the first to discuss eigenvalue analysis in system dynamics.
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Figure 2.9: Core Building Block in Structural and System Dynamics
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Please note as an aside, that I am using two essentially equivalent physical metaphors throughout
this report to represent an enterprise: the pendulum and the inverted pendulum (see figure 2. 10 below).
The reader should pick whichever metaphor (s)he feels the most comfortable with. The pendulum model
should appeal to physicists or clockmakers, while the inverted pendulum model is the tool of trade for
structural engineers who are designing high-rise buildings.
Figure 2.10: Alternate Physical Metaphors
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Therefore, I can now make the following analogy-based observations:
1 - Modes ofvibration in structural dynamics =Feedback loops in system dynamics91
In structural dynamics, the mode of vibration with the longest period of vibration is known as the
"fundamental" mode, and its period is known as the "fundamental" period as most of the modal mass or
dynamic energy is captured in this mode. Likewise in system dynamics, Graham observes that, "a
disturbance will propagate longest around the loop that propagates the disturbance most strongly". 92
2.12 - The mode (i.e. feedback loop) with the longest period of vibration (i.e.
propagation time) is called the 'fundamental" mode (or loop).
From this, I can make another observation that in many complex structures having hundreds of
degrees of freedom and hundreds of modes of vibration one or two modes tend to dominate the dynamic
behavior. Likewise, Graham observes that in complex oscillatory systems, "one or two feedback loops
often dominate the behavior despite the presence of thousands of others". 93
2.13 - In complex enterprises, one or two modes (or feedback loops) tend to dominate
the dynamic behavior of the system.
The dynamic response of a structure is also governed by the dynamic period of the input signal.
For example, if the fundamental period of earthquake ground shaking is very close to the fundamental
period of the building, then the maximum dynamic response will occur, called "resonance". Likewise,
Graham observes that "when we are looking for the cause of regular fluctuations, a loop with two or more
phase-lag subsystems with response times on the same order of magnitude may be the cause of them." 94
2.14 - When the fundamental period of the enterprise matches the fundamental period
of the forcing signal a condition of resonance will occur.
91 Jay Forrester noted (at his lecture at the 2003 System Dynamics conference in New York) that the number of
eigenvalues in a linearized system dynamics model = the number of stocks in a system dynamics model. Therefore
a two-stock pendulum generic structure has two eigenvalues.
92 "Principles on the Relationship Between Structure and Behavior of Dynamic Systems", Alan K. Graham, MIT
PhD thesis, 1977, pg. 98.
93 Ibid., pg. 97-98.
94 Ibid pg. 97.
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In nonlinear structural dynamics (e.g. earthquake engineering), there is a transfer of dominance
from one mode to another. Likewise, in nonlinear system dynamics, there is a transfer of dominance of
one feedback loop to another (e.g. in s-shaped growth).
2.15 - When enterprises enter the nonlinear range, the existence of dominant
fundamental modes (or feedback loops) changes over time. This would manifest
itself in figure 2.5 above, in which different modes and loops would turn red
during the dynamic oscillation. In fact, the notion of a fundamental mode or loop
becomes largely irrelevant in highly nonlinear problems.
When designing the structure of a building to remain stable under a dynamically demanding
environment like an earthquake, it is often advantageous to significantly modify the mode shapes and
frequencies of the building - to push them away from the damaging energy of the earthquake. We will
discuss exactly how to do this for buildings and enterprises in chapter 9. Likewise, Graham notes that "a
very efficient way to stabilize a system's oscillations is to identify the dominant loops and reduce their
ability to propagate disturbances through either parametric or structural changes". 95
6 - Excellence in structural (or system) design often entails significant modification to
the fundamental modes (or dominant loops) of the enterprise.
Multiple-degree-of-freedom (MDOF) systems are complicated and their dynamic behavior is
difficult to quantify. Fortunately, some simple techniques for linear systems have been developed in
structural dynamics. The concepts of "modal superposition" and "response spectrum analysis" (discussed
later) allow for the reduction of complex MDOF systems into a sum of simpler SDOF systems.
7 - Complex structures (or systems) can be decomposed into an algebraic series of
simpler modes (or feedback loops).
For example, figure 2.11 below shows the dynamic response of a 20-story building undergoing an
earthquake. In order to analyze and design such a structure (or "physical enterprise"), it is necessary to
model the building with millions of degrees of freedom and analyze the results on a supercomputer9 6 .
9 Ibid, pg. 99.
96 "Seismic Survival", Engineering News Record Magazine, July 1997.
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However, structural engineers have developed simple rules of thumb that allow them to greatly reduce the
complexity and rapidly estimate the response.
Figure 2.11: Structural Dynamics of Buildings (source: Arup)
Before Earthquake During Earthquake
Instead of working with a detailed 20 story, one million-element model of the structure, designers
can simplify it to an equivalent lumped mass "mega-story" model with only five dynamic degrees of
freedom. Finally, the structure can be approximated even further as a single degree of freedom model
with an equivalent mass and height as shown in figure 2.12 below. The smaller, simpler models are
attractive particularly for concept designs as they allow the use of simple design techniques like a
"Response Spectrum" which will be discussed in more detail later in subsequent sections. Note that the
model looks like an inverted pendulum. This time the stiffness is not the length of the strings, but a
function of the properties of the structure. Nonetheless, the same simple laws of physics apply.
65
Figure 2.12: Spectrum of Structural Model Complexity
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A physical analog using the building metaphor can be quite powerful in understanding the
dynamics of human organizations and enterprises. In figure 2.13, each "story" of the structure represents
a value chain member who is connected to its "upstream" supplier and its "downstream" customer. In
this case, the enterprise is a simple, three-degree of freedom production-distribution system comprising a
retailer, a distributor and a manufacturer. Notice that this enterprise structure is resting on the ground that
represents the customer base. The changing customer demand is therefore like an earthquake signal that
causes the building to oscillate. The speed at which the customer changes her mind (i.e. the "customer
clockspeed") will be discussed in chapter 9, under the lean enterprise name of "Takt"97.
97 "Takt" is the German word meaning "heartbeat", and is often used in Lean vocabulary to signify the production
speed which will match customer demand.
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Figure 2.13: Structural Dynamics of Organizations
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It is important to note that there are a variety of different types of possible "earthquakes" or
exogenous shocks to an enterprise9'. Other than changes in customer demand for product, this includes
changing demand from the capital markets for corporate profits (which we will discuss later in chapter 8).
The optimum structural form is likely to be different when designing the enterprise for the dynamic
demand from customers vs. for the dynamic demand from capital markets. Nevertheless, as most
enterprises must respond well to both types of shocks, the enterprise design must have design
"robustness" to meet the possibly conflicting demands of long-term customer satisfaction and short-term
profitability.
Other "earthquakes" include changes in government regulation, waves of mergers and
acquisitions or even technological discontinuities that send shocks through an enterprise. Note that these
types of shocks tend to cause the enterprise (whether a firm, value chain or even an industry) to evolve its
98 Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld and Eric Rebentisch identify three sources of instability in aerospace enterprises:
Technological, Organizational and Economic. See "The Impact of Instability on Complex Social and Technical
Systems", ESD Internal Symposium, April 2002.
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structural form, as Fine argues in his work on industrial evolution.99 Customer and capital market
demand dynamics on the other hand tend to cause "non-emergent" response and do not necessarily lead to
enterprise restructuring. Instead, the enterprise as designed responds in real time to the event.
As shown in figure 2.13, in the case of the enterprise responding to changes in customer demand,
time-varying customer information is sent upstream through the enterprise (like an earthquake wave) and
product is sent downstream through the enterprise (like an earthquake wave reflected back downward).
Such input waves cause the building to shake and the enterprise value chain to oscillate like a "bullwhip",
with greater amplification the further along the value chain as depicted in the figure. The larger the
earthquake, the greater the amplification will be throughout the enterprise. The greater the amplification
throughout the enterprise, the stronger (and typically more expensive) the enterprise must be in order to
prevent "damage" or wholesale collapse of the enterprise. In the context of a manufacturing corporation
for example, the larger the earthquake and enterprise amplification, the greater the enterprise capacity
must be, i.e. the more expensive fixed capital expenditures and variable inventory levels must be.
Each firm in the value chain (i.e. each mass) could also be modeled as having its own inverted
pendulum of connected masses representing internal functions. For example, this micro-enterprise could
just as easily be a firm having three degrees of freedom in its functions (e.g. marketing, engineering &
manufacturing), or more realistically in its "business processes"100 (e.g. order fulfillment).
Conversely, the above enterprise could be aggregated into a larger macro-model of an industry or
a national macro-economy as shown in figure 2.14 below. This three-degree of freedom enterprise
structure connects the macro-economy with an industry and ultimately with a firm. 10 ' From this model,
one would expect to see three "modes of vibration" in the data and the research literature 2,103. We will
revisit this macro-economic model again later in this thesis.
99 Charles H. Fine, Clockspeed: Winning Industry Control in the Age of Temporary Advantage, Perseus, 1998.
100 The Agenda, Michael Hammer, 2001.
101 There is also an underlying "growth mode" which is excluded from this discussion for the time being.
102 "Modeling Cycles in the National Economy", Nathaniel Mass, Technology Review, March/April 1976, pg. 43-52.
103 "Empirical and Theoretical Evidence of Economic Chaos", Ping Chen, System Dynamics Review, Vol. 4 No. 1-2,
1988, pg. 27.
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Figure 2.14: Structural Dynamics of Business Economies
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From the data, we can see the period of oscillation as well as the amplitude of vibration; therefore
one could theoretically calculate mass and stiffness of each of the three components of the business
economy enterprise model. But before we attempt this, let us first map the physical forces to their
organizational analogues.
2.3 Three Dynamic Forces on Enterprises
There are three primary physical forces' 04 acting on a physical system like a building during an
earthquake. They are: inertia (or acceleration-dependent forces), damping (or velocity-dependent
forces), and stiffness (or displacement-dependent forces). I am proposing a similar mapping to human
organizations and enterprises that use physical analogs and common, everyday management terms and
concepts that are summarized in Figure 2.15 below 0 5:
10" Although I focus in this thesis on Newtonianforce-based dynamics, Hamiltonian energy-based dynamic
formulations could also be used which would lead to additional insights.
10' Although most of this thesis takes a deterministic approach to dynamics for simplicity and instructive ease, I note
that this is just an approximation to the uncertain nature of complex human systems which would benefit from a
probabilistic /stochastic approach.
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Figure 2.15: Three Dynamic Properties
Inertia Inertia
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... resists velocity Usage: "Customer Responsiveness"
F=cV Synonym: Unresponsiveness
Antonym: Responsiveness
Stiffness Reactivity
... resists displacement Usage: "Supply Chain Reactivity"
F=kD Synonym: Rigidity
Antonym: Flexibility (not as in "adaptability")
It is interesting to note that the three organizational forces are common in the academic literature
as well as in business colloquialisms. Organizational inertia has for years been researched in the
academic discipline of organizational behavior, supply chain flexibility or reactivity is well known in the
supply chain / operations management disciplines, and customer responsiveness is an important topic in
the marketing discipline. This thesis attempts however to unify these disparate notions into a unified
theory of business enterprise dynamics.
From this we can see that the inertia of an organization is a measure of how much resistance to
change there is within the organization. Also, I note that organizational damping is a measure of how
responsive the organization is to the customer (i.e. do they smooth and delay decisions?). And finally, the
stiffness of an organization is how "reactive" it is to an input.
It is interesting to note that researchers at the Harvard Business School and the Tuck School of
Business have recently published the results of a five-year research program that proposed four
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characteristics that distinguish successful companies. 10 6 One was a corporate structure that is flexible (i.e.
related to stiffness) and responsive (i.e. related to damping).
In figure 2.16 below, I propose visual metaphors for each of these three forces, in order to
understand conceptually what they mean in the physical and organizational realms. Although all three
dynamic forces are always acting on a physical system, one force usually dominates.
Figure 2.16: Visualizations of the Three Dynamic Forces
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addle
-Low mass
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F = kD sprngStiffne
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-Low air friction
-Large friction forces
therefore stiffness force (displacement-dependent) governs behavior
To consider when inertia dominates, consider a large block of steel sitting at rest on a frozen
pond. There is little velocity-dependent air friction to resist movement, and there is little displacement-
dependent ground friction to resist movement. The reason that it is so difficult for a person standing on
solid ground to move the block is that the block has an endogenous property called "inertia" which resists
movement. This force is acceleration-dependent, which means it is very difficult to change the velocity
of the block. For example, if the block is at rest, it is difficult to get it moving. Or if the block is sliding
across the pond with constant velocity, it is difficult to bring it to rest.
This inertia (or mass) is defined by the size of the block and its density. It would be easy to move
this large block if it were made of a low-density material like Styrofoam. Organizationally, this inertia is
106
"What Really Works", Nitin Nohria and William Joyce, Harvard Business Review, July 2003.
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a function of the size of an organization, but more importantly, it is a function of its "density" which
manifests itself in its level of vertical integrality or focus on "functional silos". This will be discussed
further later.
To consider when damping dominates, consider a paddling canoe in a lake. There is little
acceleration-dependent mass or inertia associated with the lightweight canoe, and there is little
displacement-dependent stiffness (e.g. a rope tying the canoe to the shore) resisting movement. The
reason that it is so difficult for a person paddling in the canoe is that the water has velocity-dependent
viscosity. This means that it is relatively easy to move the paddle slowly through the water - there is little
velocity and therefore viscous resistance movement. However, when one tries to move the paddle more
quickly, the water's viscosity makes this effort harder. Note that these velocity-dependent forces would
be even more pronounced if the canoe were being paddled in a more viscous fluid like oil or syrup.
Organizationally, this viscosity is a function of the "responsiveness" of the organization, i.e. the
speed at which it responds to changes in the environment. Often, this manifests itself as the level of
corporate "bureaucracy". This will be discussed further later.
To consider when stiffness dominates, imagine pulling on a spring. There is little acceleration-
dependent mass or inertia associated with the spring itself, and there is little velocity-dependent air
friction to resist movement. The reason that it is so difficult to pull the spring is that it possesses elastic
stiffress, which is displacement dependent. In other words, it gets harder to pull the farther you pull it. It
is not difficult to start pulling it (i.e. not acceleration-dependent), nor is it difficult to pull it quickly (i.e.
not velocity-dependent).
Organizationally, this stiffness is a function of the "reactivity" of the organization i.e. the
metaphorical distance an organization moves when it reacts to a customer order. Often, this manifests
itself as the level of waste in an organization. This will be discussed further later.
A more in-depth exploration of each of the three forces: inertia, responsiveness and reactivity will
be covered in sections 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 respectively.
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2.4 Calculation of Clockspeed
Although researchers have attempted to measure industry clockspeeds based on gathering
empirical data based on items like total duration of product lifecycle 07, I am attempting to propose a
slightly more analytical framework which could give the enterprise attributes which govern its
clockspeed. Figure 2.17 below shows the general equations for calculating the natural period of vibration
of a SDOF system. 0 8
Figure 2.17: General Equations for Natural Periods of Vibration for Systems
Tn = 2z Mass T = 2z Enterprise Inertia
Stiffness Enterprise Reactivity
As an example of the ease and usefulness of this equation, I observe how an MIT colleague chose
to describe his experience at Dell Computers09 :
"Dell is the most reactive company I know. They can turn on a dime and yet they react
to every penny."
In this simple statement, a qualitative assessment of Dell's clockspeed was made. "Turning on a
dime," means agility, low resistance to change or low organizational inertia. "React to every penny"
means high stiffness, short string length or high enterprise reactivity. Therefore a small numerator
(inertia) and a large denominator (reactivity) equal a small natural period of vibration (or fast clockspeed).
But a pendulum is an even simpler specific case. If (as demonstrated in Chapter 1) any dynamic
system (whether physical or organizational) can have its dynamic response approximated by treating it as
107 "Industry Clockspeeds: Measurement and Operational Implications", Manufacturing & Service Operations
Management, 1999.
108 A more exact formula for natural period of vibration includes the damping factor, however it can be considered to
be negligible for most physical or human systems. For a more complete discussion, refer to Appendix D.
109 Personal communication with Rick Nardo, LFM 2003, April 2003.
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an equivalent pendulum having a mass size and a string length, then the clockspeed equation is easy to
derive from Newtonian physics." 0 For a pendulum, the following simple relationships hold:
Mass of a Pendulum = Pendulum Weight / Earth's gravity
Stiffness of a Pendulum = Pendulum Weight / Length of Pendulum
Substituting these into the general equations of figure 2.15 (noting that pendulum weight cancels
out) results in the following equation:
Tr= 2w (length of pendulum/gravity)
It is intuitive to note that the more corporate inertia, the more resistance there is to change, the
larger (slower) the natural period of vibration. Also, the less reactive the value chain (i.e. the longer the
string), the slower the natural period of vibration. These relationships are shown below in figure 2.18
utilizing the complete equation for clockspeed discussed in Appendix D.
Figure 2.18: The Three Dynamic Properties and the Clockspeed Equation
T = 2 Enterprise Inertia
Enterprise Reactivity
1 - Enterprise Damping2
Enterrise Enterprise
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Inertia: Low Inertia: High
Damping: Low Damping: High
Reactivity: High Reactivity: Low
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Clockspeed
WVMNV Slow
Clockspeed
"
0 A good website for learning about pendulum dynamics is: "The Pendulum Lab" by Franz-Joseph Elmer at
www.monet.physik.unibas.ch/~elmer/pendulum.
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In the coming chapters we will explore the strategic positioning of an enterprise's clockspeed.
For now I note Senge's observation that "faster is not necessarily smarter... in a world of constant
acceleration, while most firms become increasingly reactive, the race will go to the few who can think
more deeply rather than react more quickly".I
2.5 The Enterprise "Response Spectrum"
Before I discuss and attempt to quantify inertia and reactivity for organizations, I would like to
introduce a powerful concept or visual representation for enterprise design, the "Enterprise Response
Spectrum" which will be used throughout this report.1 2 This concept is used widely in diverse fields like
earthquake engineering where engineers need a simple tool to capture complex design issues. 11 3 As over
two million people died in collapsed buildings due to earthquakes from 1900-2000, such a tool was
developed quite literally to save lives - if you don't consider the nonlinear dynamic complexity of your
enterprise then people die. Can such a simple design aid be used for enterprise designers, where the
profits and well being of organizations are at stake?
Quite simply, a response spectrum plots the response on the vertical axis of an infinite number of
enterprises, each having a different clockspeed on the horizontal axis to an input signal (e.g. a change in
customer demand, a change in interest rates, a global war). As every enterprise has a clockspeed or
natural period of vibration, and every input signal has its own clockspeed, the closeness of the two
clockspeeds defines the amplitude of dynamic amplification or attenuation that the enterprise will
experience.
The two figures below illustrate the construction of a response spectrum. In figure 2.19, the
clockspeeds or natural periods of vibration are determined by assuming that each enterprise has a constant
mass, while the stiffness (represented by height) varies.
1" Peter Senge, back cover of Clockspeed, by Charles H. Fine, 1998.
112 Although I take the notion of "response spectrum" from structural engineering, it is also known as a "transfer
function" in general dynamics theory or as a "bode plot" in acoustics and mechanical vibrations.
113 Jay Forrester even introduced the concept in system dynamics for enterprises in one of the appendices in one of
his original works, Industrial Dynamics, 1961, Appendix I, figure AI-2, pg. 424.
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Figure 2.19: Construction of a Response Spectrum (Constant Mass)
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In figure 2.20 below, the clockspeeds or natural periods of vibration are determined by assuming
that each enterprise has a constant stiffness, while the mass varies. The resulting response spectrum is
identical to the previous one, as the clockspeeds of each enterprise are the same, although they are
expressed in different ratios of mass and stiffness.
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Figure 2.20: Construction of a Response Spectrum (Constant Stiffness)
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As a response spectrum graphically shows the effects of the beer-game bullwhip on a variety of
enterprises having different clockspeeds, I will illustrate this concept using a metaphor of a lion-tamer's
bullwhip.
The response spectrum plots the response (e.g. the acceleration of the end of a bullwhip) of a
range of bullwhips each having a different length (and therefore different natural period of vibration) to a
specified whipping acceleration of the lion-tamer's hand. For example, if we cut the bullwhip off at its
handle, leaving only the stump, then the acceleration of the stump is equal to the acceleration of the lion-
tamer's hand - i.e. there is no dynamic amplification. We plot this point vertically at the far left of the
graph where the period of vibration of the bullwhip stump is zero. If we add back more and more whip,
we find that the acceleration of the tip keeps amplifying the motion of the lion-tamer's hand further and
further - that is the response spectrum increases as we move further to the right as the whip has a longer
and longer natural period of vibration. Note that there is a "magical" length of whip, which maximizes
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the amplification of the acceleration of the lion-tamer's hand. This corresponds to the highest point on
the response spectrum, and occurs at the resonant natural period of the whip - i.e. when the natural period
of the whip is approximately equal to the period of motion of the lion-tamer's hand. Finally, as we add
more and more length to the whip, making it longer and longer and hence the natural period of vibration
longer and longer, the maximum acceleration of its tip begins to diminish, and in fact "de-amplifies" the
motion of the lion-tamer's hand. On the response spectrum, as we move further to the right, the values
reduce. The characteristic shape of a "mountain-looking" graph is an acceleration response spectrum as
shown in figure 2.21 below.114
Figure 2.21: The Bullwhip and the Enterprise Response Spectrum
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For example, if an enterprise's clockspeed is the same as the input signal's clockspeed, the
enterprise will experience maximum bull-whip effect - a phenomenon known as 'resonance". However,
if the clockspeed of the enterprise is much faster than the input clockspeed, the enterprise will not "feel"
114 In the body of this thesis, I focus almost exclusively on the acceleration response spectrum. As there are three
primary forces in structural dynamics, there are three response spectra, the other two being velocity and
displacement response spectra. For a brief discussion of the three spectra and how they are related, see Appendix E.
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the input strongly and it will not amplify its effects (see left side of spectrum). Also, if the clockspeed of
the enterprise is much slower than the input clockspeed, the enterprise will also not "feel" the input
strongly and it will de-amplify its effects (see right side of spectrum). I shall return to this concept later.
Enterprise damping acts to reduce the response of enterprises. Therefore, there is a different
response spectrum for different levels of enterprise damping as shown in figure 2.22 below.
Figure 2.22: Effect of Damping on Response Spectra
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The shape of the enterprise response spectrum is also a function of the dynamics of the
"earthquake", that is the dynamics of the changes of customer demand, etc. The peak of the response
spectrum occurs near the clockspeed of the customer demand. For example, figure 2.23 below, shows the
response spectra of two different simplified markets, where there is only one clear customer signal. On
the left (in red) is a market where the clockspeed of the customer demand changes every six months and
on the right (in blue) is a market where the clockspeed of the customer demand changes every year.
Notice how they both are relatively "pointy" curves.
79
Figure 2.23: Shapes of the Enterprise Response Spectrum
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In the field of earthquake engineering, ground motion typically has many complex frequencies or
clockspeeds occurring simultaneously - we say that the earthquake signal is "rich in frequency content".
This environment produces a broad-shaped response spectrum as is shown in green in figure 2.23. In the
business world, this environment is like the world of real markets, where demand for multiple product and
customer segments occurs simultaneously - the business environment is "rich in demand clockspeed
content" or heterogeneous.
In fact, only in rare cases does the demand (both in earthquakes and markets) have only one
predominant clockspeed. In earthquake engineering, Mexico City proved to be such a rare environment.
The city is founded on an ancient lakebed of deep soft soil having a natural period of vibration or
clockspeed of 2 seconds. That is if you smacked the ground of Mexico City with a large hammer, it
would shake back and forth like a bowl of Jell-O, left-to-right, every 2 seconds. This is extremely
relevant, because the majority of building collapses were high-rise buildings also having fundamental
periods of vibration of 2 seconds. The buildings went into resonance with the very strong single
clockspeed of the ground. If the ground of Mexico City were made of more solid rock which creates a
ground motion having more rich, simultaneous frequencies, (like the lower, broader green curve in figure
2.23) those buildings would not have collapsed. Similarly, in the business world, a company that serves
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only one customer with one predominant product is subjected to the full dynamic amplification of
changes in that demand. However, if there were multiple customer segments, each changing their
demand patterns at slightly different times, the dynamic response of the enterprise would be less,
requiring less enterprise strength. In fact, as we shall discuss in chapter 9, this "Agile" product offering
and production line flexibility, is one of the many key architectural advantages that Toyota exploits.
Before leaving the concept of an enterprise response spectrum for the time being, let us
summarize the concepts developed thus far that allow describe the three-step process of dynamic
enterprise design. I will summarize them in the logical format of: "Enterprise + Environment =
Response" as shown in figure 2.24
Figure 2.24: The Enterprise Design Process
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The first step is to estimate the enterprise structural properties (namely the inertia and reactivity)
in order to calculate the enterprise clockspeed, which is then plotted on the horizontal axis. The second
step is to estimate the market environment spectrum, the shape of which is a function of the market
richness, and the amplitude of which is a function of the enterprise damping or responsiveness. The third
step is to determine the enterprise response quantity (e.g. growth, throughput or production) by reading up
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from the enterprise clockspeed to the environment response spectrum, and then horizontally to the value
of the response. In this way, the enterprise design spectrum will indicate the maximum growth that an
enterprise of a given clockspeed would experience given a specific market demand dynamic.
The response spectrum not only shows how the response is a function of the enterprise and its
environment, but also that the enterprise structure drives its behavior as shown in figure 2.25 below.
Figure 2.25: Enterprise Response Spectra: Structure Drives Behavior
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2.6 Comparing System Dynamics and Structural Dynamics
Having defined a response spectrum using the concepts of structural dynamics, it is helpful to
reconcile the two different representations of dynamic systems used in this work: system and structural
dynamics in order to observe their complementary nature. As shown in figure 2.26 below, the appeal of
using structural dynamics is the obvious and transparent representation of an enterprise's structure as
captured by the masses etc. - with its response or behavior not readily apparent. Whereas, the appeal of
using system dynamics is the transparent representation of an enterprise's behavior as captured by the
stocks as state variables - with the structure not readily apparent." 5
The mathematical solution of a system's structural dynamics lies in the numerical integration of
the equations of motion which are a system of ordinary differential equations. As pointed out by
1 5A comparison of system & structural dynamics within the context of dynamic systems is shown in Appendix B.
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Forrester, the use of integral calculus (e.g. for stocks) is more intuitive because it is easier to assign
causality.116 For example in the case of the pendulum, it is clear that integrating acceleration causes
change in velocity, and the integration of velocity causes change in displacement.
Figure 2.26: Complementary Representations of a System's Dynamics
Structural Dynamics System Dynamics
(Structure is obvious) (Behavior is obvious)
Mass
StIffness Position
3Velocity
One can then map the system's state variables (or stocks) to the structural dynamic model which
represents the system's structural properties as shown in figure 2.27 below for a typical enterprise.
Figure 2.27: Summary of Structural and System Properties
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116 Jay W. Forrester, Principles ofSystems, 1968, pp. 6-11 and 6-12.
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Finally, to close the loop between system and structural dynamics and the concept of a response
spectrum, one can see in figure 2.28 below the three ingredients of the dynamic analysis color coded for
the three figures: red represents the environment i.e. the exogenous force of gravity (and its direct impact
on the inertial mass), blue represents the structure i.e. the stiffness or the length of the pendulum, and
yellow represents the response i.e. the state variables of displacement and velocity.
Figure 2.28: Relating Response Spectrum to System and Structural Dynamics
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From the above comparisons of the complementary nature of system and structural dynamics, it
becomes clear that while both describe the structure and behavior of dynamic systems, each has particular
strengths in communicating such systems. Structural dynamics works with strategic "high-level"
aggregated enterprise properties of inertia, damping and reactivity while system dynamics works at a
more operational level with more refined and discretized details of decision making.
Having defined the concept of a response spectrum that will be used over and over again
throughout this report, we now move to an exploration of each of the three dynamic forces that we
introduced in section 2.3. We begin with Inertia.
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2.7 Inertia: Dynamic Property #1
The question now arises as to how one defines and measures the two crucial organizational
parameters, Inertia and Reactivity. Let's first focus on "Inertia" which is defined by Newton's second
law of motion:
F = mA
Inertia Force = mass * acceleration
The mass (or inertia) of an organization is an endogenous property of the organization (whether a
firm or a value chain or a nation) that it can design and control. Physical inertia is a function of the size
of the object times its density:
Physical Inertia = Size * Density
In a classic paper on organizational inertia, Hannan and Freeman note that structural inertia is a
function of an organization's age, size and complexity.'17 They also note that inertia is stronger in the
core activities of an organization than in its peripheral activities. One can therefore extend the physical
formulation to organizations where organizational inertia can be thought of as a function of the "size" of
the organization times "density" of the organization:
Organizational Inertia = Size * Density
Size can encompass such parameters as number of employees, number of citizens, etc., but the
more important "fuzzy" parameter is the density. Density defines the quality of the relationships between
the organization's constituents. Some determinants of the density could therefore be hierarchical
structure (e.g. vertical vs. virtual integration), age of organization, etc.
117 Hannan, Michael T., and John Freeman, "Structural Inertia and Organizational Change", American Sociological
Review, Vol. 49, April, 1984, pp. 149-164.
85
Some of the original "classic" works on organizational design theories define inertia as an
"overbounded system""1 or in terms of its synonymous cousin, a "bureaucracy". Child defines
bureaucracy or inertia in a similar way to the above formula:119
Organizational Inertia = Size * Degree of Complexity
In this formulation, size and complexity can be described as variables of "vertical span" and "horizontal
span" respectively as shown in figure 2.29 below, and defined by the following synonymous formula:
Organizational Inertia = Degree of Decentralization * Degree of Formalization
Figure 2.29: Enterprise Inertia
1 , a 0
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More recent work defines organizational inertia as being "cultural"120. Foster and Kaplan of
McKinsey define inertia or "cultural lock-in" as follows12 :
"18 Alderfer C., "Consulting to Underbounded Systems," A dvances in Experiential Social Processes, Vol. 2, London
1980, Chapter 11.
" 9 Child, J. (1973). "Predicting and understanding organizational structure", A dministrative Science Quarterly, 18,
pp. 168-185.
120 Pankaj Ghemnawat, Commitment: The Dynamic ofStrategy, 1991, pp. 23-25.
11Creative Destruction, Richard Foster and Sarah Kaplan, 2001, pg. 16.
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"Cultural lock-in - the inability to change the corporate culture even in the face of clear
market threats... results from the gradual stiffening of the invisible architecture of the
corporation, and the ossification of its decision making abilities, control systems, and
mental models. It dampens a company's ability to innovate or to shed operations with a
less-excitingfuture."
It is interesting to note that Foster and Kaplan use the other two terms of dynamic forces
(stiffness and damping) to define the third force (inertia). They further define the cause of inertia being
three general fears - cannibalization of important product lines, channel conflict with important customers
and earnings dilution that might result from a strategic acquisition. 22 Researchers at Stanford University
have also defined inertia in terms of an organization's complexity and opacity123 and in fact, the notion
has appeared in the popular business press in books like MacKenzie's Orbiting the Giant Hairball.124
The second part of Newton's equation, "acceleration" defines the "force field" within which the
mass or organization moves. This is an exogenous property of the environment, however, I will discuss
how it too can be designed and controlled. What does "acceleration" mean to a business manager? What
notion does it conjure up to a CEO that is intuitive and in language that is meaningful to her? The answer
is possibly simpler that one would expect. This "force field", this "pull of gravity" that brought the
falling apple onto Newton's head, is actually the "force of competition" in the business world - which too
can be calculated from Newton's laws. 2 1
Newton's second law of motion, which defines the motion of the pendulum and the oscillation of
the building undergoing an earthquake can be generalized to cover even more amazing dynamics -
namely the motions of the heavens, the orbits of the moon around the earth and the earth around the sun
(see figure 2.30 below) 26
122 Ibid, pg. 17.
123 "Structural Inertia and Organizational Change", Michael T. Hannan, Laszlo Polos, and Glenn R. Carroll,
Research Paper No. 1734, April 2002.
12 4 MacKenzie, Gordon Orbiting the Giant Hairball: A Corporate Fool's Guide to Surviving with Grace, 1998.
121 Others have also supported this insight including: "Understanding the Home Market Effect and the Gravity
Equation: The Role of Differentiating Goods", Robert C. Feenstra, James A. Markusen and Andrew Rose, No. 6804
in National Bureau of Economic Research Working Papers, 1998. Richard Koch, The Natural Law ofBusiness,
2000, pg. 119.
126 MiroWski (1989) notes that this use of physical metaphor of celestial bodies in the unification of physics and
economics was already discussed in Walras' 1909 article, "Economique et Mechanique".
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Figure 2.30: The Pull of Gravity - The Force of Competition
Newton's Second Law of Motion can be written in its more general form called the "Law of
Universal Gravitation":
Fgravity = G (mi*m 2)
r2
Now I have explicitly defined two masses, in, and In2 : ranging from Newton's tiny apple vs. the
massive earth to the tiny Apple Computer company (of the 1980s) vs. the massive IBM (of the same time).
The second and more important parameter is the distance between the two bodies, or more
accurately, the square of the distance between the two bodies, r2. In business terms, this could be the
distance in "market space", between two firm's products or services. This market space could be defined
using micro-economic definitions of "cross-price elasticity of demand" . In other words, the closer you
get to a rival's product offering, the more intense the competition, the lower the potential profits. If you
offer the same product in the same space as a large established competitor (who enjoys economies of
scale and possibly network externalities), you will get pulled into it, crashing like a comet to its surface.
In the limit, an uncontrolled monopolist is like a "black hole" with infinite gravity where nothing escapes
its pull. Conversely, supernormal profits can be earned out in "deep market space" where you are far
from competitor's offerings, essentially offering niche, differentiated products. Figure 2.31 below
illustrates an organization's "profit trajectory" is unbounded to grow in deep space (that is away from and
unaffected by competitors). However the pull of competition, like the pull of gravity, "bends" space and
depresses profits.
27 Microeconomics, Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2001, pg. 32-33.
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Figure 2.31: The Acceleration of Competition
Profit "Deep Space"
Traj ctory (No Competition)
mpe Space
(or Time)
This "Law of Universal Competition" (as it might be called) therefore states that distance and
relative mass (= size*density) are both important, but distance is the biggest lever to success. Therefore,
although this force field is exogenous to your enterprise or organization, one can design strategies that
chart the path, orbit or trajectory of one's organization to maximize profits in the face of competition.
Now I can re-integrate our concept of clockspeed within the context of a field of gravitation or
competition, and plot a spectrum of enterprise on our "enterprise response spectra". If we recall the
natural period (of either a pendulum in the earth's gravity field, or of a celestial body in space is equal to:
T, = 27 (length of string/gravity)
It is clear therefore that as the strength of the gravity field defines clockspeed, so the strength of
the competitive space defines clockspeed. In other words, the speed of oscillation of your enterprise is a
function of the relative mass or your enterprise, as well as the distance you are to your competitors. This
is shown in figure 2.32 below. Note that as an approximation, I conjecture that profitability is afunction
of the inverse of the degree of competition. As we can see, the keys to profitability lie in the extremes of
the spectrum.
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Figure 2.32: "Spectral" Competition
Profitability =
- - -
-
1/Competition
Degree of
Competition
Period
Fast Clockspeed
"Black Hole"
Medium Clockspeed
0
00
Q
0
Slow Clockspeed
0O 0----------00
"Deep Space"
At the right, small niche players subject to distant competitors create a weak gravity/competition
field like deep space (slow clockspeed environment on the right of the figure) where supernormal profits
can be earned. But a note of caution - as you earn supernormal profits in deep space, you are likely to
expand by collecting more mass (as you pull-in asteroids through mergers & acquisitions), which in turn
attracts other larger competitors into your lucrative space, increasing the gravity of competition and
depressing the profitability profile. The business world therefore actually mimics the "big bang" of the
universe. The forces of profitability seek expansion into deep space, and yet the same forces cause the
accumulation of mass, the attraction of competitors, the reduction of distance, the increase of competition,
the depression of profits (towards commodity status) and the final collapse of the universe. To quote the
American poet, T. S. Elliot2 , "... This is the way the world ends, not with a bang but a whimper."
Further to the left, as either competitors get more massive, or closer or both, clockspeeds
increase, the amount of competition increases and the profitability decreases. One would expect this
trend to increase without limit (and in fact, it may), however, like all dynamic systems, competition would
128 "The Hollow Men", T.S. Elliot, 1925.
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tend to fall off settling in on the commodity equilibrium. In the limit, as fewer and fewer larger
competitors dominate, the resulting oligopoly (or monopoly) makes supernormal profits possible without
exogenous control forces like anti-trust legislation. In reality, without these controls, the world would end
with a supernova bang.
2.8 Reactivity: Dynamic Property #2
Having defined Inertia and Competition, it is now time to turn briefly to the other part of the
clockspeed equation, Reactivity and Demand. Let's first focus on "reactivity" which is defined by
Newton's third law of motion: "for every action, there is an equal an opposite reaction". In this case I am
also interested in how far the system moved when the action was applied.
F = kD
Spring Force = stiffness * displacement
Again, the stiffness (or reactivity) of an organization is an endogenous property of the
organization, (whether a firm or a value chain or a nation) which it can design and control. Value Chain
Reactivity (like physical stiffness) is a function of the properties of the organization
What is rather interesting is that Newton's "Law of Universal Gravitation" was extended many
years later to apply to much larger forces acting over very small distances, like those inside atoms. The
Law of Electromagnetism is therefore very similar to Newton's law:
Feiecticity = k (Q1*Q-)
r2
This law explains how a spring coils back as electrical charges over very small distances oscillate.
In the enterprise metaphor, these small but strong forces that cause reactivity can be described in the
speed at which information and materials flow throughout the enterprise. As an enterprise is a system
with time connecting all the parts, removing such delays forms the basis of "time-based competition"12 9
where direct and responsive links between all customers and suppliers all along the value chain, as well as
129 "Time - The Next Source of Competitive Advantage", George Stalk Jr. Harvard Business Review, July-August
1988.
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minimizing inventory and using just-in-time methods cause a shortening of the supply line. In the
pendulum metaphor, this is equivalent to shortening the string. Recall, when the string is shortened, the
clockspeed increases. Companies like Toyota, Southwest Airlines and Dell metaphorically have "short
strings" (or short delays in their value chains) which means that they are very reactive to customer
demands.
2.9 Responsiveness: Dynamic Property #3
Having defined Inertia and Reactivity, the two parameters that define clockspeed, it is time to
briefly discuss the third of the dynamic forces on an enterprise that is the "friction" in the enterprise that
is responsible for bringing the enterprise to stop oscillating over time. It is known as the Damping Force
or Responsiveness.
F = cV
Damping Force = viscosity * velocity
Again, the viscosity (or responsiveness) of an organization is an endogenous property of the
organization, (whether a firm or a value chain or a nation) which it can design and control! Customer
Responsiveness (like physical viscosity) is a function of the properties of the organization and its
immediate environment. In the pendulum example, viscosity or responsiveness is analogous to the
medium through which the pendulum oscillates whether it is air (in which the pendulum swings for a long
time) or whether it is water or oil (in which case the pendulum motion comes to rest more quickly) as
shown in figure 2.33 below.
Figure 2.33: The Effects of Viscosity (Responsiveness) on a Dynamic Enterprise
Friction
Friction ( eqwater)
(e.g. air)
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The underlying physics of the damped pendulum is the addition of another balancing loop (a
"minor" loop130 ) to the primary pendulum balancing loop as shown in figure 2.34 below. This additional
131
loop (shown in blue) acts to drain velocity away from the system
The speed at which the system comes to equilibrium depends on the system's degree of damping,
which is governed by the damping factor (or time delay). The smaller the time delay, the faster the
system comes to rest. In the case shown below, balancing loop B1 is stronger than balancing loop B2 as
the response is oscillatory and the system is under-damped.
Figure 2.34: Underlying Physics of the Damped Pendulum
Structural Dynamics Model System Dynamics Model
Change in
Damping Position
(e g water)
Change in Velocity
Gap (Acceleration)
Desired Length of Graviy Damping Factor,
Position Pendulum Rod (constant),, (Time Delay)/
(constant) (constant) Damping
Stiffness Mass Increases
as Delay
Time Decreases?
Note under-damped. therefore B, is stronger than B2
Management policies that delay response or average information over time have the effect of
reducing variation and therefore reducing oscillation of the enterprise. This will be discussed later 2.
30 
"Principles on the Relationship Between Structure and Behavior of Dynamic Systems", Alan K. Graham, MIT
PhD thesis, 1977.
131 "Properties of Damped Oscillations", Helen Zhu, MIT System Dynamics in Education Project, document D-47-
67, June 3, 1998.
132 "Generic Structures: Exponential Smoothing", Kevin M. Stange, MIT System Dynamics in Education Project,
document D-4782, 1999.
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Finally, before we leave the topic of damping, one might note that enterprise damping has a
frequency-dependence which can be expressed in linear combinations of mass and stiffness as shown in
figure 2.35 below.
Figure 2.35: Mass & Stiffliess Proportional Damping
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As the damping mechanism is seen to be a feedback loop connecting a stock (i.e. inertia) with an
outflow controlled by a time constant (i.e. stiffhess), it is clear that damping can be expressed as mass-
proportional, stiffness-proportional or any linear combination of these two (e.g. Rayleigh damping).133
133 For a more detailed description of the formulations of damping, see Chopra, pp. 418-419.
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Recall that the two "states" which define the dynamics of the pendulum are velocity and position,
therefore the "state-space" diagram for an undamped pendulum is a circle, while the state-space diagram
for the damped pendulum is a spiral as shown in figure 2.36 below.
Figure 2.36: State-Space Diagram of the Damped Enterprise
Having defined the three structural properties of enterprises (inertia, damping and reactivity) as
well as the three response quantities or state variables (displacement, velocity and acceleration), we can
now summarize them on the pendulum archetype in figure 2.37 below.
Figure 2.37: Summary of Three State Variables and Three Structural Properties
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2.10 Strength & Toughness: Dynamic Properties # 4 & 5
The three primary dynamic properties of organizations (inertia, responsiveness and reactivity) are
those required to describe the dynamics of enterprises that are confined to the linear range of response.
However, often in the real world, organizations have finite capacities, and thus exceedance of these
properties leads to nonlinear behavior.
The fourth dynamic property of enterprises, which applies only in the nonlinear range, is
enterprise strength (or "carrying capacity" in system dynamics parlance). The most obvious example of
organizational capacity is a manufacturing firm's production capacity, which will be discussed and
explored in more detail in chapter 3.
Enterprise strength is intimately connected with the linear dynamic properties of reactivity
(stiffhess) and responsiveness (damping). As shown in figure 2.38 below, the exceedance of enterprise
strength has two effects: decreasing the effective enterprise reactivity (stiffhess) and decreasing the
effective enterprise responsiveness (increasing the effective damping). The effective damping is the area
(in yellow) under the force-displacement curve, also known as enterprise hysteresis. This hysteretic
damping supplements the linear damping that exists in the system.
Figure 2.38: Enterprise Strength and Effective Enterprise Stiffness and Damping
Force
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Linear
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The notion of the exceedance of strength (or capacity) without collapse reveals another enterprise
property: enterprise toughness (or ductility). Toughness is the ability to deform inelastically without
collapse. As shown in figure 2.39 below, it is the ratio between the ultimate displacement and the linear
elastic displacement at strength. It is interesting to note that enterprise strength and toughness are
important properties that define how cost-effective an enterprise is. This will be discussed further in
chapter 9.
Figure 2.39: Enterprise Toughness
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Finally, it is interesting to note that enterprise strength is synonymous with enterprise carrying
capacity. If the carrying capacity is exceeded, and secondary effects take over, the result can be
"overshoot and collapse". As shown below in figure 2.40, both strength and toughness are needed to
define the potential for collapse. 34 These concepts are both rooted in the physics of structural dynamics
as well as in system dynamics as demonstrated in socio-environmental systems like the earth's natural
carrying capacity."'
"34 When loading is near-static, toughness does little to help prevent collapse, based on the ratio of tdTn. However,
when loading is dynamic, toughness is an essential property for economic enterprise performance.
135 World Dynamics, Jay W. Forrester, 1971, and Limits to Growth, Meadows et al., 1972.
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Figure 2.40: Enterprise Strength and Toughness Prevent Collapse
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To summarize this chapter so far, we have demonstrated that the dynamic response of an
enterprise is dependant upon two things:
" the clockspeed of the enterprise relative to the clockspeed of the environment (as introduced by
the concept of the response spectrum), and
" the strength (or carrying capacity) and toughness of the enterprise. 136
We will next extend the concept of an enterprise response spectrum (which illustrates the
relationship between enterprise & environment dynamics) to include the effects of relative strength of the
enterprise relative to the environmental demands.
136Note that strength and ductility are important quantities in quantifying the dynamic response of structures to
earthquakes (response spectra) and blast loading (shock spectra).
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2.11 Strength-Modified Enterprise Response Spectra
A strength-modified response spectrum is a response spectrum which takes into account the finite
carrying capacity of most enterprises. In essence, we are modifying the previously discussed linear
elastic response spectra by factors which are a function of their ability to deform inelastically without
collapse. As discussed above, exceedance of the finite enterprise capacity creates an enterprise with
lower effective stiffness and higher effective damping. On our linear response spectrum, this equivalent
to a shift in enterprise response to the right and downward respectively as shown in figure 2.41 below.
Figure 2.41: Strength-Modified Enterprise Response Spectra
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Preliminary parametric studies on the system dynamics model with varying period and varying
degrees of capacity appears to reveal the following trend:
* For short-period enterprises (relative to the forcing period), production is conserved.
" For intermediate-period enterprises (relative to the forcing period), energy is conserved
(i.e. the difference between the areas under the linear and nonlinear curves).
* For long-period enterprises (relative to the forcing period), orders are conserved.
These three heuristics (shown in figure 2.42 below) were derived from the field of nonlinear
structural dynamics taken from earthquake engineering.1 17
137 Naftn Newmark and Emilio Rosenbleuth, Fundamentals ofEarthquake Engineering, 1971.
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Figure 2.42: Newmark's Method for Constructing Nonlinear Response Spectra
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e.g. for a structure with a ductility (R) = 4, the force reduction factors (R) are:
R = 1 R = 421 = 2.5 R= = 4
These application of these heuristics for force reductions on nonlinear spectra are shown below in
figure 2.43.
Figure 2.43: Strength-Modified Reductions for Enterprise Response Spectra
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2.12 The Mechanics of Time, Delays and Time-Based Competition
We will conclude the theoretical part of "Physics 101" by discussing the mechanics of time.
Managing dynamic complexity is essentially about mastering an enterprise's most precious commodity,
time. This is a difficult and challenging task, as time (or delay) is hiding in almost every technical or
physical aspect of an enterprise and more importantly in almost every social or behavioral aspect of an
enterprise. What makes it more difficult is that time (or delay) is sometimes harmful to an enterprise's
competitive advantage, and sometimes it is helpful. As Sterman notes: "Some delays breed danger by
creating instability & oscillation. Others provide a clearer light by filtering out unwanted variability and
allowing managers to separate signals from noise. ""'
In the discussion that follows, I attempt to uncover the nature of delays in socio-technical systems
using both the system dynamics and structural dynamics methodologies.
139 I begin by exploring three
simple structures shown in figure 2.44 below and identifying the dynamic components of each. (Note that
inertia is shown in blue, stiffness is shown in red and damping is shown in green.)
Figure 2.44: Impact of Delays on Mass, Stiffness and Damping
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138 John Sterman, Business Dynamics, pg. 409.
139 Much inspiration for this endeavor is taken from Forrester's Principles ofSystems, 1968.
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The top part of the figure shows a simple one stock, one loop system with a balancing loop
controlling the inflow. This type of behavior leads to goal-seeking growth. Using a physical analogy, it
is like a ball rolling down a hill in a very viscous environment (like molasses). The time delay defines the
"stiffness" or severity of the growth curve. As there is no overshoot or oscillation, the system contains a
lot of damping - in fact (as the system eventually attains its growth goal), it is "critically damped".
In order to produce oscillatory behavior, we need to introduce another piece of structure into the
main balancing loop. As we know that oscillation arises from a delay on a balancing loop, we must
introduce a delay structure which can be seen in the middle part of the figure as an additional stock and
outflow. We now have a two-stock, one loop system. Note that the response now has a clear periodicity
- which we defined before as being a function of both inertia and stiffness. Therefore we know that we
must have introduced both a "piece" of inertia as well as a "piece" of flexibility (which is the inverse of
stiffness). As is shown in the figure, the inertia is actually the stock and the flexibility is actually the time
controlling the outflow. To be clear, the new inertia is not actually due to the existence of a new stock
(i.e. metaphorically a new bathtub), but more correctly the amount of material or information (i.e. water)
in the bathtub. So when Sterman notes that, "delays give systems inertia"1 , he means more precisely
that delay structures give systems inertia. Delays themselves give systems reduced stiffness (i.e.
flexibility) and stocks of material or information give systems inertia. Together, the two (stocks and
associated controlling time delays) give systems their inertia and flexibility and therefore their periodicity.
Finally note that we have gone from critically damped behavior to completely undamped behavior.
In order to produce damped oscillation, we must add a second minor loop on the outflow. As
shown in the bottom portion of the figure, we now have a two-stock, two-loop system. Damping is
actually a smooth on the outflow of the delay. Note that we now go from undamped to underdamped
behavior.
140 John Sterman, Business Dynamics, pg. 423.
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To summarize therefore, time (the governing mechanism controlling rates) is the source of two
enterprise properties: enterprise stiffness (or reactivity) and enterprise damping (or responsiveness).
Stocks (e.g. material, information or perceptions) are the source of enterprise inertia. Delay structures
involve the addition of a stock with an outflow controlled by a delay time. The stock (of the delay
structure) therefore gives the system inertia or memory, while the delay time (of the delay structure) gives
the system flexibility or possibility damping. Returning to Sterman's observation about the
"schizophrenic" nature of delays, we can now add some more clarity: "Some delays breed danger by
creating instability & oscillation (i.e. by reducing stiffness like adding to a pendulum's length). Others
provide a clearer light by filtering out unwanted variability and allowing managers to separate signals
from noise (i.e. by adding damping)." See figure 2.45 below.
Figure 2.45: Enterprise "Mechanics of Materials"
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The management application of this theory of the mechanics of time became known as "time-
based competition". 14 1 In the late 1980s, Boston Consulting Group's George Stalk took Forrester's 1961
work on Industrial Dynamics to note one of the reasons why Japanese companies were so dominant. He
141 Stalk Jr. G., "Time: The Next Source of Competitive Advantage," Harvard Business Review, July-August 1988,
pp. 41-51.
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observed that they took an integrated view of the system or enterprise, and reduced the consumption of
time throughout the system. By focusing on the delays in the system, Stalk was exploring only one of the
dynamic structural properties, the stiffress or reactivity. He noted that by removing the delays, one could
shorten the pendulum length, speed up the clockspeed and gain competitive advantage.
While this is an important observation, it does not present a complete picture of the full dynamics
of the problem - i.e. it considers only the dynamics of the enterprise and not that of the environment. As
shown in figure 2.46 below, depending on where the enterprise is on the response spectrum (i.e. where its
dynamics lie relative to the dynamics of its environment), delays can either give rise to oscillations (for
short-period enterprises) or they can reduce oscillations (for long-period enterprises).
Figure 2.46: The "Relativity" of Time
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For example, we must explain why Airbus has become such a formidable competitor to Boeing,
when its strategy does not explicitly embrace time-based competition via the compression of delays, but
conversely by slowing down its clockspeed via the increase of enterprise inertia. This will be discussed in
later chapters. 14 2
142 A more detailed discussion of delays is given in Appendix C.
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2.13 Enterprise Physics Example: Decision Dynamics
I will now briefly examine a few management insights attempting to capture some or all of the
concepts of enterprise physics. I begin with an exploration of the dynamic effects of delays in managerial
decision-making.
When changes are presented to management, like a change in customer demand for products,
there are delays in management's ability (or desire) to make decisions on these changes. Delays therefore
slow things down, increasing an enterprise's clockspeed. The question remains, are these delays a
function of an enterprise's inertia, responsiveness or reactivity? The answer is: all of these.
As Sterman notes, these delays give rise to inertia in the enterprise. 143 Forrester demonstrates
that the way in which a delay is represented (either as a single stock or as a series of multiple stocks)
impacts the amount of high-frequency damping exists in a system.144 See Appendix C for a further
description of this. Finally, the delay obviously injects a static time offset, and therefore reduces the
enterprise stiffness or reactivity. Figure 2.47 below summarizes the dynamics embedded in the
representation of delays.
Figure 2.47: The Physics of Decision Dynamics
Fast to React Slow to React
Slow to Respond (damped) Fast to Respond (undamped)
Input = Actual Demand Input = Actual Demand
edo ~ I t Orderso1 Odr 69Pipeline
6 0
Time Time
143 Sterman, John, Business Dynamics, 2000, pp. 423.
144 Forrester, Jay, Industrial Dynamics, 1961, pp. 419.
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2.14 Enterprise Physics Example: Mass(ive) Production
Next, we will examine the notion of "mass" production - a term used to characterize a dominant
microeconomic industrial strategy in the U.S. in the majority of the 20' century, but also playfully, a term
that uses the inertial force (or mass) to describe its underlying dynamics. The term "mass" production
was originally intended to relate that production was for the "masses" of people, and was therefore
created in "mass" quantities. It is an interesting linguistic coincidence to note that the physics of "mass"
production is largely based on the fact that the enterprise structure has large amounts of inertial "mass".
A review of figure 2.48 below shows a comparison of U.S. mass production-style with Japanese
lean production-style outputs in the global automotive industry. I will reiterate and expand on a few of
the points made by the original researchers. 1 45
Figure 2.48: The Dynamics of Mass(ive) Production
20-
Undamped Damped Japan
15-- Pendulum Pendulum
0
0
0
5
1947 1954 1961 1968 1975 1982 1989
Year
145 Womack, Jones & Roos, The Machine That Changed the World, The Free Press, 1990, pp. 246-250.
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"Westerners are resigned to the idea of the business cycle. Like gravity, its simply there,
although no on quite knows why... Mass production is, in fact, a system ideally suited to the survival of
large enterprises in a highly cyclical economy. Both workers and suppliers are considered variable
costs. When the market goes down, the assembler companies jettison their human and organizational
ballast and expect to find their workers and suppliers pretty much where they left them once conditions
improve."
A General Motors executive, was reported as commenting on the data in figure 2.48:
"When the Japanese [meaning lean] producers encounter these gigantic market waves, they will
quickly become as mediocre as we are. They will have to start hiring and firing workers along with
suppliers and will end up as mass-producers in short order."
The researchers go on to conjecture:
"... widespread adoption of lean production may dampen both inflation and the business cycle. If
mass production is ideally suited to the survival of big companies through deep cycles in demand, it may
also be cycle-enhancing. That is, its penchant for massive inventories, both of in-process parts and
finished units, would seem to exacerbate the cycle: As inflation builds, stocks are built up against
expectations ofyet higher prices. This move pushes prices up farther. Then, when the economy suddenly
falters, the built-up stocks are worked off deepening the slump upstream in the production system.
Some observers have even wondered if the lack of a cyclical market in durable goods in Japan is
a direct result of lean production: an inventoryless, highly-flexible system may signficantly damp
cyclicality.
The Japanese have another cycle damper in their arsenal in the form offlexible compensation.
Most employees at all levels in Japanese companies receive a large part of their compensation - up to a
third - in the form of bonuses are directly tied to the profitability of the company. So when a market
drops, at least in theory, the company can dramatically slash prices due to lower operating costs and
restore production to its former level.
These observations can shed some light on the underlying dynamics of each system. For
example, mass production is like an undamped pendulum with a larger mass and shorter (less flexible)
length which can produce a faster clockspeed than lean production, as is evidenced by the five year
business cycle periodicity. The absence of a period of oscillation in lean production is possibly due to a
combination of the above-mentioned highly-damped, more-flexible (longer length) and less massive
pendulum. The massive mass production pendulum swings with rapid, powerful oscillations, while the
lean production pendulum swings with slower, controlled movements.
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2.15 Enterprise Physics Example: Value Chain Reengineering
By way of another quick example, I will use the laws of enterprise physics to demonstrate that
Business Process Reengineering' can have the simple effect of increasing the enterprise's clockspeed -
which by definition makes it more competitive. Business Process Reengineering "obliterates" value
chains by disaggregating mass from vertical functional silo-based organizations into less massive, value
streams focused on a customer and a specific product/service offering. In addition, it eliminates Non-
Value Added activities that act to shorten the supply line, in effect stiffening up the pendulum by making
the string shorter. Both the reduction of inertia and the increasing of reactivity work to increase the
organization's clockspeed. Figure 2.49 below illustrates schematically how reengineering works.
Figure 2.49: Dynamics of Reengineering the Enterprise
lue Chain
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2.16 Enterprise Physics Example: The Machines that Changed the World
Having laid out the basic "laws" of enterprise physics, one can then assemble an example matrix
of industries having differing clockspeeds and investigate the dynamics of their responses to various
inputs. Consider for example, three technological artifacts that have shaped economic development over
the past century: the airplane, the automobile and the computer as shown in figure 2.50 below.
46 Reengineering the Corporation: A Manifesto for Business Revolution, Michael Hammer and James Champy,
1993.
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Figure 2.50: The Machines that Changed the World
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One could estimate the clockspeeds of each industry, and Fine 47 has proposed a disaggregation
of industry into its product technology, process technology and organizational clockspeeds as shown in
figure 2.51 below.
Figure 2.51: Clockspeeds of The Machines that Changed the World
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147 Charles H. Fine, appendix to Clockspeed: Winning Industry Control in the Age of Temporary Advantage, 1998,
pg. 239.
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Finally, one could plot these clockspeeds on a typical macroeconomic design spectrum in order to
observe the relative maximum responses of each industry to a dynamic input like the five year business
cycle as shown schematically in figure 2.52 below.
Figure 2.52: Response of The Machines that Changed the World
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2.17 Enterprise Heuristics
Now that I have defined some of the key dynamic "laws" of enterprise physics, we can now
develop insights, or heuristics (or "meta-laws") that govern the behavior of enterprises. For example:
Just because you are in a slow clockspeed industry,
does not mean that you can behave slowly.
What is embedded in the equation of organizational clockspeed is the recognition that a lot of
organizational inertia creates a slow clockspeed, however it for this very reason that if you want to move
that organization, you must begin now with a slow but sustained force. If you wait and then try to push
all at once, the required force will be too large.
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A follow-up enterprise heuristic arises from the definition of an enterprise design spectrum as
discussed in section 2.5:
An enterprise's clockspeed is an endogenous, controllable quantity.
A SWOT analysis1 " reveals that a firm's performance is a function of both its external
(exogenous) environment in the form of opportunities and threats as well as its internal (endogenous) core
capabilities in the form of its strengths and weaknesses. This is represented graphically as shown in
figure 2.53 below as the shape of a response spectrum is governed largely by its external environment,
while the horizontal position along the response spectrum is governed by the internal core capabilities,
namely inertia and reactivity.
Figure 2.53: SWOT and the Enterprise Response Spectrum
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148 SWOT (which stands for Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) is a strategic model to frame a
firm's competitive position.
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2.18 Chapter Summary
This chapter introduced the physics underlying an enterprise's dynamics. Learning by analogy
from the dynamics of a simple pendulum, we extended this generic structure to understand the dynamic
behavior of other human enterprises.
We then examined the three forces (mass, damping and stiffness) that act on any physical
enterprise, from which we then derived the equation of the enterprise's clockspeed, finally drawing
analogy to the clockspeed of human organizations.
Having defined this clockspeed, or enterprise natural period of oscillation, we then introduced the
concept of a rapid design and visualization tool, called an "enterprise response spectrum" which allowed
us to quickly develop intuition about the dynamic behavior of an enterprise based on the relative
clockspeed between it and the supporting structure.
We then began to explore the possible extensions of the three physical forces to human
organizations being: corporate inertia, value chain reactivity and customer responsiveness. Finally, we
postulated some meta-laws or heuristics that could lead to the future design of enterprises.
Having covered the fundamentals of enterprise physics in this chapter, in the next chapter we will
study a classic enterprise "structure", namely an industrial production-distribution enterprise which is
represented as a three-story building being shaken in an earthquake. This will allow us to use the
concepts of enterprise clockspeed and response spectrum that we developed in this chapter to understand
the dynamic response of a well-known enterprise.
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Chapter 3: The Dynamics of Value Chains
The primary focus of this chapter is to explore the fundamental dynamics of a typical enterprise.
Later in chapter 9, we will discuss how an enterprise might achieve high-performance using "Lean"
enterprise principles. Therefore, I briefly introduce here the important Lean concept of "stability" in
order to be aware of the causes of enterprise oscillations. As we perform experiments on the enterprise,
we should begin to think about strategies and policies to mitigate such instabilities.
3.1 Enterprise Description
I will now run a series of dynamic experiments on the three-degree of freedom enterprise shown
below in figure 3.1, which represents a typical enterprise value chain. This is the original "classic"
production-distribution model that Jay Forrester used in 1961 to demonstrate the field of system
dynamicsi4.
Figure 3.1: Three-Degree of Freedom Enterprise Model
Factory
-0~ -0
3 CL
0
Demand Input,
Like a three-story building being shaken by a horizontal earthquake ground motion, the
production-distribution model can be thought of as a three degree-of-freedom system that has three
sectors consisting of retailer, distributor and manufacturer. Within each sector (i.e. each colored sphere),
149 Industrial Dynamics, Jay Forrester, 1961, pg. 137-186.
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there is a complex internal structure of material and information flow interconnected by decision rules. In
system dynamics language, each sector has 5-6 stocks (or state variables) representing the state of the
system. The details of each sector of the structural and system dynamics model are shown below in
figures 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 representing the details of the retailer, the manufacturer and the distributor
respectively. In each figure, the sphere on the left represents schematically the main stocks (illustrated as
bathtubs) of each sector, while the sphere on the right shows the details of the flows of material,
information and decisions in the system dynamics formulation, with the stocks (or bathtubs) now shown
as shaded rectangles. The system dynamics models for each of the three sectors have largely the same
structure and mathematical formulation. There are a total of over 70 equations in the system dynamics
model. The equations for the Vensim model are reproduced in Appendix F"".
Figure 3.2: Retailer Stock & Flow Models (left: schematic; right: system dynamics)
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I
"0 Special thanks to Tom Fiddaman of Vensim for reproducing the details of the Vensim model of Jay Forrester's
Industrial Dynamics Model.
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Figure 3.3: Factory Stock and Flow Models (left: schematic; right: system dynamics)
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Figure 3.4: Distributor Stock & Flow Models (left: schematic; right: system dynamics)
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3.2 Enterprise Natural Period of Oscillation
First, I will subject the enterprise to a random noise signal and monitor the inherent dynamics
embedded in the enterprise. From Figure 3.5 below, we can observe first hand the nature of the "bull-
whip". The blue, red and black lines corresponding to the orders for the retailer, distributor and
manufacturer are each larger in amplitude, signifying that the orders are being amplified up the value
chain, just like a building's top floor moves more that its lower floors when subjected to an earthquake. I
also note that there is a phase shift (or a delay) from the black line to the gray line that indicates the
manufacturing lead-time in the factory from orders received to products delivered.
Finally, and most importantly, one can observe the clockspeed or natural period of vibration of
this enterprise as the random noise causes the system to react in the dynamic way that it naturally wants
to. This enterprise has a natural period of vibration of about 26 weeks or one half year.
Figure 3.5: Enterprise Natural Period of Vibration (from Random Noise)
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Manufacturing Orders into Factory units/week
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3.3 Demand Amplification along the Supply Chain
From figure 3.5 above, we can see that there is a demand amplification as you move further up
the supply chain, that is as you move from customer to retailer to distributor to manufacturer. This
demand amplification is shown in figure 3.6 below. This phenomenon is well-documented 5 1' 1 2 and in
fact various management simulations like "the Beer Game" have been developed to demonstrate this
effect'53 ,1 4 . Recently Fine noted that this bull-whip effect is a characteristic of a "fulfillment" supply
chain, as distinct from "technology" and "architecture" supply chains"5 .
Figure 3.6: Demand Amplification Along the Value Chain - "the Bullwhip Effect". (source: Fine)
Increasing Demand Amplitude (Volatility)
Output: Product Flow
User Buyer Channel Firm Supplier Equipment
Value Chain Value Chain Value Chain Value Chain Value Chain Value Chain
Input: Information Flow
3.4 Developing Enterprise Response Spectra
From this model, we can begin to derive the Enterprise Response Spectrum - the concept that we
introduced in section 2.5. In the following four analyses, I subjected our "26-week period" enterprise to
four different dynamic customer demand sinusoidal inputs: 13-week period, 26-week period (matching
the enterprise period), 52-week period and 104-week period. The results are shown in figure 3.7 below.
" Industrial Dynamics, Jay Forrester, 1961.
152 Business Dynamics, John Sterman, 2001.
'5' The Fifth Discipline, Peter Senge, 1990.
154 Business Dynamics, John Sterman, 2001.
155 Clockspeed, Charles Fine, 1998.
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Figure 3.7:
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Note that for each case, one can plot the maximum "bullwhip amplification", or Dynamic
Amplification Factor (DAF) defined as the ratio between the peak customer amplitude (i.e. "the ground"
in the building metaphor) and the manufacturer (i.e. "the roof' in the building metaphor). Note that when
the forcing period of 13 weeks is faster than the 26-week enterprise period, (i.e. the structure behaves as if
it were slow clockspeed) then the maximum amplification is only 1.3. What is happening is that the
customer demand is changing so rapidly that the enterprise does not have time to adjust resulting in small
waves being sent up the value chain. This is called "hyper-dynamic" response.
When the forcing period begins to slow down to 26 to 52 weeks (i.e. the structure behaves as if it
were medium clockspeed), it starts to go into resonance with the enterprise's own inherent dynamics.
This causes the maximum amplification of approximately 2.0. This is called resonant dynamic response -
the bullwhip is in full effect. Note as an aside, if this enterprise were in an annual or bi-annual
seasonal/cyclical business (like the construction industry) then the enterprise would be in a perpetually
bad state, unless it designed its dynamics to lie outside the seasonal cycles - more on that later.
Finally, when the forcing period begins to slow down much further to say 104 weeks (i.e. the
structure behaves as if it were fast clockspeed), it doesn't even create dynamic energy, and the enterprise
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moves with the customer demand signal as if it were a static problem. This causes the maximum dynamic
amplification to approach 1.0 in the limit.
When I plot these four points and fit them to a curve, I have created an enterprise response
spectrum, which managers and designers can then refer to and make decisions on without having to run
expensive, time-consuming analyses. Another name for such curves in the engineering and physics world
are "transmissibility curves", which we will continue to discuss below in the context of enterprise
damping (or responsiveness).
3.5 Determining Enterprise Damping
One can now estimate the amount of damping inherent in such a complex human enterprise.
Figure 3.8 below plots the enterprise response spectra for the production-distribution system that we are
studying having differing amounts of damping (or responsiveness).
Figure 3.8:
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From this I first note that the green line and green shaded area shown above in figure 3.8 is the
same as that shown in figure 3.7. We are now merely looking a larger solution space. A simplified
equation for damping is shown in the yellow box in figure 3.8. From this one can calculate that our
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enterprise, which has a natural period of 2 year, also has approximately 25% damping. In order to put it
into perspective, a physical enterprise like a 10 story building shaking in an earthquake has a 1 second
natural period and 2-3% damping. A complex human enterprise therefore moves much more slowly and
much less responsively. In fact, at 25% damping, our value chain has as much damping as an automobile
shock absorber.
Another means to estimate fundamental period of vibration and damping is to shock the
enterprise by hitting its base with a metaphorical hammer. Figure 3.9 below shows a one-time 10%
increase in customer orders, and the response of the enterprise to that shock. The period of vibration
again is about 2 year. Again we see the presence of the bullwhip, and we see the oscillations die down
rapidly due to the large amounts of damping. A second way of estimating the amount of damping is to
observe the amount of decay between successive peaks of the response. This is known in the structural
dynamics literature as "logarithmic decrement". As shown in the yellow box below, the damping is
estimated to be approximately 30% from the logarithmic decrement method.
Figure 3.9: Enterprise Damping (from Logarithmic Decay)
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3.6 Strategy #1: Modifying Enterprise Inertia
Having explored the effects of enterprise amplification, we will now use the three firm
production-distribution model to explore different strategies for designing effective enterprises. We will
look at each modifying each of the three linear dynamic properties in turn: inertia, damping and stiffness,
(in sections 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 respectively) followed by an exploration of the nonlinear dynamic property of
strength or capacity (in section3.9).
One way to explore the effects of enterprise inertia is to remove one of the firms in the
production-distribution chain - for example, by changing Forrester's three-degree of freedom supply
chain 15 6 to a two-degree of freedom enterprise by removing the distributor. Intuitively, the removal of a
link in the chain should increase the enterprise clockspeed - recalling from chapter two the analogy of
bullwhip in which a system with distributed mass and stiffness has a longer natural period of vibration
with longer length. In addition to a modest decrease in natural period of vibration, one would expect a
significant drop in force' 7 which is not a function of relative clockspeed as is evidenced in a response
spectrum but merely a function of total mass. In other words, if F = mA, the force is reduced due to the
direct decrease in mass, not necessarily due to a dynamic reduction in acceleration.
Note in the following analyses, that the forcing function is a sinusoid having a natural period of
one year. As the natural period of vibration of the base case enterprise is less than one year, we are left of
the peak on the elastic response spectrum.
156 Forrester, Jay W., Industrial Dynamics, 1961.
157 In structural engineering vocabulary, "force" is known as "base shear" or force at the base of the enterprise.
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3.7 Strategy #2: Modifying Enterprise Damping
Next, we can examine the effects of modifying enterprise damping. In the production-
distribution system, this is done by modifying the speed of inventory adjustment, i.e. by modifying the
velocity of flow rates through the supply pipeline. In figure 3.10 below, I explore the effects of varying
the inventory adjustment time by a factor of ten times faster and ten times slower than the base case.
Figure 3.10: Effects of Modifying Enterprise Damping
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As expected, speeding up flow rates through the reduction of inventory adjustment times
decreases the damping (shown in red above). Less damping for a given frequency results in
amplification, however, less damping also results in a slight decrease in natural period of vibration, which
for this model results in a reduced amplification.
Conversely, slowing down the flow rates through the increase of inventory adjustment times
increases the damping (shown in blue above). More damping should both slightly increase the natural
period of vibration as well as more importantly decrease the amplification though increased damping.
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3.8 Strategy #3: Modifying Enterprise Stiffness
Finally, we can examine the effects of modifying enterprise stiffness. In the production-
distribution system, this is done by modifying the clerical delays (i.e changing the order handling times).
In figure 3.11 below, I explore the effects of varying the order handling time by a factor of three times
faster and three times slower than the base case.
Figure 3.11: Effects of Modifying Enterprise Stiffness (3x)
1/3 of Base Line Base Line 3 times Base Line
(Faster - Stiffening) (Slower - Softening)
8 les in 200 weeks e6ycles in 200 weeks rycles in 200 weeks
2,000 0 - 4,000
1700 -o
1900
1,000 1,000 1,800
0 0 -400
0 40 80 120 160 200 0 40 80 120 160 200 0 40 80 120 160 200
Time (week) Time (week) Time (week)
RRD: noise~ff ,.,ibA,',k RRD: noiseoff mitswek RRH]: nois"Kf unilo/week
R": noiseoff inits/week RF: noiseoff ito/wek R": noosooff onus/week
HER. noineoff omitsweek HR noisooff uits/weo RR noiseoff omitsweek
RF noinooff ,mit/week S": nwseoff :mO/ SRF noiscoff wit/week
MOF: noiscoff mits/week MOF: noiseoff unt/week MOF: noiseoff uit/wk
1900 -----------------------------------------------
1800 ------------------------------------------ ase
1700 ------------------------------------ Line
b T.
Tno Tfcmig
52 weeks 52 weeks
As expected, stiffening up the enterprise results in a slight reduction in natural period of
vibration, which corresponds in a slight reduction in amplitude (shown in red above). Conversely,
decreasing the stiffness results in a slight increase in the natural period of vibration which corresponds to
a slight increase in amplitude (shown in blue above).
In addition, these effects can be verified by varying the range of enterprise stiffness even further
using factors of ten times on the order handling times as shown in figure 3.12 below.
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Figure 3.12: Effects of Modifying Enterprise Stiffness (lOx)
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Again, stiffening up the enterprise results in a further reduction in natural period of vibration,
which corresponds in a slight reduction in amplitude (shown in red above). Conversely, decreasing the
stiffness results in a further increase in the natural period of vibration which corresponds to a decrease in
amplitude (shown in blue above).
In summary, as shown in figure 3.13 below, enterprise clockspeed can be increased by decreasing
time delays (i.e. supply line length), by decreasing stocks (e.g. inventory accumulation) and by increasing
the velocity of inventory adjustment (i.e. by reducing the time to reduce inventory adjustments).
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Figure 3.13: Summary of Modifying Enterprise Dynamic Properties
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3.9 Strategy #4: Modifying Enterprise Strength
The enterprise under consideration exhibits essentially linear response as can be seen in figure
3.14 below. We can see that the enterprise is oscillating around an equilibrium of 1,000 orders, with the
upper and lower peaks being approximately constant and symmetrical. Note that although the customer
demand (the green line) is only oscillating by +or- 100 units, because of delays in the enterprise, the
orders reach +or- 800 units - and the factory is producing +or- 500 units!
There is an assumption in the model however that is forcing this linear behavior, namely that the
capacity (or strength) of the enterprise to meet any dynamic demand is infinite. This is obviously
unrealistic.
Figure 3.14: Linear Response of Enterprise
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If one limits the capacity of the enterprise at the manufacturer, that is, we "fuse" the system by
installing a constraint we can observe the behavior in figure 3.15 below. In the diagram on the left, the
enterprise has infinite capacity, the period of oscillation is 52 weeks and the maximum amplification is
1.8.
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Figure 3.15: Nonlinear Response (from Capacity Constraint)
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If however, one makes the enterprise weaker and weaker, then by definition, one limits the
amplitude of the oscillation more and more. Note, however that we trade uncertainty in production for
ever-growing backlogs (as shown in the red line). Finally note that the effective period of oscillation
elongates to 60 and 70 weeks as the system gets weaker.
This departure from a fairly regular period of oscillation can be a signal that some portion of the
system has begun to behave in a nonlinear fashion, as was discussed in Chapter 2.
As can be seen in figure 3.16 below, a varying period and/or amplitude may indicate nonlinear
behavior.
Figure 3.16: Nonlinear Period and/or Amplitude Shift.
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An example of a fast clockspeed company softening and increasing its response is shown in
figure 3.17 below. This could arise from a merger or acquisition or if the enterprise's effective stiffness
was decreased through an exceedance of its capacity.
Figure 3.17: Nonlinear Slowing and Increasing
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Conversely, an example of a medium clockspeed company softening and decreasing its response
is shown in figure 3.18 below.
Figure 3.18: Nonlinear Slowing and Decreasing
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Moving in the other direction, one can examine what happens when a slow clockspeed company
stiffens to become a medium clockspeed company, as shown in figure 3.19. This could arise through the
shedding of mass via a divestiture, outsourcing, or simply "leaning up" processes.
Figure 3.19: Nonlinear Speeding up and Increasing
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Finally, one can examine what happens when a medium clockspeed company stiffens to become
a fast clockspeed company as shown in figure 3.20 below. Again, this could arise through the shedding
of mass via a divestiture, outsourcing, or simply "leaning up" processes.
Figure 3.20: Nonlinear Speeding up and Decreasing
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In fact, the ability of an enterprise to evolve its properties (whether they be mass, reactivity,
responsiveness or strength) over time leads to nonlinear "evolutionary" behavior. If an enterprise decides
to increase its capacity, significant time delays and capital outlays can be involved. This can introduce
another longer period dynamic well documented in commodity markets"'. As shown in figure 3.21
below, the supply chain dynamics leads to a relative short period of oscillation (in this case, about V
year).
Figure 3.21: Capacity-Constrained Enterprise
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The three-degree of freedom enterprise can therefore be given more evolutionary "life" as the
strength of the enterprise (i.e. its capacity) can grow based on demand for the enterprise's goods /
services, or more directly, based on the equilibrated price demanded and received for these goods /
services.
158 Dynamics of Commodity Production Cycles, Meadows, D.L., Pegasus Communications, 1970.
130
-.,. - . , !V! . - - , =26"- - - , -
3.10 Manufacturing vs. Commodity Value Chain Dynamics
Having spent the best part of this chapter studying the physics of a typical value chain, namely a
production-distribution enterprise which implicitly produces differentiated products, I will now briefly
introduce its cousin, the commodity value chain.
While the governing structural dynamics of the commodity value chain is not different from other
value chains (i.e. the rules of clockspeeds and bullwhips still exist), Forrester pointed out that the
underlying strategic architectures driving the dynamic behavior are inherently different. 5 9 To be more
specific, commodity value chains "push" their product downstream, while manufacturing value chains
have their products pulled from customers in the form of orders. In order to keep their undifferentiated
flow processes flowing, commodity value chains typically protect production rates at the expense of price
stability, while differentiated product value chains typically protect profits at the expense of production
stability as shown in figure 3.22 below. We will return to commodity strategies (even for complex high-
tech products) later.
Figure 3.22: Manufacturing vs. Commodity Value
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3.11 Enterprise Integration
Before we leave the analysis of an inverted pendulum-as-enterprise discussion, let us conclude
with an observation of the opportunity to design the enterprise as a system, that is in its entirety. Lyneis
observed:
"...for a major US. manufacturing firm, the policies of engineering, production and
capacity expansion interacted to cause a loss of market share. Each of the policies
looked at in isolation is reasonable, however together they contribute to declining
performance. The best policy or plan of action for each functional area was not the best
policy set for the company as a whole. Interactions tend to be more important than
components - policy design byfunctional area is not always effective."' 6
Forrester notes that responsibility for making important corporate decisions should not reside
solely within one functional silo. For example, production managers should not decide production rates
and sales managers should not set prices. Price setting for example is one of the system policies that ties
together everything a corporation does. These decisions affect the corporate system far outside their own
departments."'
The problem with the functional mindset of "doing things right" as opposed to "doing the right
things", is when one takes a systemic or enterprise view6 2 . It is very difficult to change an organization
that is doing the wrong things 'righter', whereas it is much easier to correct an organization that is doing
the right things 'wronger'.
As will be shown in chapter 8, this approach will yield uncommon competitive advantage. But
managing the feedbacks requires considerable re-architecting of the enterprise, that is, re-configuring the
boundaries around the existing business processes, and the subsequent interactions between the new
processes. As Ackoff eloquently noted, "no system is ever simply the sum of the behavior of its parts, it
is the product of the interactions." 6 3
160 Corporate Planning and Policy Design: A System Dynamics Approach, James M. Lyneis, MIT Press, 1980, pgs.
5 & 9.
161 Keough, Mark and Doman, Andrew, "The CEO as Organization Designer: An Interview with Prof. Jay W.
Forrester", The McKinsey Quarterly, 1992 Number 2, pp. 3-30.
162 Lean Enterprise Value, Earll Murman et al., Palgrave Publishers, 2002.
163 Ackoff, Russell L., A ckoff's Best: His Classic Writings on Management, 1999.
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If the goal of an enterprise or firm is to produce excellent products and services, then the
performance metrics should provide incentives for all business processes (or firm functions) to behave in
a coordinated, integrated way as seen in figure 3.23 below. If the traditional output metrics of Quality,
Cost and Delivery will ensure success with the customer, then an integrated leadership team (ILT) should
collectively agree on the optimum growth rate that will provide appropriate levels of input metrics of
Morale and Safety, which will in-turn ensure excellent QCD output.
Figure 3.23: End-to-End Enterprise Integration
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3.12 Predictive Enterprise Design
As stated at the very beginning of this thesis, one of the questions that inspired this work was an
answer to the question, "can enterprises be predictively architected?"'" Having established the basis for
enterprise engineering, we are half way to answering the question.
This chapter has explored the structure and behavior of a rather complex socio-technical system -
a value chain. Notice that the technical details of the product technology or production system
164This is a fundamental research question from MiT's Engineering Systems Division.
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technology of the value chain have not been discussed. Instead, all of the focus has been on the dynamics
of human complexity that is the value chain's inertia, damping and reactivity as operationalized by the
embedded decision dynamics of the enterprise. In this way, we have de-coupled the human complexity
from the technical complexity. Whether the value chain was manufacturing and distributing complex
commercial jet airplanes or cases of beer165 , it is not the technical complexity that tends to make socio-
technical enterprises unpredictable.
Before we begin to design enterprises in Part II of this thesis, we can decompose the above
question into: "can we predict the behavior of a complex human enterprise?" The work of this chapter
seems to show that analytically, complex human enterprises exhibit a dynamic response that is predictable
using the laws of enterprise physics. In fact, the empirical evidence seems to support the analytical
findings. For over 10 years, MIT's Prof. John Sterman has been administering a version of Jay
Forrester's Industrial Dynamics model to graduate business students and executives in the form of an
educational simulation called "The Beer Game". With hundreds of simulations using thousands of
participants, he as assembled a dataset with remarkable conclusions: complex human enterprises are
indeed predictable. They exhibit the same dynamics discussed in this chapter. He has shown that there is
a predictable enterprise oscillation, amplification and phase lag.
It appears that the question should not be, "is it possible..." but more to the point, "how do you design
enterprises to ensure predictable performance." This will be tackled in Part II.
3.13 Chapter Summary
This chapter focused on the dynamic behavior of a typical "extended" human enterprise: the
value chain (or conversely, the vertically-integrated corporation), by applying the "laws" of enterprise
physics derived from the previous chapter.
165 This refers to MIT's famous "beer game", a management simulation which teaches system dynamics for a
manufacturing-distribution enterprise.
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Using the system dynamics methodology, we examined the dynamic response of the enterprise to
an input excitation, represented as customer order volatility. Using this methodology we studied the
dynamic characteristics of the enterprise (including its natural period of vibration, its damping and its
strength or capacity).
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Chapter 4: The Dynamics of Macro-Economies and National Enterprises
4.1 The Dynamics of Macro-Economic Cycles
From the microeconomics of the value chain enterprise, I now turn our attention to the dynamics
of a macro-economic enterprise. As introduced in chapter 2, macro-economic cycles can be described
using a three-degree of freedom enterprise structure shown in figure 4.1 below.
Figure 4.1: Structural Dynamics of Macro-Economic Cycles
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As can be seen above, there are three well-defined modes of dynamic behavior superimposed on
each other. First is the well-known "business cycle"166 which has a 3-5 year period of vibration. Second
166 Business Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex World, John D. Sterman, McGraw-Hill,
2001, pg. 782-785.
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is the underlying 10-20 year "construction cycle"167 which was proposed by Juglar and Kuznets. And
finally, there is the underlying 50-70 year "economic long wave"6 8 , proposed by Kondratiev.
Macroeconomists refer to these three cycles as "the short run", "the medium run" and "the long run"
respectively6 9 .
Jay Forrester attributed the short-term business cycle to the over-building and under-building of
consumer durables, while the economic long wave can be largely attributed to the over-building and
under-building of capital plant. 170 He also noted that although there are theoretically dozens of
fluctuating modes in an economy, only two or three dominant modes appear because most modes are
"entrained" to synchronize with each other. 7
Similarly, Nathaniel Mass demonstrated that the business cycle is the result of policies relating to
the management of labor and production (i.e. those inputs associated with short-term variable costs),
while the construction cycle is the result of policies relating to the management of fixed capital (i.e. those
inputs associated with long-term fixed costs), and finally that the economic long wave is the result of the
capital equipment sector of a national economy diverting a portion of its output for its own use in
producing capital equipment.'7 2 Mass noted that a common structure underlies both the short-term
business cycles and the longer-term capital cycles. The primary difference between the two lies in the
time-based differences between labor and capital markets - namely their average lifetimes and delivery
delays.
When one applies the concepts of response spectra from chapter 2 to the economic cycles
described above, one can see the relative effects of each of the three cycles on enterprises having their
own dynamic characteristics as shown below in figure 4.2.
167 Ibid, pg. 782-785.
168 Ibid, pg. 782-785.
169 Macroeconomics, Olivier Blanchard, 2000, pg. 19.
170 "The Beginning of System Dynamics", The McKinsey Quarterly, 1995 Number 4.
"7 Keough, Mark and Doman, Andrew, "The CEO as Organization Designer: An Interview with Prof Jay W.
Forrester", The McKinsey Quarterly, 1992 Number 2, pp. 3-30.
172 "Modeling Cycles in the National Economy", Nathaniel Mass, Technology Review, March/April 1976, pg. 43-52.
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Figure 4.2: Response Spectra of Economic Cycles
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From above, we can qualitatively see that the three main economic dynamics affect industries
differently. For example the computer industry (which have a clockspeed of around 1-3 years173) moves
so quickly that movements of the slower business cycle, construction cycle and long wave are hardly
amplified (i.e. the computer industry lies in the pseudo-static region of all three response spectra).
Therefore time-based strategies for computer companies who wish to reduce demand volatility, would be
simply to speed-up its clockspeed (i.e. move to the left). A similar trend occurs in the automotive
industry which has a clockspeed of around 5 years.
The aerospace industry however is a more in an interesting case. With its clockspeed of around
10 years174, the aerospace industry finds itself near resonance with the construction cycle, but out of phase
with the business cycle"75. Interestingly, aerospace companies wishing to speed-up their clockspeed, find
themselves worsening the effects of the hire-fire business cycle.
173 Charlie Fine, Clockspeed, pg. 239.
"74 Ib)id.
175 Note that the concept of Enfrainment (covered elsewhere in this thesis) offers an interesting additional challenge
to this theory.
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4.2 The Dynamics of Global Macro-Economies
From the macroeconomics of national enterprises, I now turn our attention to a comparison of
global macro-economic enterprises. Let us begin with a rapid assessment of the underlying clockspeeds
of the world's three largest economic blocks: the US, Japan and the European Union.
Intuitively, one would expect the US to have the fastest clockspeed, driven by its short-term
capital markets, its willingness to abandon sluggish industries for newer more innovative high growth
industries, and its relatively flexible labor policies' 76 . Likewise, one would expect Japan to have the
slowest clockspeed, driven by its risk-aversion and the long-term view of its debt markets, the strength of
its vertically-integrated keiretsu, its ability to embrace mature industries and drive more value out than the
initiators of those industries, and its long-term social policies (e.g. life-time employment). Finally, one
would expect the EU to have an intermediate clockspeed, as shown in figure 4.3 below. The question is,
does the dynamics embedded in the data support this?
Figure 4.3: Hypothetical Dynamics of Global Economic Powers
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176 Professor Lester Thurow, MIT course 15.012 Macroeconomics, Spring 2002.
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In fact it is important to note that these three dynamic systems do not oscillate independently
from one another. Researchers have conjectured that there are cross-country ties which act to
dynamically couple these enterprises as shown in figure 4.4 below.177
Figure 4.4: Dynamic Coupling of International Economic Enterprises
Supporting Structure
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Figure 4.517 below shows the long-term unemployment trends in the US over the past 40 years.
The first thing that we note is that there appears to be a pronounced periodic oscillation approximately
every 10 years, and an underlying (fundamental) one of approximately 30 years. These appear to be the
first two modes of vibration of the US economy. It appears therefore that one measure of the US macro
economy might indicate that the US has a fundamental period of vibration of approximately 30 years.
But what would one expect from Japan? From the EU?
177 Anderson, Heather M. and Ramsey James B., "U.S. and Canadian Industrial Production Indices as Coupled
Oscillators", Journal ofEconomic Dynamics and Control, Vol. 26, No. 1, January 2002, pp. 33-67.
"1 Taken from Charlie Fine's Spring 2003 Operations Strategy final class project with Brian Bowers, Lou Rassey
and Eric White..
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Figure 4.5: US Unemployment
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Using the basic principles of enterprise pendulum physics, one might intuit that Japan has a
slower clockspeed than that of the US. Although they have fewer citizens than the US, they seem to
organize their nation, their keiretsu, their society etc. as a more unified, "massive" structure. In addition,
they seem to have a longer string, that is they seem to be less reactive, as reflected in their governmental
bureaucracies, etc. Finally, they seem to be less responsive to changes in the environment, that is they
smooth their expectations over longer time horizons. This gives them greater damping.
One would expect Japan's clockspeed to be slower than the US, and figure 4.6179 below supports
that conjecture. We can see that Japan has an 80-year fundamental mode of vibration.
Figure 4.6: Japanese Unemployment
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179 Ibid.
On the international spectrum of clockspeeds, the European Union would be expected to lie
somewhere between the two, and the data supports this. The fundamental period of vibration lies in the
region of 40-50 years. But what can knowledge of these national clockspeeds do to help us understand a
nation's dynamics? Again, I invoke the concept of the Enterprise Response Spectrum as discussed in
figure 2.10.
Figure 4.7 below plots the fundamental periods of vibration for each of the three nations. If one
were to map a typical response spectrum curve over the data, one would expect to find "period-based
unemployment". That is, one would expect to find less unemployment in Japan than in the EU and the
US. In fact, when one plots the real average unemployment data, one can see that the classic spectral
growth curve describes the behavior well. Also, as an aside, I note that the ratio of the first to second
mode periods of vibration is approximately 4:1. This relationship also exists in the dynamics of building
structures.
Figure 4.7: Global Enterprise Dynamics
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I would like to make one final note before leaving international competitive dynamics. It is
interesting to note that the colloquial language used to express competition at a national level has its own
vocabulary to reflect the meta- or super-business issues. When two corporate enterprises are engaged in
competition, we use the term "competition". However, when two national enterprises are engaged in
competition, we use the term "wars", whether "trade wars" or "military wars". They are not "trade
competitions" or "military competitions". As Victor Hugo wrote:
"A day will come when you, France; you Russia; you Italy; you Britain; and you
Germany - all of you, all nations of the Continent will merge tightly, without losing your
remarkable identity... A day will come when markets, open to trade, and minds, open to
ideas, will become the sole battlefields. ""'0
This was a point that was made with respect to the industrial competition between Boeing and
Airbus in the previous chapter - it is beyond corporate competition, it is a national trade war. We will
explore in the next section how enterprise physics is used to understand even national "military
competitions".
4.3 The Dynamics of National Enterprises
When you are trained to see and you begin to look, the laws of enterprise physics are everywhere.
In recent television interview', US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld answered questions as to
why the Spring 2003 War in Iraq went so well:
"...It's the law ofphysics... speed is more important than mass"
Even in the public sector, national leaders understand and invoke the power of the laws of
physics. Donald Rumsfeld was extolling the need for speed. Although he did not specifically define all
the elements of a pendulum, he did cover the important parts explicitly.
"80 Birds of Prey - Boeing vs. Airbus: a Battlefor the Skies, Matthew Lynn, 1997.
181 Meet the Press, April 13, 2003.
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As shown in figure 4.8 below, in the Cold War, with a massive, monolithic threat, from the Soviet
Union, the "gravitational field" (competitive pull) was strong. The US clockspeed was slow, meaning the
defense's pendulum was massive, with long chains of command (long pendulum string length), and its
policies were full of bureaucratic friction (damping). This strategy of "overwhelming force" was
necessary to match the USSR in the "higher, faster, farther" world.
With the subsequent break-up of the Soviet Union, with no single, clear massive threats, the US
military complex is now faced with a new type of dynamic environment. Now the enterprise needed to be
more reactive (i.e. shorter pendulum length), it had to be more responsive (i.e. reduce the viscosity), and it
needed to be more responsive or more agile (i.e. have less inertial mass). All of these things together
resulted in a faster clockspeed.
Figure 4.8: Evolution of War Strategies
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4.4 Macroeconomic "Bullwhip"
As was discussed in sections 2.2 and 3.3, the bullwhip represents demand amplification up a
value chain. Fine describes that it is due to information and delivery delays that cause over- and under-
ordering. 182
Micro-economists describe the causes slightly differently183 . They argue that the bullwhip is
much more prevalent for durable goods (like commercial aircraft) than for non-durables. By definition,
the stock of durables is large compared with annual demand (see figure 4.9 below for commercial
aircraft). The current stock of around 14,000 aircraft is much greater than the annual demand of around
1,000 aircraft'8 4 . With annual retirements of around 300 aircraft, the net inflow of 700 aircraft represents
around 5% growth on the 14,000 base. Note that this 5% growth matches the long-term demand for
aircraft travel. Aircraft are such long-lived assets that the entire fleet will renew itself on average every
20 years.
Figure 4.9: Stock and Flow of Commercial Aircraft
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182 Charles H. Fine, Clockspeed, 1998, pg. 90-93.1 83 Microeconomics, Pindyck and Rubinfeld, pg. 37-38.
184 "Airbus A3XX: Developing the World's Largest Commercial Jet (A)", Benjamin Esty, Harvard Business School
Case 9-201-028, June 20, 2002.
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To summarize therefore, durable goods exhibit a high degree of dynamic complexity (and are
more affected by the bullwhip) due to their longer leadtimes and lifetimes as shown in figure. As was
discussed previously in Chapter 4, long leadtime industries like aerospace tend to be out-of-phase (i.e.
"hyper-dynamic") with the 3-5 year business cycle, making conventional stiffening or speeding-up tactics
produce adverse effects as one begins to climb up the response spectrum. In addition as just discussed
above, the fact that durable goods by definition have long lifetimes can cause overbuilding of capacity and
precipitous drops in price and profitability as competitors often follow in this profitability death spiral.'
Figure 4.10: Effects of Leadtimes and Lifetimes on Dynamic Complexity
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The durability of goods causes short-run elasticities to be larger than long-run elasticities, i.e. the
demand for durable goods fluctuates sharply in response to short-run changes in income and less so in the
long run as replacement of durables is necessary (see figure 4.11 below).
185 See Sterman & Paich for a more detailed description of "Boom & Bust".
147
Response
Spectrum
Tn
Figure 4.11: Elasticities of Durable Goods
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Durable industries therefore are quite vulnerable to changing macroeconomic conditions like the
business cycle where they magnify changes in macro-variables like GNP. Short-run GNP elasticity of
demand is larger than the long-run elasticity for long-lived capital equipment, thus changes in investment
in equipment magnify changes in GNP. It is for this reason that capital goods industries are considered
"cyclical" (see figure 4.12 below).
Figure 4.12: GNP and Investment in Durable Equipment8 6
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186 Microeconomics, Pindyck and Rubinfeld, pg. 37.
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In looking at multiple stages in an industry value chain, there is greater amplification the farther
upstream you are. This can be explained either as there is more propagation of phantom orders 
due to
information and delivery lags or it can be explained as the enterprise participant with the greatest mass
and inertia moves the least. From figure 4.13 below, it is clear that the massive "world GDP" moves the
least (at +/- 1.6%) while the least massive semiconductor capital market moves the most (at +/- 60%)87.
Figure 4.13: Bullwhip in the Semi-Conductor Industry
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There is one curious observation in the bullwhip for macro-economies. We saw in chapter 3 that
not only is there demand amplification up the supply chain, but there are subtle delays causing phase
shifts among the players in the supply chain. In the above figure, we can see the demand amplification,
however there is no phase shift i.e. all the sine waves cross the zero axis at approximately the same times.
This curious synchronized vibration is known as "entrainment".'
88
Forrester notes that entrainment is a notion that in all dynamic systems, similar modes of behavior
lock together with even the slightest coupling between systems. Very small signals will entrain or
synchronize such systems, especially in highly damped systems. Forrester notes that when the National
187 Data taken from Lou Rassey's 2003 LFM thesis and internship at Intel.
188 See John Sterman (2001) and Alan Graham (1977).
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Bureau of Standards used pendulum clocks for the basic time standard that entrainment was enough of a
concern that two clocks had separate concrete foundations and were also turned at right angles to one
another to keep synchronizing forces from being transmitted between them.1' 9
4.5 The "Governing Dynamics" of Economic Ideologies
I end this chapter on the dynamics of macroeconomic trends with a brief discussion about
fundamental economic ideologies which distinguish between the most basic notions of competition and
cooperation. This theme has already come up within the context of "stakeholder cooperation" vs.
"shareholder competition" in sections 6.1 and 6.4, "public" vs. "private goods" in section 6.6, as well as
the in the context of "enterprise integration" vs. "functional competition" of section 3.7.
Adam Smith's notion of an "invisible hand" that will guide the common good, via the collective
(but disconnected) selfish interactions of individuals was challenged (or extended) over 200 years later by
John Nash in his search for the "governing dynamics". Nash's "equilibrium" is a sort of win-win state
where the best possible outcome occurs when everyone does what is best for themselves and the group.
Under the invisible hand, each player's individually rational choice leads to a sub-optimum collective
outcome, as expressed in the "Prisoner's Dilemma" for oligopoly producers (which we will discuss again
in the next chapter). But Olsen and others suggest that there is a way out of Adam Smith's competitive
sub-optimum via co-operation enforced by institutions 90.
This Adam Smith vs. John Nash competition vs. cooperation dynamic can be understood by using
the generic structure of the pendulum that we have seen thus far throughout. Again, the notion of a
balancing loop with delays which causes so much of the oscillatory behavior in social and technical
systems can be extended to look at very high-level trans-national, trans-era issues, like the dynamics of
189 Keough, Mark and Doman, Andrew, "The CEO as Organization Designer: An Interview with Prof. Jay W.
Forrester", The McKinsey Quarterly, 1992 Number 2, pp. 3-30.
190 Olson, Mancur, "The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups", Harvard Economic
Studies, Vol. CXXIV, 1971.
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economic ideologies as shown in figure 4.14 below'9 '. Note the 200-year period of oscillation. It is
interesting to note that the two ideologies broadly capture the competing dynamic philosophies of Boeing
and Airbus.
Figure 4.14: Evolution of Human Economic Ideologies
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4.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter raised the discussion of enterprise design from the microeconomic level of firms and
value chains, to the macroeconomic level of three different macro-enterprises: nations, multi-national
trading blocks and global economic ideologies.
We applied the pendulum physics introduced in Part I, to the US, Japan and EU economies in
order to understand the dynamic structure of nations (e.g. clockspeed). We then illustrated how the
methodology of pendulum physics could be applied to designing national defense strategies.
And finally, we briefly explored how the generic structure of the pendulum could be used to
understand the dynamics of global economic ideologies.
191 From Eric White's LFM Thesis, "Lean Enterprise Distribution Tactics with Customer Supply Chain Integration",
June 2003.
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Chapter 5: The Dynamics of the Airline Industry
5.1 "The World's Worst Industry"
"There is no worse business of size that I can think of than the airline business. Since it
began in 1903, the industry has had an overall net loss. If there had been a capitalist at
Kitty Hawk, the guy should have shot down Wilbur! I mean... one small step for mankind,
and one huge step backwards for capitalism."'92
So spoke Warren Buffet, widely regarded as the world's most successful investor, and Fortune
magazine's "Most Powerful Man in Business" in 2003193. In fact, as shown in figure 5.1 below, the
cumulative net profit of the global airline industry is negative.
Figure 5.1: Cumulative Net Profit of the Global Airline Industry
This work contends that an understanding of the dynamics of the industry lies in an understanding
of the structure of the dynamic complexity of the industry. I contend that (among other strategic issues to
be discussed later in this chapter) the airline industry is extraordinarily dynamically complex with cause
and effect being very distant in time and space, and that two such structural sources of this dynamic
complexity can be seen below in figure 5.2 as being long leadtimes and long lifetimes of the capital
equipment (i.e. the aircraft) as was introduced in chapter 4.
192 "Warren Buffet Talks Business", discussion at the Kenan-Flagler Business School at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, PBS Home Video, 1995.
193 Fortune magazine, "The 25 Most Powerful People in Business", July 21, 2003.
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Figure 5.2: Sources of Dynamic Complexity in the Airline Industry: long capital Leadtimes & Lifetimes
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As has been discussed in Chapter 2, long leadtimes in the order-delivery cycle give rise to delays
which can result in oscillation throughout the supply chain, resulting in excess costs and inefficiencies (as
is seen in the two figures on the left. Also, long product lifetimes can lead to overcapacity in the airlines
due to imperfect forecasting and delays in capacity expansion and contraction.
In order to understand the effect of fixed capital costs (e.g. airplanes) on the airline industry as
well as the effect of the airline industry on its suppliers of fixed capital (i.e. airplane manufacturers), this
work proposes to examine the coupling of two types of engineering systems: matter transformation and
matter transportation systems as a production-distribution system shown in figure 5.3 below. 94
194 Magee, C.L. and de Weck, O.L., "An Attempt at Complex Systems Classification", Proceedings ofthe ESD
Internal Symposium, May 29-30, 2002, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Engineering Systems Division,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, pp. 217-250.
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Figure 5.3: The Airline Industry & its Suppliers as a Production-Distribution System
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The two engineering systems can be represented using object-process diagrams as shown in
figure 5.4 below. Note that the primary exchanges between the two systems are manufactured product
(i.e. airplanes) in exchange for cash.
Figure 5.4: Object-Process Diagrams of the Airline Industry & its Suppliers
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As shown in figure 5.5 below, a simple five forces'9 industry analysis would reveal that low
profitability (especially for network carriers) is due to supplier power (e.g. pilot labor costs), buyer power
(due to web-based fare visibility) and overcapacity driven by high barriers to exit. This lack of
profitability at the end of the value chain can act to constrain profitability in the suppliers to the airline
industry - like the equipment (airplane) manufacturers. Although the number of competitors of airplane
manufacturers is small (effectively only Boeing and Airbus), the rivalry is unexpectedly intense as the
competition is not purely on corporation-based market forces, but on broader national strategic interests.
Figure 5.5: Five Forces Analysis of the Airline Industry
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5.2 Deregulation, Instability and Oscillation
Due to the strategic importance of the airline industry, national governments around the world
regulated its performance in order to provide stability to this vital strategic asset. Governments protected
195 Michael Porter, Competitive Strategy, 1980.
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this industry by setting fares (i.e. Pini) well above that which would have cleared in a free market (i.e. P),
as shown in the supply and demand curves of figure 5.6 below'96.
Figure 5.6: Regulation Effects on Supply and Demand
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This price minimum, Pmi,, acts to create a loss to consumers (i.e. the traveling public) represented
by the areas A+B. The producers (i.e. the airlines) receive a transfer of money from consumers
represented by rectangle A. It is clear therefore that regulation favors the producers over the consumers
by redistributing wealth.
If the producers were to respond to unsold output by cutting production (i.e. limiting production
to Qj), then the loss to producers is A-C. Note, however, that at a price of Pmin, the producers would like
to supply Q2, which is much more than the consumers are willing to buy. Even if they have some
restraint in production, they will still produce up to Q3, hoping to sell this quantity at the expense of
competitors. This trapezoid D measures the cost of unsold output. The total loss to producers in this case
is actually A-C-D. Therefore, although a regulated market should help producers profitability, it is clear
that overproduction by the airlines will limit their profitability.
Overproduction notwithstanding, as long as price was propped above its market-clearing value,
average profits would be higher than in a free market. Conversely, in a deregulated world, prices drop
196 Microeconomics, Robert S. Pindyck and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 2001, pg. 301.
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considerably (as predicted in figure 5.3 above) and costs remain largely the same, reducing profitability
for airlines as shown in figure 5.7 below 97. Deregulation therefore largely favors the consumers and
squeezes the producers.
Figure 5.7: Overall Effects of Deregulation
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After deregulation around 1980, the airline industry exhibited clear dynamic instability and
oscillation as shown in figure 5.8 below. The airline industry began to behave as a dynamic system (with
a characteristic natural period of vibration to be discussed further in Chapter 7) undergoing forced
vibration defined by the sudden rush of capital and construction of new capacity. The relative ease of
inducing capital inflows in economic upswings and difficulty in flushing out excess capacity in economic
downswings (i.e. low barriers to entry and high barriers to exit) have resulted in chronic instability and
low average profitability.
197 Department of Commerce, U. StatisticalAbstract, 1986, 1989, 1992, 1995, 1998.
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Figure 5.8: Deregulation Effects on Airline Profitability
LU
4-p
0
a.
0
$25b
$20b
$15b
$10b
$5b
$Ob
-$5b
-$10b
-$15b
-$20b
194
........ - --------- - ---Y-~
-.. -.-.-.- 
--------
-- - --- --- -----
~
-~ -
-----...............- - ---- -- ----
0 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Source: Murman et al.
Regulation had the effect of constraining growth below free-market levels. Deregulation, on the
other hand had the effect of expanding growth to levels twice as high as in a regulated environment (see
the slope of the growth curve before and after 1980 in figure 5.9 below).
Figure 5.9: Deregulation-Induced Demand Growth
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5.3 The Dynamics of Capacity (Supply) & Demand
We are taught in classical microeconomics that supply and demand are equilibrated by price.
This static equilibrium assumes that there are no delays in the achievement of this goal-seeking, balancing
feedback loop.
Figure 5.10 below shows how price equilibrates supply and demand in the classic (static)
microeconomic model. However due to the delays embedded in the three balancing loops shown below,
there is dynamic oscillation in the generic structure of a commodity market. This "commoditization"
manifests itself as recurring cycles in investment, capacity utilization, prices, margins and return on
capital.
Figure 5.10: Price Equilibrates Supply and Demand
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In fact, it is this simplified generic structure model of commodity markets, that is used by Airbus
to understand and drive the strategy of designing and delivering airplanes.
9
"'' As can be seen in figure
5.11 below, there are is one primary balancing loop in which price balances supply with demand. Again,
because of delays, there are significant oscillations to this loop, just like in any commodity market.
In addition to this primary balancing loop, there are three lesser positive reinforcing loops (which
are not shown on figure 5.11) that include: increasing orders due to the "lead time/supply line effect" and
enjoyable travel begets more travel.
Figure 5.11: Basic Dynamics of Airline Industry
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Again, it is interesting to note that the dynamics of any commodity, whether it is high-technology
airplane production, or low-tech pork-belly production, figure 5.12 below shows that the underlying
dynamic structure is the same 200. Note that as price (in green) attempts to equilibrate demand (in blue),
with supply (in red). As supply contains significant delays, the result is instability, just like in the airline
industry.
198 "System Dynamics for Market Forecasting and Structural Analysis", Jim Lyneis, System Dynamics Review,
Volume 16, Number 1, Spring 2000.
19"Commoditization of Technology-Based Products and Services: A Generic Model of Market Dynamics", Henry
Birdseye Weil, MIT, 11 March 1996.
200 Dynamics of Commodity Production Cycles, Meadows, D.L., Pegasus Communications, 1970.
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Figure 5.12: Basic Commodity Dynamics of Hog Production (source: Meadows)
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Finally, the generic structure can be seen in figure 5.13 below2 0'. Price (in green) is balancing the
demand loop (in blue) with the supply loop (in red). Again, the supply loop contains significant delays,
(which are illustrated by the yellow circles) resulting in instability. The equations for the Vensim model
are reproduced in Appendix G.
Figure 5.13: Basic Commodity Dynamics (source: Meadows/Fiddaman)
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201 Dynamics of Commodity Production Cycles, Meadows, D.L., Pegasus Communications, 1970.
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As Forrester pointed out, delays can be both helpful and harmful with respect to causing
instabilities, depending on where they are in the system.202 In parametric studies conducted by this author
on the above commodity dynamics model, I observe that there is a trend of increasing the stability of the
system by increasing the delays in the supply loop, while decreasing the delays in the demand loop (as
shown in figure 5.14 below).
Figure 5.14: Effect of Delays in the Supply and Demand of Basic Commodities Dynamics
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5.4 The Dynamics of Supply & Demand in the Airline Industry
Having looked at the general dynamics of supply and demand (with reference to the classic
commodity cycles), I now apply this generic model to the specific case of the airline industry. From
Weil 203, the basic system dynamics model of the airline industry can be seen in figure 5.15 below.
In this figure, fares and other cash items like revenues and profitability are shown in the outer
loop in green. Costs are shown in red in the interior and are broken down into fixed and variable.
Demand and its associated variables are shown in blue. Capital expenditure on fixed cost infrastructure is
shown in the yellow loop in the upper right of the figure.
202 Industrial Dynamics, Jay W. Forrester, 1961, pg. 62.
203 "Commoditization of Technology-Based Products and Services: A Generic Model of Market Dynamics", Henry
Birdseye Weil, MIT, 11 March 1996.
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Figure 5.15: Basic System Dynamics Model of Airline Industry (source: Weil)
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5.5 Commoditization Cycles
Weil defines "commoditization" as a competitive environment in which product differentiation is
difficult, customer loyalty and brand values are low, and sustainable advantage comes primarily from cost
(and often quality) leadership". 20 Commoditization tends to begin with a "runaway" dynamic behavior.
Let us begin by first exploring the structure of this behavior. Reinforcing behavior, (otherwise known as
"positive feedback") by definition drives a system towards an unstable equilibrium like a marble on an
inverted bowl as shown in figure 5.16 below. When Albert Einstein stated that the greatest force in the
world was compound interest20 , he was referring to the power of the positive feedback of reinforcing
loops which leads to exponential growth.
204 
"Commoditization of Technology-Based Products and Services: A Generic Model of Market Dynamics", Henry
Birdseye Weil, MIT, 11 March 1996.
205 The Natural Laws ofBusiness, Richard Koch, 2000, pg. 212.
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Figure 5.16: The Positive Feedback of "Reinforcing" Loops
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These growth dynamics are caused by the commoditization of the three important customer
metrics: quality, cost and delivery - none of which are tied explicitly to airline profitability! We will
explore each of these in turn.
As can be seen in figure 5.17 below, airline capacity expansion (in the form of new aircraft
orders), is fueled by the need to lower fares to improve flight productivity (or "load factors") when new
planes are brought on line. This in turn drives up demand that drives up the need for more planes. I call
this "cost-based commoditization" because the airline passengers are attracted to fly by the lower fares,
which translate into lower transportation costs for them. This behavior of overbuilding and then lowering
price to fill capacity drives further overbuilding.
Figure 5.17: Cost-based Commoditization
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The second type of positive commoditization dynamic comes from the fact that airline capacity
expansion (in the form of new aircraft orders), is fueled by more frequent flight service, which improves
on-time delivery. As can be seen in figure 5.18 below, this in turn drives up demand that drives up the
need for more planes. I call this "delivery-based commoditization" because the airline passengers are
attracted to fly by the more frequent flight schedules.
Figure 5.18: Delivery-based Commoditization
Aicraft
+Projected
DadDevre
Travel Cur+ W t F"
The third type of positive commoditization dynamic comes from the fact that airline capacity
expansion (in the form of new aircraft orders), is fueled by less crowded flight service, which improves
flight quality. As can be seen in figure 5.19 below, this in turn drives up demand that drives up the need
for more planes. I call this "quality-based commoditization" because the airline passengers are attracted
to fly by the less crowded flights.
Figure 5.19: Quality-based Commoditization
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Having considered the dynamics that cause growth, we can now briefly explore those embedded
dynamics that drive "balancing" behavior. Balancing behavior, (otherwise known as "negative
feedback") by definition drives a system towards a stable equilibrium like a marble in a bowl as shown in
figure 5.20 below.
Figure 5.20: The Negative Feedback of "Balancing" Loops
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In the aforementioned dynamics of capacity expansion of commodities, there are two
fundamental balancing dynamics that bring a system to a stable equilibrium. The first is that demand
growth drives prices up, which in turn stabilize demand growth, as shown in figure 5.21 below.
Figure 5.21: Demand Balances Price (or Cost to Customers)
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The second primary balancing loop focuses on quality. Demand growth drives crowding up,
which in turn stabilizes demand growth due to lower passenger service quality, as shown in figure 5.22
below.
Figure 5.22: Demand Balances Quality
Airline Airline AA,
R venues 1 Expenses Pirf " A brline
4 Teimesy Profitability
Horizon
Aircraft
Oirders
Projected
Demand Desired
,Capacity
Travel Current Fleet
+c
A r nd
-~ & FIW Sewvlce
Qualt
ANrplane Load Factors
Airlie (Produactivity)
Fares
5.6 Profitability Cycles
I note so far that all of the reinforcing and balancing behaviors of the commodity cycles are
independent of the amount of profit that the airlines make. In other words, exponential growth and/or
decay in the size of the current fleet of aircraft can occur even if profit-seeking corporate behavior were
not present, as in the case of providing public transportation infrastructure. The next set of dynamics
captures this profitability dynamic.
When airline fares impact the revenues (and therefore profitability) of the airlines, we get a
balancing loop instead of the reinforcing loops that we previously saw when fares impact customer
demand. In other words, capacity expansion limits profitability in the short-term. This is shown in figure
5.23 below.
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Figure 5.23: Low Short-Term Profitability Limits Capacity Expansion
(due to lower revenues)
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In addition, fleet capacity expansion can be
rising variable costs associated with increased travel
costs, higher departure frequency or better quality as
below.
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shown in figures 5.24, 5.25 and 5.26 respectively
Figure 5.24: Low Short-Term Profitability Limits Capacity Expansion
(due to higher variable costs related to lower fares)
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Figure 5.25: Low Short-Term Profitability Limits Capacity Expansion
(due to higher variable costs related to more frequent departures)
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Figure 5.26: Low Short-Term Profitability Limits Capacity Expansion
(due to higher variable costs related to higher quality flights)
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Finally, fleet capacity expansion can be limited by short-term hits on profitability due to rising
fixed costs associated with investment in the fleet as shown in figure 5.27 below.
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Figure 5.27: Low Long-Term Profitability Limits Capacity Expansion
(due to higher fixed costs)
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5.7 The Dynamics of Exogenous Shocks to the Airline Industry
Using a system dynamics model (not unlike the one we have been discussing), one can begin to
explore the effects of exogenous shocks to the airline industry. This is important today, as exogenous
shocks like September 1 1 bombings, the Iraq war and the SARS outbreak have all been cited as causing
the significant downturn in airline profitability. Researchers have examined the impact of such shocks
like the Gulf War in 1991 on the airline industry as shown in figure 5.28 below 2 6.
Figure 5.28: Impact of the Gulf War on the Airline Industry (source: Liehr et al.)
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206 Liehr, Martin; Grossler, Andreas; Klein, Martin; Milling, Peter M.; "Cycles in the Sky: Understanding and
Managing Business Cycles in the Airline Market", System Dynamics Review, Volume 17, Number 4, Winter 2001,
pg. 311-332.
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It is interesting to note that in the presence of an exogenous shock, the inherent dynamic structure of the
industry remains intact. That is, the ten-year period of vibration remains largely unchanged, indicating
that the industrial inertia and reactivity (the quantities that make-up the industrial clockspeed) have not
been modified. The primary difference in the scenario with and without the Gulf War is the amplitude of
demand, which returns to its dynamic equilibrium within a few cycles, i.e. within a few decades.
5.8 Positive Feedback and The Dynamics of Cost
Finally, I end this chapter on an exploration of the dynamics of the airline industry by considering
the important dynamics of cost.
Modern economic theory rests on the century-old notions of equilibrium and decreasing returns
associated with negative feedback which leads to a predictable equilibrium for prices and market shares.
However, as Arthur points out, knowledge-based parts of the economy like aircraft manufacture are
largely subject to the positive feedback of increasing returns as such products are complicated to design
and manufacture.207 As aircraft require large initial investments in research, development, testing and
tooling (i.e. non-recurring costs), once sales begin, incremental production is relatively inexpensive. As
more aircraft are built, unit costs continue to fall and profits continue to increase. If there are increasing
returns to scale, then it is economically advantageous (from a public policy perspective) to have one or
two large firms producing (at relatively low cost) rather than to have many smaller firms producing (at
relatively high cost). In fact, the greater the returns to scale, the larger the firms tend to be. It is for this
reason that the manufacture of large aircraft has evolved to a global duopoly. This public policy approach
of encouraging a few, large firms in industries of increasing returns is often followed by closer regulation
as is seen for example in power companies.
Industries with increasing returns have production costs fall as market share increases, however
this increased production has the additional benefit of gaining more experience in manufacturing, known
207 Arthur, W. Brian, "Positive Feedbacks in the Economy", The McKinsey Quarterly 1994 Number 1, page 83-84.
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as the "learning curve". The learning curve describes a phenomenon in which the cumulative average
recurring production cost per aircraft tends to decline by a more or less constant percentage between
doubled quantities of production. Research has indicated that, for complex modern aircraft, learning
coefficients between 75% and 80% are typical208 . This means that for every doubling in cumulative
aircraft production, the associated marginal production costs would reduce by 20%-25%, as shown in
figure 5.29 below.
Figure 5.29: The Learning Curve for Aircraft Manufacture
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It is important to note that airplane costs (and therefore profits) are a function of the total number
of airplanes built. There are strong reinforcing incentives to price initially at the expected future cost
rates, in order to bring forward sales ahead of competitors which increases cumulative production, which
in turn drives down costs - a sort of self-fulfilling prophesy. If one does not estimate demand accurately
and take learning into account the cost calculations, the calculation of airplane program value may be
incorrect. In fact, if the selling price remains approximately constant over the life of the program, then the
first production runs will actually lose money, and profit-making production will be in the distant future,
where it is discounted. It is well known that firms in industries that exhibit strong learning curve effects
have typically based their pricing strategies on anticipated market development rates2 09.
208 Reinhardt, U.E.. "Break-even Analysis for Lockheed's Tri-Star: An Application of Financial Theory," The
Journal of Finance, 1971.209 Kim Warren, Competitive Strategy Dynamics, John Wiley & Sons, 2002, pg. 284-286.
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5.9 Chapter Summary
This chapter extended the use of system dynamics from exploring a generic enterprise (i.e. a
value chain) to exploring an entire industry (i.e. the airline industry). We began by exploring the causes
of the industry oscillation, before using a commodity-based system dynamics model to understand the
dynamics structure underlying industry profitability.
Finally, we discussed the dynamics of the nature of the primary capital expenditures in the airline
industry: the airplanes. We noted that durable goods have their own worse-before-better equilibrium, and
we noted that the costs for the production of aircraft decline over time as a manufacturer descends the
"leaming curve".
In Part I of this thesis, we have laid out the principles of "enterprise engineering" which were
based on the "laws of enterprise physics". The first step in mastering "dynamic complexity" has been
established - namely the quantification of the dynamic behavior of enterprises or the exploration of the
temporal distance or disconnection of cause and effect.
In the Part II, we will focus on the principles of "enterprise architecting" which are rooted in the
"heuristics of enterprise design". This is the second part of mastering dynamic complexity, namely the
quantification of the complexity embedded in the enterprise or the exploration of the spatial distance or
disconnection of cause and effect. In the next chapter, we will first consider the proper "extent" of the
boundaries of the enterprise and the nature of the relationship amongst the different actors in comprising
this extended enterprise.
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Part II: Enterprise Architecting
"We are called to be the architects of the future, not its victims."
Buckminster Fuller
Engineer, Architect, Philosopher
"Architectural insights are worth far more than ill-structured engineering analyses."
Eberhardt Rechtin
Professor, Systems Architect
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Chapter 6: Architecting Enterprise Relationships
In this chapter, I will attempt to define three important activities in architecting enterprise
relationships: defining the appropriate extent of the enterprise (i.e. the boundary), defining the interfaces
at the boundaries (i.e. the governance profile), and finally how to grow the capabilities of the enterprise
through managing the dynamic resources.
One of the most important activities in systems thinking is what John Sterman calls, "challenging
the clouds"210 . The highest leverage policies often occur beyond the boundaries of the enterprise for
which corporate policy makers are accustomed to operating within. In the following, I will define both
the "quantity" of relationships with potential stakeholders followed by a discussion of the "quality" of
relationships with stakeholders.
6.1 Quantity of Relationships: Stakeholders vs. Shareholders
One of the most important strategic decisions that a corporation can make, is to define the extent
of the "governance profile", that is which stakeholders to explicitly include in the firm's value web. A
stakeholder analysis 2 1 begins with the identification of the possible range of stakeholders which can be
broken down into the five general types: Shareholders, Customers, Employees, Partners/Suppliers, and
Society, as shown in figure 6.1 below.
Other than the recognition of the existence of these stakeholders, the obvious challenge is to
prioritize the importance of each stakeholder and to define the level of economic rent-sharing with each.
To this end, there are two well-known "objective functions" which can be optimized: Economic Value
Model (Economic Rate of Return) and the Stakeholder Surplus Model (Financial Rate Return).
21 Business Dynamics, John Sterman, 2000, pg. 222.
211 Lean Enterprise Value, Earfl Murman et al., 2002.
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Figure 6.1: Stakeholder Analysis
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The Economic Value Model is typified in the US market-based capitalist economy. It tends to
focus almost exclusively on maximizing wealth for the shareholders. This rather limited stakeholder
scope has the benefits of clear objectives and relatively transparent, well-defined methods to achieve this
objective. Companies operating under such economic objectives tend to answer to the faster clockspeed,
frictionless demands of the capital markets which results in a focus on the shorter-term. From our
previously-developed concepts of enterprise physics, one could conjecture that in general, shareholder-
focused US firms tend to have higher Value Chain Reactivity and Customer Responsiveness along with
lower Organizational Inertia.
The Stakeholder Surplus Model on the other hand is typified in the European and Japanese social-
based economies. These tend to focus on a broader, more complex range of stakeholders, which include
employees/unions, suppliers as well as shareholders. The objective function to maximize is wealth for the
whole group. Companies operating under such economic objectives tend to have slower clockspeeds and
they focus on the longer-term. Again, from enterprise physics, one could conjecture that in general,
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stakeholder-focused firms tend to have lower Value Chain Reactivity and Customer Responsiveness
along with higher Organizational Inertia.
6.2 World-Class Company vs. World-Class Enterprise
Having looked at the two generic economic models, we can now begin to see how Boeing and
Airbus view themselves within the context of their business environment. Figure 6.2 below illustrates
conceptually the architecture of the stakeholder network for each company. As can be seen, The Boeing
Company defines and operates itself as a well-defined corporate identity with clear, distinct relationships
with other non-explicit stakeholders, for example: suppliers, labor unions and government. In contrast,
Airbus defines its enterprise architecture more broadly with more stakeholders with more explicit
responsibilities and a more complex objective function.
Figure 6.2: Boeing vs. Airbus Enterprise Architectures
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As shown on the conceptual "firm-enterprise spectrum" in figure 6.3 below, Airbus gives more
explicit importance to the needs of multiple stakeholders. This is a much more complex endeavor, often
with much less transparency than does Boeing's more traditionally-limited stakeholder scope in which
delivering customer value (based on quality, cost and delivery metrics) and delivering shareholder value
(based on earnings per share) is a relatively well-known optimization function in US business research.
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Figure 6.3: Firm-Enterprise Spectrum
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In fact, when we begin to examine how Boeing and Airbus engage the respective interconnected
dynamic forces212 of: government policy dynamics, business cycle dynamics, industry structure dynamics,
corporate strategy dynamics, and technology dynamics, we can see that Boeing's decidedly corporate
view of its business means that it views its products as "private goods" in which product differentiation is
the strategy.
However as shown in figure 6.4 below, Airbus' enterprise architecture engages these five
dynamics at a decidedly higher level of government and public policy. This means that it views its
products as "public goods" in which commodity production and protection is the strategy. It is interesting
to note that in the inverted pendulum structure of figure 6.4 below, Airbus operates from the large,
massive, slow clockspeed level of government, while Boeing operates from the less massive, faster
clockspeed level of the corporation - a position metaphorically not unlike the tail being wagged by the
dog. The question therefore arises, "are these two different enterprise architectures a function of each
company simply reflecting the economic environmental model within which it arises", or is there some
deeper logic to the "architectural fit" between the products & services of the commercial aviation
industry.
212 From MIT Professor Charles Fine's Fall 2002 class "Technology Roadmapping".
180
Figure 6.4: Boeing vs. Airbus Stakeholder Emphasis
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5.3 Dynamic Complexity of Enterprises
The nature of commercial airplane financing, design and delivery is a very complex system with
significant feedbacks and time delays resulting in severe cycles of over- and under-investment and low
aggregate industry profitability, as shown in figure 6.5 below.
In the upper left of the figure, we see the customer (i.e. the Japanese airlines) who would demand
new airplanes to fuel capacity expansion of their networks. They therefore give Boeing money (flow of
capital is shown in yellow arrows) in return for products (flow shown in green arrows). The problem is
that the launch of a new commercial airplane program can cost as much as $10 billion and take as much
as 10 years to realize. A question for Boeing is simply "can you close the business case on a new airplane
program when demand is so cyclical and uncertain and fixed costs are so large and so high?" In effect,
every $10 billion launch of a new airplane program for a $40 billion revenue company is like betting the
ranch every decade. So where does the investment money come from? (The NPV diagram which is at
the center of the diagram is also at the center of the problem for Boeing and Airbus).
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Figure 6.5: Enterprise "Dynamic Complexity" and Feedback
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In the past, Boeing would share the costs and risks with the "launch customer" airlines, but the
business model of the large network carriers is making it difficult for them to underwrite new airplane
development. Therefore airplane manufacturers have begun to turn to their supply base (see lower right
of figure) for risk-sharing agreements. It is interesting to note the power of the customers and suppliers
in this relationship. The Japanese airlines will only buy airplanes from Boeing, if Boeing agrees to
provide work to Japanese suppliers - a situation called "offset agreements". Boeing therefore agrees,
provided that the suppliers agree to cover their own non-recurring production costs. But where do these
suppliers get such investment money?
The Japanese suppliers in turn provide tax revenues and votes to the Japanese political parties
which divert national tax revenues towards supporting the technology and production infrastructure costs
of bringing Boeing's production to Japan. But why would the Japanese government agree to indirectly
underwrite Boeing's development costs? One reason is that the Japanese economy gets skilled high-
technology jobs which they can build into an industry of their own in the future.
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The other reason comes from closing the "causal loop" diagram. The government agrees to
subsidize the supply base because it also wants a reliable and efficient national transportation network,
which it views as a strategic economic engine. Because the government does not want to outsource such
an important activity to foreign operators, they are willing to subsidize the Japanese air carriers via tax
breaks, soft-loans, etc. 2 13
So as can be seen, this is a complex enterprise, involving multiple international stakeholders,
whose destinies are all tied together. It illustrates the blurring of the definition of "government subsidies"
as for example one could construct an argument that the Japanese government is subsidizing its
participation in the offset arrangement. Importantly, we note that the decisions of these diverse
stakeholders may be distant in space and time, resulting in significant system dynamic complexity.
The size and complexity of such a stakeholder interest group, coupled with a focus on the long-
term explains why firms operating under such an environment tend to use tools and methodologies which
reveal that business cause and effect are not tightly-coupled in time and space, that is they have high
"dynamic complexity". Companies like Toyota and Southwest Airlines, therefore have begun to design
strategies which leverage the complexity of the shareholder-focused firm, and companies like Airbus have
begun to use methodologies like system dynamics to analyze the effects of such designs.2 4 ,21
The enterprise architectures of the two rivals (Boeing and Airbus) in the global airframe duopoly
are very different. Boeing's shorter-term shareholder-focus and Airbus' longer-term stakeholder focus
lead to very different strategies. The results of these two architectures are a likely reason for Airbus's
erosion of Boeing 's market share as shown in figure 1.27.
Finally, before we leave the topic of dynamic complexity of enterprises, I would like to make the
observation that if cause and effect are distant in space and time, then one would expect the same to be
true in how costs and revenues are accounted for in such dynamically complex enterprises. Business
213 In the US, government "bailout" of struggling airline carriers is done to preserve a functioning national air
transportation network, however, in the long-run such policies lead to high barriers-to-exit, ensuring continued
overcapacity in the market and lower profits for all airlines.
214 "Towards Better Government", PA Consulting Group paper.
215 Henry Birdseye Weil, MIT Spring 2002 course notes "Competitive Strategy".
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Week magazine recently ran an article on the commercial aerospace's industry's accounting practices216
It is interesting to note the popular business press' distain for the relatively obscure methods of "program
accounting", which allows aircraft manufacturers to offset steep upfront costs with distant payoffs. One
brokerage analyst remarked, "you can drive a truck through what's GAAP (Generally Accepted
Accounting Practices) in aircraft manufacturing", which is precisely my point - cause and effect are more
distant in space and time in this industry than the more traditional industries for which GAAP
unquestionably applies.
6.4 Enlarging the Stakeholder "Pie"
As shown in figure 6.6 below, the Shareholder-focused objective function is to maximize value to
shareholders, which can sometimes come at the expense of other stakeholders like employees and
suppliers in the form of mass layoffs which result in large swings in capacity. The economic valuation
principle is "financial (or internal) rate of return" 217 . This is known as the "zero-sum game" in which
some stakeholders must lose in order for others to win.
The Stakeholder-focused objective function is to maximize value for all (or more) stakeholders,
which is equivalent to enlarging the pie for all. Although the economic interaction of all stakeholders is
more indirect, it is not less valid - it only requires more sophisticated ways for evaluating the enterprise
success. The economic valuation principle is the economic rate of return"21 . This is known as the
famous "win-win" situation. As noted by PA Consulting, "stakeholder management creates 'virtuous
circles' among multiple stakeholders which perpetuates long-term success, while short-termist 'value-
grabbing' strategies on the other hand create 'vicious spirals' which encourage negative outcomes for all,
including shareholders." 219
216 BusinessWeek, "Boeing's Secret", May 20, 2002, pg. 110-120.
211 Prof. Benjamin Esty, "Boeing vs. Airbus: a Case of Failed Pre-emption"?
218 Ibid, Esty.
219 "Dynamic Strategy: Creating Shareholder Value Through Stakeholder Management", PA Consulting Group.
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Figure 6.6: Enlarging the Value Pie
Suppliers
Customers
Share-
Supplier holders
Customers Emplo
"Zero Sum Game"
Shareholders
Employees
I
E aCustoinmers 
Empl 
ue ePi
Enlarging the "Value Pie"
I will attempt to demonstrate in chapter 8 that world-class companies are expert in managing the
apparently counterintuitive discipline of simultaneously managing to the long- and short-term via taking
the care of all relevant stakeholders. As shown in figure 6.7 below, such companies recognize that there
is immense un-captured value embedded in aligning multiple stakeholders.
Figure 6.7: Un-captured Stakeholder Value (source: PA Consulting)
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6.5 Commodity Strategies
Airbus's multiple stakeholder point of view, allows (in fact, encourages) them to take a long-term
view. I will briefly investigate two objectives of the multiple-stakeholder view that leads to very different
strategies than Boeing employs.
First, the provision of a strong and efficient transportation network is seen as imperative to a
well-functioning common market. Therefore they view the air transport network as an integrated system
with both infrastructure fixed costs and variable costs. They observe that airline customers are "myopic"
(i.e. are short-sighted) and are unwilling to pay for expensive new airplane fleet. To avoid this non-
productive anti-investment cycle, the government employs the same strategy as the savvy commercial
products manufacturers/marketers: namely cross-subsidization of loss-leader complementary goods in
order to make profits back on the complementary service with lower variable costs.
As seen in figure 6.8 below, Gillette's strategy for giving away the relatively expensive razor
handle (infrastructure), in order to lock the customer into the Gillette shaving system, whereby profits are
made in the repeat business of low variable cost disposable razor blades. Likewise, the "corporation' of
the French, German, Spanish and British governments, effectively "give away" the relatively expensive
airplanes (infrastructure), in order to lock the passenger into the European air transport system, whereby
profits (in principle) are made in the repeat business of low variable cost business seat passengers. It is
important to note that even though these products (whether razors or jumbo jets) can be marketed and
sold as differentiated high-value products, they are sold and distributed as commodities.
Figure 6.8: Strategy of Subsidizing Loss-Leaders
Customers
ar Myopic European
short-sighted) Gillette Governments
"Loss-Leader"
Subsidk L)d
7nxd-Cost
InfrastructR se
"Profit-Maker"
Unsubsidized
Variable-Cost
Di s s Sell Seat-Kilmeters at a Prfit
Sell Razmr Blades at a Prmfit
186
!! - - - t - __.. - - -- __ - - - . - __ - - Aiii
Second, the provision of a stable employment environment is high on the stakeholder priority list
and, leads them to slow but steady growth and counter-cyclical production. This drives them to see their
output as commodities220 that are protected by government. As figure 6.9 shows, there is an economic
progression of eventual government protection from traditional "extraction" industries like agriculture,
towards low-technology goods like steel and finally, towards high-technology goods like aircraf . In
fact, it is interesting to note that Airbus was originally founded as a groupement d'interet economique
(GIE) which is a form of commercial partnership established by French law in the mid-1960's which was
intended to help wine growers.
Figure 6.9: The Progression of Economic Value (source: Pine)
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An example of this in the US is the Midwest, which for over 100 years served as the US
powerhouse for agricultural production (e.g. wheat and cattle). It became so efficient however that farm
subsidies became the norm until displaced workers could excel as manufacturers of airplane products, e.g.
the city of Wichita acquired the status of "the air capital of the world". It is interesting to note that the
next step in the expansion from manufacture of technology-based goods towards services is already
beginning to take place in the US heartland, as Airbus recently opened up an office in Wichita which
specializes in the design of wings for the A380 super jumbo - see figure 5.10 below.
220 "Commoditization of Technology-Based Products and Services: A Generic Model of Market Dynamics," Henry
Birdseye Weil, MIT International Center for Research on the Management of Technology.
221 Joe Pine, class presentation, Jim Utterback's Spring 2002, Managing Change in Product and Process Innovation.
222 Birds of Prey: Boeing vs. Airbus -A Battle for the Skies, Matthew Lynn, 1995, pg. 113.
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Figure 6.10: The Progression of Economic Value in the US Midwest
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Finally, it is also interesting to note that in its quest to produce the A380, Airbus recognizes the
informal "offset" agreements required to build and sell abroad. As a result, it states that approximately
50% of the suppliers and vendors for the A380 are located in the US which translates into approximately
223120,000 American jobs - therefore every order for an Airbus aircraft is a boost for the US economy.
Note that although the EU leads in this subsidization process, the US eventually follows as shown
in figure 6.11 below. The Economist recently noted that in the past two years, the US federal government
has come to the rescue of farming, steel and the airlines22 4.
Figure 6.11: Subsidization of Commodities
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2 "Transport on the Rebound?" Aviation Week & Space Technology, June 23, 2003, pg. 24.
224 "Extinction of the Car Giants", The Economist, June 14t 2003, pg. 11.
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Airbus can therefore afford to buy market share at the expense of profitability as seen in figure
1.27. And it is this growing market share that allows them to offer a family or platform of products,
which in turn grows their market share as shown in figure 6.12 below.
Figure 6.12: Reinforcing Dynamics of Attacking Market Share
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Henderson notes that such deliberate investments to buy market share in order to reduce future
costs (a.k.a. "dumping" or the sale of temporary excess capacity at marginal costs) should be encouraged
and is in fact a realistic and superior business strategy.225 Under such a strategy, the consumer is always
the beneficiary, while the principal victims are competitors seeking price stability.
Weil defines the stage of 'advanced commoditization' as "a competitive environment in which
product differentiation is difficult, customer loyalty and brand values are low, and sustainable advantage
comes primarily from cost (and often quality) leadership."2 26 In this light, it is clear that the commercial
airplane industry can be thought of as entering an advanced stage of commoditization. As shown in
figure 6.13 below, the three stages of commoditization have generic dynamic behaviors associated with
225 Stem, Carl W., and Stalk, George Jr., Perspectives on Strategy from the Boston Consulting Group, 1998, pg. 291.
226 "Commoditization of Technology-Based Products and Services: A Generic Model of Market Dynamics," Henry
Birdseye Weil, MIT International Center for Research on the Management of Technology.
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them. In fact, the advanced stage of commoditization is frequently met with severe cyclic behavior. It is
also interesting to note that such stages can be mapped to the dynamics of industrial innovation. 2 7
Figure 6.13: Stages of Commoditization
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5.6 Public vs. Private Goods
The nature of the aerospace industry is further complicated by the interaction between the defense
sector and the civil sector. Due to the highly competitive nature of the civil aviation industry, there is not
a lot of capital to spend on basic R&D in launching new products. The opposite is true however for civil
aviation's sister sector, the defense sector, where demand for high-performance products can be so
inelastic that significant government-led R&D investment provides significant developments.
The US has the world's largest military and space spending programs, which provides such
aerospace "public goods" as the B2 bomber and the Space Shuttle, as shown in figure 6.14 below.
Europe chooses to make its own big investments in aerospace development, but due to its history, elects
to funds it own "public" goods in the form of the Concorde SST and the new Airbus A380.
227 James Utterback, Mastering the Dynamics ofInnovation, 1994.
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Figure 6.14: Public Goods Delivering high Economic (not Financial) Rates of Return
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In both cases, government funds are used to support "public goods" in supported industries,
ranging from military and space to the national transportation of people and goods - all strategically
important industries.
A "public good" has two characteristics, it is "nonrival" (meaning that the marginal cost of its
provision to an additional consumer is zero) and it is "nonexclusive" (meaning that people can not be
excluded from using it).228  A major $10 billion tunnel or a $5 billion suspension bridge is therefore a
public good, in that once built the marginal cost of another driver going over it is effectively zero, and it is
difficult to collect revenue from it to pay for it during the lifetime of the public good - i.e. charging tolls
is both time consuming, expensive and if tolls leading to a reasonable return on investment were charged,
it would make travel on the bridge cost prohibitive. Although one might conclude that building such a
bridge would not be economically viable, this public good is provided as a means to stimulate economic
growth into an entire region, the social benefits of which can be shown to outweigh the costs with a rate
of return and payback period that is acceptable to an entire society. As case in point is the $14 billion
Boston Central Artery/Tunnel project, a bridge-tunnel asset for which 90% is being paid for by US
federal taxes, that is by taxpayers in 49 other states who are unlikely to ever use or directly benefit from
the project.
228 Microeconomics, Robert S. Pindyck and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 2001, pg. 593 and 644.
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As markets tend to undersupply public goods, governments can resolve the problem by either
supplying the good itself, or by altering incentives for private firms to produce it. The provision of public
transportation infrastructure asset like a major bridge or fleet of aircraft allows for an effective network of
"private" goods and services to be employed e.g. cars on the bridges or airlines on the aircraft, as shown
in figure 6.15 below. Taxpayers do not think twice about paying for roads and highways (the
infrastructure of transport), why not subsidize the air transport infrastructure (i.e. airplanes)?
Figure 6.15: Transportation Infrastructure Assets as Public Goods
Neither the US nor Europe's government-sponsored aerospace programs are judged on "financial
rate of return" grounds, but on "economic rate of return" grounds, as they provide skilled jobs, advanced
technology development, and strong strategic networks. The question for both Boeing and Airbus is how
efficient is the technology transferred from the commercial and military sides of each company's
operations.
To summarize the enterprise architectures of Boeing and Airbus using the enterprise physics
methodology developed herein, it appears that Boeing has higher value chain reactivity and customer
responsiveness than Airbus. But the interesting piece of the physics lies in the inertia or apparent inertia.
There is something clearly deflecting Boeing's profit trajectory downward. Could it be the pull of
Airbus' larger explicitly-defined stakeholder enterprise?
6.7 Macro- vs. Microeconomics
From the above discussions on public vs. private goods, it is clear that each engages a
different economic sector, namely the macro- and micro-economies respectively. The policy
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decisions in the realm of macroeconomics surround the topics of GDP output, unemployment
and inflation2 29. The corporate decisions in the realm of microeconomics surround the topics of
price, quantity and cost structure.
"More than any other sphere ofactivity, aerospace is a test of strength between states, in
which each participant deploys his technical and political forces."
These words, from a report to the French Parliament in 1977230 illustrate the nature of
competition and the scope of the relevant stakeholders that Airbus sees itself. It is conjectured that Airbus
explicitly engages the high-level topics of macroeconomics while Boeing engages the lower-level topics
of micro-economics.
The products of the commercial aircraft industry have long been the US' largest export231 . This
has a significant effect on the balance of trade (or U.S. balance of payments) and the currency exchange
rate.232
6.8 Quality of Relationships: Governance Profile
Having defined the quantity or extent of the enterprise stakeholders of Boeing and Airbus, I will
now attempt to discuss the quality of the relationships among the stakeholders. Both the quantity and the
quality are essential in defining the actual dynamic properties of the enterprises.
Jeffery Dyer describes the notion of a firm's relationships with its supply network as its
"Governance Profile."233 A firm's relationship with its supply network can have three general forms:
internal "vertical integration", external "arm's length contracts" and external (or internal) "virtual
integration. The pressures that define the basic need to outsource are shown in figure 6.16 below. In
general, if there are complex tasks to be managed or coordinated, firms are best placed to do this via
229 Macroeconomics, Olivier Blanchard, 2000, pg. 19.
230 Birds of Prey - Boeing vs. Airbus: a Battle for the Skies, Matthew Lynn, 1997.
231 Made In America: Regaining the Productive Edge, Michael L. Dertouzos, Richard K. Lester, Robert M. Solow,
pg. 201, 1989.
232 Macroeconomics, Olivier Blanchard, 2000, pg. 372.
233 Collaborative Advantage: Winning Through Extended Enterprise Supplier Networks, Jeffrey Dyer, 2000.
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internal hierarchy. However, if increased productivity is the goal, markets rather than firms are best-
suited for this.
Dyer notes the limits to arm's length relationships include less technology development taking
place as well as less risk-sharing throughout the supply base. The limits to vertical integration however
include loss of incentives to compete, loss of access to potential economies of scale, inability to raise
capital and generally higher labor costs. As will be discussed in Chapter 7, there is a clear industry
dynamic which describes the evolutionary swing from internal hierarchy to external specialization and
market efficiencies.
Figure 6.16: Integration-Disintegration Pressures (source: Dyer)
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As industries continue to evolve, there are further pressures to refine the relationships within the
governance profile towards more outsourcing, but less arm's length relationships. This interesting middle
ground, Dyer calls, "Virtual Integration" as shown in figure 6.17 below. The primary ingredients for
virtual integration are: Investments in dedicated assets, inter-organizational knowledge-sharing and inter-
organizational trust.
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Figure 6.17: Collaboration Pressures (source: Dyer)
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It is interesting to observe the profitability metrics (e.g. pretax return on assets) of companies
having different governance profiles. As can be seen from figure 6.18 below, those companies focused
on Partnership-based governance profiles exhibit from 2%-7% greater ROA than those companies whose
governance profiles are dominated by the traditional arm's length contracts.
As an aside, it is also interesting to note within the US automotive industry, that although Ford is
known as the lean manufacturing company, Chrysler (with 50% higher ROA) is known as the lean
enterprise company. We shall return to this topic again in chapter 7.
Figure 6.18: Profitability of Lean Enterprises (source: Dyer)
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Boeing, although in a different manufacturing sector than the other companies in the figure,
exhibits the traditional sub-5% ROA results that its fellow arm's length firms do. In fact, when we
compare the governance profiles of Boeing and Toyota as shown in figure 6.19 below, we see that there is
clearly an opportunity for Boeing to evolve its internal suppliers to become partner suppliers, who could
then become teaching centers to disseminate knowledge out to the supply base, converting "arm's length
companies to partner/suppliers.
Figure 6.19: Comparative Governance Profiles
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As a final anecdote on the importance of the quality of enterprise relationships, it is interesting to
observe the behavior of Toyota, a commanding value chain leader. As shown in figure 6.20 below, a
recent article of BusinessWeek magazine ran an editorial admonishing Toyota for foolishly subsidizing
one of its suppliers, implying that such behavior must certainly not be a characteristic of a leading
company.23 4 Yet ironically 10 pages later, Toyota's president Fujio Cho was cited in BusinessWeek's
annual list of the top international managers for Toyota's outstanding performance. Apparently US
business culture finds long-term, trust-based learning partnerships counterintuitive to sound financial
performance.
234 "Stop Feeding the Losers, Toyota", and "Managers to Watch", BusinessWeek, January 13, 2003 pp. 48 and 61.
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Figure 6.20: Toyota's Counterintuitive Enterprise Relationships
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In summary, the two notions of "enterprise boundaries" and "governance profile" work to define
the clockspeed and therefore the dynamics of the enterprise. They combine to define both the competitive
pull, where mass is beneficial, as well as organizational inertia where mass can be limiting. In this way,
stakeholder focus can add competitive pull, while virtual integration can streamline organizational mass
while maintaining value chain reactivity.
6.9 Growing Relationships: Dynamic Resources
Having defined the appropriate extent of the enterprise (i.e. the boundary), and then the interfaces
at the boundaries (i.e. the governance profile), I will now turn to how to grow the capabilities of the
enterprise through managing the dynamic resources. Charlie Fine235 captured the simple richness of the
feedback dynamics of projects (or resources) which along with making money, can create new
235 Clockspeed: Winning Industry Control in the Age of Temporary Advantage, Charles Fine, 1998, pg. 164-165.
Referenced from Dorothy Leonard-Barton, Wellsprings of Knowledge.
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capabilities which again in turn create new projects as shown if figure 6.21 below. Such reinforcing
behavior can either drive the company exponentially upwards if the core capabilities are positive, or
downwards if they become core rigidities.
Figure 6.21: The Dynamics of Resources and Capabilities (source: Fine, Leonard-Barton)
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Kim Warren notes that a firm's performance is a function of its ability to accumulate and retain
stocks of resources, which in turn is a function of its ability to manage its resource flows 23 6. The
interdependence between resources (stocks) and capabilities (flows) is implicit in the architecture of the
enterprise. Such a system dynamics view of the dynamics of resources (and therefore competitive
advantage) has become known as the "Dynamic Resource-Based View", DRBV.
In the simple generic structure of our industrial enterprise, shown in figure 6.22 below, we can
see that the strategic resources of workforce and inventory are driven by capabilities like productivity.
But an interesting question is, what drives capability?
236 "Strategic Performance Dynamics", Kim Warren, British Academy ofManagement Conference, 2002.
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Figure 6.22: Industrial Example of the Dynamics of Resources and Capabilities
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Warren notes that firms do not exhibit a uniform tendency to accumulate capability in any
resource-building task unless they have high learning effectiveness. 21 Other researchers2 8 note that
highly successful companies like Toyota have at the core of their corporate DNA, a highly effective
learning organization. This is a topic we shall return to in chapter 7, when we discuss what policies or
architecture enables such an environment.
Fine and Whitney 239 discovered some of the 'secrets' to Toyota's success in learning comes from
their dynamic assessment of the capabilities that they want to possess. In the classic make vs. buy
decision, most companies do not distinguish from the dynamics of this decision, that is, the stocks of
supply assets and the flows of knowledge capabilities as shown in figure 6.23 below.
237 "Strategic Performance Dynamics", Kim Warren, British Academy ofManagement Conference, 2002, pg. 11.
238 "Decoding the DNA of the Toyota Production System", Steven Spear and Kent Bowen, Harvard Business
Review, September-October 1999.
239 "Is the Make-vs. -Buy Decision Process a Core Competence?", Charles H. Fine and Daniel Whitney.
199
Figure 6.23: Supply vs. Knowledge Assets (source: Fine & Whitney)
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Toyota, on the other hand clearly distinguishes between product (or resource) supply and
infrastructure (or capability) supply. As shown in figure 6.24 below, Toyota takes the opposite view than
do most US competitors about what to outsource. Toyota holds onto to infrastructure or knowledge
assets, in order for them to learn how to build. They then build enough product to learn further, then
outsource capacity not knowledge. This allows them to further teach (and learn from) the enterprise.
Figure 6.24: Learn to Build, Build to Learn, Teach the Enterprise (source: Fine & Whitney)
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6.10 Chapter Summary
To summarize what we have discussed in chapter 6, we have examined the spectrum of
characteristics of a business endeavor ranging from the corporation to the enterprise. As shown in figure
6.25 below, we can begin to understand the philosophical differences between Boeing and Airbus.
Figure 6.25: Boeing vs. Airbus: The Rules of Engagement
World-class Corporation World-class Enterprise
Shareholder focus Stakeholder focus
Financial Rate of Return Economic Rate of Return
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Rapid Growth Expectations Slow Growth Expectations
Short-Term Planning Long-Term Planning
Production of Private Goods Production of Public Goods
Realm of Microeconomics Realm of Macroeconomics
Due to the embedded public-sector and private-sector nature of this business, it would be a
mistake to view the industry as in fact, a business. It is more accurately viewed as meta-business, or "big
business", in which national interests are at stake, whether these include an effective international
transportation network, an effective high-technology national workforce, or a satisfied stock market. In
order to win in this game, the successful enterprise will have to be as good on "the hill" (i.e. Capitol Hill)
as it is on "the street" (i.e. Wall Street).
This chapter discussed the importance of defining the quantity and quality of the relationships
that make up the extended enterprise. Using the commercial airplane industry as an example, I introduced
the notion of shareholders as an important but limited subset of an enterprise's stakeholders.
In addition to the enterprise composition, we then discussed the nature of the airline/aerospace
industry as operating within the realm of both private goods and public goods, which lead us to explore
strategies of typical protected commodities associated with public goods.
Finally, we ended with an introduction to the three-dimensional concurrent engineering
capabilities required for the concurrent design of the enterprise's products, production systems and supply
chain, expressed as dependencies on knowledge, capacity and governance profile, respectively.
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Chapter 7: Architecting Corporate & Product Strategies
From the microeconomic multi-firm enterprise, to the macroeconomic enterprise, I now turn
back to the dynamics of an individual firm, to use Enterprise Physics to help understand the dynamics of
the corporate architecture and its product selection and launch timing strategies.
7.1 Corporate Strategy: Market Dynamics
The Boeing Company is organized around two different market sectors in the commercial
aerospace industry: Commercial Airplanes and Integrated Defense Systems (which includes military
aircraft and missiles as well as space and communications), as shown in figure 7.1 below.
Figure 7.1: Primary Market Sectors of The Boeing Company
"il sCommunicadons and Alssifes
Integrated Defense Systems
-------------------
The market for BCA's products lies in the hands of airline companies, whether privately-owned,
publicly-held, or state-run as well as airplane leasing companies. BCA's primary competitor in this
space is Airbus Industrie (80% owned by EADS - the European Aeronautic Defense and Space
company). As can be seen from above, BCA accounts for over 50% of Boeing's revenues. The market
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for IDS' products lies largely in the hands of government military and space programs. IDS' primary
competitor in this space is Lockheed Martin.
Boeing's clear bipolar market composition can be exposed by examining the response of its stock
market valuation with respect to its competitors in the different market segments when the market is
subject to an exogenous shock like the September 1Ith attacks. Figure 7.2 below illustrates the effect of
this dynamic on the commercial airplane side of Boeing's business.
As both Boeing and EADS (Airbus) earn the majority of their revenues from commercial airplane
manufacture, their stock price valuation took a severe hit (relative to both the Standard & Poor's 500
index as sell as the S&P Aerospace Index) as the market recognized the impact of the terrorist attacks on
air transportation demand.
Figure 7.2: Effect of September 11 on Boeing Commercial Airplanes (source: Boeing)
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Conversely, the September 1 l' shock had the opposite effect on defense-related business, as
investors recognized the future growth in demand for defense assets in a new terrorist environment. As
can be seen in figure 7.3 below, Boeing's competitors in the defense markets had increased share prices
post-September 1 l, while Boeing, with the majority of its revenues coming from the commercial
airplane market, languished.
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Figure 7.3: Effect of September 1 lthon Boeing Integrated Defense Systems (source: Boeing)
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7.2 Product Strategy: When to Launch?
The launch of a new commercial airplane program represents an upfront investment cost of
approximately $10 billion and a development time on the order of 10 years. When considering which
new type of airplane to launch (see figure 7.4 below), and when to launch it, firms can use enterprise
physics to help understand market and industry dynamics.
Figure 7.4: Product Type and Launch Timing (source: The Boeing Company)
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To answer the difficult question of when to launch the next product, there are obviously a myriad
of complex considerations centered on the customer's needs, the competitor's strategies, etc. However
there is also an interesting dynamic that is embedded in the system that envelops both the customers and
the competitors: the profitability cycle as shown in figure 7.5 below.
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Figure 7.5: Airline Profitability
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The figure shows the profitability of the global airline industry over the last 30 years. The first
thing to note is that prior to 1978, the industry was under a stable, damped oscillation, reporting
negligible profits and losses since the beginning over 70 years ago. After 1978, however the enterprise
began oscillating wildly, and has done so ever since. What was going on in the dynamics of the
enterprise?
Prior to 1978, the industry had significant damping in the form of smoothing, leveling and
averaging, otherwise known as "regulation". After 1978, de-regulation made the system become oscillate
like a lightly damped pendulum. In fact, post 1978, I notice another interesting observation: there appears
to be a 10-year periodicity inherent in the dynamic enterprise. This may be related to the 10-year Juglar
machine investment cycles that I referred to in Chapter 2 (figure 2.7). In addition, the amplitude of
oscillation appears to be increasing with time.
When closing the business case on a $10 billion dollar gamble which could bring in $200 billion
in revenues over the next 20 years, launch timing is important, because receiving 5-10 years of increasing
sales will pull forward the NPV result more than launching in an environment where there will be 5-10
years of decreasing sales, thereby pushing future free cash flows out into the future where the time value
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of money works against you. This can be seen in figure 7.6 below, where the difference between hitting
and missing launch timing can mean as much as $12 billion in Net Present Value and can more than 15
years in break-evenA.
Figure 7.6: Project NPV
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7.3 Product Strategy: What to Launch?
An equally complex question surrounds marketing, and what product should you launch. What
attributes should it have? This is particularly difficult when the voice of the customer in today's
economic environment may not reflect what the customer wants when the product arrives in their fleet 10
years from now. This is a very complex systemic problem in which cause and effect are significantly
distant in space and time.
Most of the time, marketing decisions are bottom-up analyses made by assessing customer fleet
planning requirements and considering the competitor's long-term product strategy. Rarely does the
product strategy involve a long-term top-down assessment of the dynamics of the industry structure. But
as we will see, enterprise physics may shed some light on the problem.
240 Source: Marchini, Masashi, Piepenbrock, Taguchi, and Wright, MIT course 1.45 Construction Finance, Fall
2002.
207
............
Figure 7.7 below shows the development of products in commercial aircraft over the past 70
years. We can see that the "dominant design"24 ' of aluminum tube and wing with wing-mounted jet
engines arrived in 1955242, with marginal technological improvement in the 40 years since.
Figure 7.7: Dominant Design - Technology
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I couple this piece of knowledge with the observation that the occurrence of the dominant design
in the mid-1950's also coincided with the maximum number of firms in the industry as shown below in
figure 7.8.
Figure 7.8: Dominant Design - Firm Concentration
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241 Mastering the Dynamics ofInnovation, Harvard Business Press, James Utterback, 1996.
242 Lean Enterprise Value, Murman et al., Palgrave Press, 2002.
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James Utterback 243 noted that the emergence of a dominant design was approximately coincident
with the maximum number of firms in an industry. Before this time product innovation was the prime
competitive advantage and after this time, process innovation is the prime competitive advantage (see
figure 7.9 below).
Figure 7.9: Aerospace "Industrial Evolution" (source: Utterback)
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In fact in the evolution of any industry, Utterback notes that there are three distinct phases. The
first or "fluid" phase is characterized by craft production, in which products have high performance -
indicating the onset of the higher, faster, farther world. In the second or "transitional" phase, which is
characterized by segmented operations in mass production, products are characterized by their features,
around which a dominant design emerges. Finally, the third phase is characterized by integrated flow
243 Mastering the Dynamics ofInnovation, James Utterback, 1996.
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process in lean production, where quality, cost, delivery and reliability are the primary product
characteristics - indicating the onset of the better, faster, cheaper world.
In general, the evolution of an industry can be characterized by a classic technology or product or
firm S-curve. The above evolution is shown in figure 7.10 below with the fluid and transitional phases
combined for simplicity.
Figure 7.10: S-curve of Industrial Evolution
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Note that the examples shown above do not claim that Boeing, GM and IBM are not today "lean"
companies, but merely that they grew-up in a "mass" world and therefore have their DNA hardwired to
thrive in that environment. For them transition into the better, faster, cheaper world requires a
reprogramming or re-architecture. For companies that grew up in the better, faster, cheaper worlds in
their respective industries (like Airbus, Toyota and Dell) their DNA is hardwired to thrive in the post-
dominant design world
Recalling the enterprise physics from chapter 2, successful firms or value chains have different
dynamic characteristics in each phase of the S-Curve. In the rapid growth phase, successful firms will be
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configured to be fast clockspeed, that is their inertia will be relatively low, their damping will be
relatively low, and their stiffness or reactivity will be relatively high. In the mature phase, successful
firms will be configured to be slower clockspeed, that is their inertia will be relatively high, their damping
will be relatively high, and their stiffness or reactivity will be relatively low. There is an important
distinction however which will be discussed in detail in chapter 9 regarding the substructure and
superstructures of firms and value chains particularly in the mature phase of the industrial S-Curve2"4.
As seen in figure 7.10 above, the enterprise physics model can be applied both to understanding
the dynamics of firms as well as to the dynamics of the industry (within which the firm operates). Charlie
Fine explores the dynamics of industrial evolution further, by looking beyond the empirical notion of a
dominant design as a leading indicator or industrial evolution towards the forces that cause industrial
evolution via the "Double Helix".24 ' The pendulum in figure 7.11 below summarizes the forces which
cause firms and industries to swing from integral product and supply chain architectures to modular
product and supply chain architectures. The displacement trajectory of such an industrial pendulum can
be considered to be a double helix.
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244 I draw this distinction, because in the mature phase the clockspeed appears to be faster. I argue that this is the
case for the clockspeed of the superstructure, not the substructure and thus not the entire system.
245 Fine, Charles; Clockspeed: Winning Industry Control in an Age of Temporary Advantage, Perseus, 1998.
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Once again, this phase-shifted sinusoidal dynamic looks like a familiar application of the generic
structure of the second order-balancing loop with delays that was described in its general form in chapter
2. Therefore I can postulate another simplified pendulum model (as shown in figure 7.12 below) in which
product and process innovation are in oscillation just like displacement-velocity and inventory-workforce.
Figure 7.12: Generic Structure: Industry Dynamics
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From this industry dynamic, it appears that the industry is consolidating after the dominant
design, and is favoring the network process improvements associated with the 7E7. This observation is
borne out in research done by Eclat Consulting4 6 , which demonstrates that prior to deregulation of the
airline industry, airline travel capacity expansion was achieved via advancements in product technologies:
either larger planes or planes flying further. In contrast, after deregulation as the industry continued to
evolve from "higher, faster, farther" products, towards "better, faster cheaper" products and production
networks, travel capacity expansion was achieved via more frequent departures, as shown in figure 7.13
below.
246 From guest lecture by Eclat Consulting in MIT Fall 2002 course, The Airline Industry.
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Figure 7.13: Evolution of Airline Travel Growth Sources (source: Eclat Consulting)
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The question of which product to launch could be thought of within the system of which product
would best support the network within which it operates, given the abovementioned industry evolution
towards, "better, faster, cheaper". As figure 7.14 below shows, the lean network is one in which
passengers flow directly from point-to-point without having to be batched, while the mass network is one
in which passengers are batched into "sorting centers" 4 which is driven by network economies of scale.
The question of whether speed or efficiency of airplane fits best with the point-to-point lean network
model.
Figure 7.14: Better, Faster, Cheaper Networks
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27Lean Thinking, James Womack and Dan Jones, 1996.
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Finally, just as there are clear product and process evolutions, there is also an associated post-
dominant design organizational evolution. The "higher, faster, farther" world is characterized by vertical
functional organizations, while the "better, faster cheaper" world is characterized by horizontal process
organizations as shown in Figure 7.15 below.
Figure 7.15: Organizational Evolution
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There are different strategies that are appropriate as an organization emerges into the "better,
faster, cheaper" world, based on the economies of Scope, Speed and Scale24 (see figure 7.16 below). The
customer relationship management organization (a.k.a. marketing) is now driven by economies of scope,
that is, by the need to offer diverse, customized products and services. In the commercial aviation
industry, this might mean offering a broad product platform that leverages commonality. The product
innovation organization (a.k.a. engineering) is now driven by economies of speed, that is, by the need to
deliver product innovation faster to serve the rapidly changing needs of the customers. In the commercial
248 Hagel III, John and Singer Marc, "Unbundling the Corporation", Harvard Business Review, August 2000.
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aviation industry, this might mean reusing technical knowledge and expertise (e.g. knowledge-based
engineering, or three-dimensional model-based definition). The infrastructure management organization
(a.k.a. manufacturing) is driven by economies of scale, that is, by the need to improve asset utilization. In
the commercial aviation industry, this might mean being able to send multiple products down the same
assembly line or maintaining stable volume production to ensure workforce stability and maximize
production learning.
I
Figure 7.16: Organizational Strategies
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7.4 Product Strategy: the Dynamics of Disruptive Technologies
Clayton Christensen differentiates between a "Sustaining" and a "Disruptive Technology" 249 . A
sustaining technology is typically developed by companies that tend to have integral product and supply
chain architectures, who beat competitors with increased functionality (as in the "higher, faster, farther"
model). By comparison, a disruptive technology is typically developed by companies that tend to have
modular product and supply chain architectures, who beat competitors with speed and customization (as
in the "better, faster, cheaper" model).
As shown in figure 7.17 below, the performance trajectories of both supply (i.e. products) and
demand (i.e. customer preferences) are upward-sloping with respect to time, with technological
advancement typically growing at a faster rate than customers' ability to absorb the performance
increases. When a technology is under-serving the desired market, sustaining technological
improvements are made. In fact, such improvements are usually made in the quest for the more profitable
customer segment (upper in figure 7.17 below). Once a significant enough of the market becomes over-
served by the sustaining technology, a discontinuity called a "disruptive technology" often arises in which
a low-performance product targets undemanding customers. Often, the disruptive technology is
competing against non-consumption - that is against customers who simply weren't in the market.
Therefore a poor-performing product is often good enough to beat non-consumption. In response to this
movement, the incumbent product provider is more than happy to let go of the lower end of its market, in
the search for the more profitable upper end of the market. Large volumes of low profit customers allow
the disruptive technology to improve on its own sustaining technology trajectory, pushing the incumbent
out of higher and higher profit market segments. In fact, a disruptive technology is actually a misnomer,
it is actually a trivial technology using a disruptive business model.
249 The Innovator's Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail, Clayton M. Christensen, Harvard
Business School Press, 1997.
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Figure 7.17: Sustaining vs. Disruptive Technologies
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In the realm of commercial aviation, Boeing and Airbus are both developing new technologies
(the 7E7 and A380 respectively) that sustain the current business model, namely the hub-and-spokes
airline network. This philosophy tends to lead to the development of an ever more efficient fleet of
airplanes which can transport large numbers of passengers large distances between network hubs (i.e.
twin aisle, wide-body aircraft) and smaller single aisle, narrow-body aircraft that can transport smaller
numbers of passengers shorter distances from hubs to final point destinations.
An emerging business model that is beginning to challenge and dismantle the current hub-and-
spoke model of the large network carrier is the point-to-point business model of today's most profitable
airlines: Southwest, JetBlue, RyanAir and ValueJet. These low-fare airlines are targeting the underserved,
undemanding markets of leisure travelers - in fact Southwest was originally founded not to compete with
other airlines, but to compete with "non-consumption", that is with car, bus and train travel. As the
incumbent manufacturers retreat into smaller and smaller niche markets for larger airplanes, "disruptors"
like the Brazilian manufacturer, Embraer and the Canadian manufacturer, Bombardier are manufacturing
and selling inexpensive small products that are "good enough" for the underserved markets of the low-
fare carriers.
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As a case in point, JetBlue recently announced a large order of Embraer's new 190, a 100+ seat
airplane (shown in figure 7.18 below), which is beginning to cut right into Boeing and Airbus' profitable
cash-cow products, the 737/717 (bottom, right) and the A320 family (bottom, left).
Figure 7.18: The Disruptor (top) and the Disrupted (bottom)
Looking beyond the relatively new business model of the point-to-point, low fare carrier, one can
begin to see a more radical departure from the current network carrier model, and that is the distributed
ownership model offractional ownership.250 Bringing the traveler closer to the arrival of personal air
transportation, fractional aircraft ownership delivers the benefits of the point-to-point travel with the
added benefits of more customized departure times and locations. All this is done at a fraction of the cost
of owning the whole aircraft. Fractional aircraft ownership gives customers access to a large fleet of
private aircraft. It is interesting to note that Warren Buffet, "the world's most successful investor", who I
introduced in chapter 4 as bemoaning the airline industry as "the world's worst industry", has made
significant investments in NetJets, a rapidly growing fractional aircraft ownership company.
As shown in figure 7.19 below, the number of companies or individuals in the U.S. who owned a
share in business aircraft has exploded from 110 in 1993 to 3,694 only seven years later.5 In fact, the
fractional aircraft ownership business model has been growing at phenomenal 50% annual rates in a 5%
annual growth air travel market. Like Moore's Law of growth in semiconductor speed, this represents a
250 DrivingAirline Business Strategies through Emerging Technology, Nawal K. Taneja, Ashgate Press, 2002, pg.
123-125.
251 Financial Times, 6 November 2001, pg. 12.
218
doubling approximately every 18 months. This expansion exploits the point-to-point network dominance
of private aircraft which can fly in and out of approximately 5,400 airports in the U.S. compared to only
about 580 airports for the current scheduled airlines. 2
Figure 7.19: Growth of Fractional Aircraft Ownership vs. Growth of Demand for Air Travel
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This disruptive technology or business model has its own sustaining technology trajectory, as
fractional aircraft ownership companies are looking to offer supersonic business jets to their niche high-
margin customers.2 3
Casting an eye even further forward, one can use the framework herein to explore the dynamics
of future technological and business model evolution. As shown in figure 7.20 below, further
advancement of the disruptive point-to-point business model could lead to technologies that allow smaller
and smaller planes transporting undemanding, unprofitable customers where they want to go, when they
want to go. This trend might extend from the existing smaller 50-seat regional jets (which are flown by
much lower labor-cost pilots) down to the new proposed Eclipse mini-jet aircraft coupled with The
Nimbus Group's "air taxi" service in small 5-seat jets25 4.
252 Driving Airline Business Strategies through Emerging Technology, Nawal K. Taneja, 2002, pg. 125.
253 Ibid, pg 126.254 DrivingAirline Business Strategies through Emerging Technology, Nawal K. Taneja, Ashgate Press, 2002, pg.
126-127.
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Eventually, the dream of the personal air vehicle or aeromobile (not-unlike the current
automobile) may be realized, but a combination of a large underserved market of undemanding customers
will have to meet with a confluence of new technologies. In order to access the global population masses
(like automobiles) these technologies might include: UAV (unmanned air vehicle) avionics and flight
control systems to allow common (non-expert) users to drive the vehicle, VTOL (vertical take-off and
landing) to eliminate the need for conventional runways and airports, and ATM (air traffic management)
system to control and safely regulate the congested interactions of millions of aeromobiles. As an aside,
it is interesting to note that Boeing is already developing each of these technologies separately today.
Figure 7.20: Disruptive Technologies in Commercial Aviation
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Finally, a distinction must be underlined between the disruptive technologies, which support a
disruptive business model, and the sustaining technologies, which while very advanced and sophisticated,
only sustain the current business model. In this definition, the Concorde, with all of its advanced
technologies, flying a smaller number of people point-to-point, was after all a (possibly breakthrough)
sustaining technology as it sought to serve today's most profitable customers with a better product, not
unprofitable customers with a poor product. It is equally interesting to note that one of the world's most
successful enterprises, Toyota is quietly developing an air vehicle for an undemanding market with a price
under $100,000 (see figure 7.21 below).
220
Figure 7.21: Products for "Unprofitable" Customers?
Targeting "Profitable" Customers Targeting "Unprofitable" Customers
7.5 Product Strategy: the Dynamics of Game Theory
Finally, no product strategy discussion would be complete without an exploration of the
economic dynamics embedded in game theory. In a perfectly competitive (or even in monopolistic)
market, all firms are doing the best that they can and have no reason to change their price or output. The
same is not true, however in an oligopolistic market, where a few firms compete with each other and entry
by new firms is impeded. In such an oligopolistic market, each firm will want to do the best it can, given
what its competitors are doing. This leads to a stable state of equilibrium, known as a "Nash
Equilibrium"2" which I will discuss below in the context of the airplane manufacture market.
The market for the manufacture of large (100+ seat) airplanes is a clean example of this
oligopolistic market, as it has collapsed down into a duopoly due to barriers to entry and scale economies.
As discussed throughout this report, the two players in this duopoly are Boeing and Airbus. Although
each manufacturer would argue for higher degree of product (or product family) quality, aircraft today are
largely seen as homogenous or identical goods in which consumers consider only price when making their
purchasing decisions.
Assuming that it would be uneconomical for both Boeing and Airbus to develop a new airplane
due to the $10 billion development costs and the limited potential size of the market (say 1,000 planes
over 20 years), then the first-mover would have an advantage in capturing the market. For example,
assume theoretically that producing a new aircraft could yield a lifetime profit of $5 billion (after
25s Microeconomics, Robert S. Pindyck and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 5t edition, 2001, pg. 430.
221
repaying development costs) for either Boeing or Airbus, while not producing the aircraft would yield a
profit of $0. Conversely, if both companies developed the airplane, they would each lose $2.5 billion
(revenues minus development costs). Figure 7.22 below illustrate the payoffs in this hypothetical
example. If Boeing had the first mover advantage, it would be logical for them to develop the airplane
and take all of the $5b profits - the game, known as the "prisoner's dilemma" is solved, with the upper
right square representing the Nash Equilibrium.
Figure 7.22: "The Aircraft Manufacturers' Dilemma"
Airbus
Produce Don't Produce
Produce
Boeing
Don't Produce
When contemplating the development of a new aircraft, Krugman 216 noted however, that
government subsidies can have an important impact on the outcome of defining the Nash equilibrium.
If the European government preferred (for various macroeconomic or Economic Rate of Return reasons)
for Airbus to develop the new aircraft, they might commit to subsidizing the new plane (in accordance
with the 1992 GATT bilateral agreements) to the tune of $10b before Boeing has committed to produce
the plane. The new payoff matrix would change to that shown in figure 7.23 below.
256 "Is Free Trade Passe?", Paul R. Krugman, Journal ofEconomic Perspectives 1 (Fall 1987): 131-44.
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Figure 7.23: "The Aircraft Manufacturers' Dilemma" after Airbus Subsidy
Airbus
Produce Don't Produce
Produce -$2.5b, $7.5b $5.0b, $0
Boeing
Don't Produce $0, $15.Ob $0, $
Now, Airbus will make money from a new plane, whether or not Boeing produces one. Knowing
that Airbus will produce either way, Boeing will then decide not to produce in order not to lose money,
and the Nash Equilibrium has shifted to the lower left corner. The effect of the $10b subsidy therefore
changes the outcome for Airbus from one in which they don't produce and earn $0, to one in which they
do produce and they earn $15 billion. Of this, $5b is a direct transfer of profit from the US to the EU,
making the subsidy a worthwhile investment from a European perspective.
The traditional view that trade restrictions lead to economic deadweight losses to the society
carrying them out is therefore challenged in circumstances like the one above. Where there are
asymmetric national resources (e.g. Europe's comparative competitive advantage being its willingness to
subsidize a domestic industry, while the US is unwilling), there will be benefits transferred by the
unsuccessful competitor which outweigh the problems of the sacrificial deadweight losses.
Although this example was fictitious and based on the observations of Krugman , various
researchers25 8 have recently demonstrated similar benefits of policies which give domestic industries a
competitive advantage, in real cases like the Airbus A380.
257 "Is Free Trade Passd?", Paul R. Krugman, Journal ofEconomic Perspectives 1 (Fall 1987): 131-44.
258 "Airbus vs. Boeing: The Case of Failed Pre-emption", Benjamin Esty, Harvard Business School Press.
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7.6 Production Strategy: Velocity
Having decided on what products to launch and when to launch them, it is also important to
consider how many to make, or more importantly what is the velocity of which they are made?
Underlying this is the complicated question of meeting customer demand and/or taking market share,
and/or maintaining capabilities through continuous learning and improvement.
As shown in figure 7.24 below, Boeing and Airbus have had different philosophies with respect to
production velocities (or rates, taken as the slope of the production output curves). In general, Boeing
appears to have a greater ability (or simply desire) to achieve both higher rates of production as well as
higher rates of negative production (i.e. ramping-down speed). Note that Boeing's maximum ramping-
down rate over the past 30 years is an order of magnitude steeper than Airbus'.
Figure 7.24: Boeing and Airbus Production Output and Production Velocities
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One can also express the above data in another way to observe the underlying market shares of
each competitor as shown in figure 7.25 below. This leads to the question, is growing market share
simply correlated to or caused by stability in output. We will return to this question in chapter 9.
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Figure 7.25: Boeing and Airbus' Share of Deliveries
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7.7 Corporate Strategic Choices: "The Race to the Bottom" vs. "The March to the Top"
Finally, pulling together some of the concepts developed in this chapter, I offer an illustrative
example to compare corporate strategic choices with the computer industry. I begin by observing that
Boeing's corporate DNA is firmly rooted engineering and the ability to produce world-class high-
performance products. This is obvious, as Boeing grew-up in the pre-dominant-design "higher, faster,
farther" industrial phase. The commercial aerospace industry is currently in its post-dominant-design
"better, faster, cheaper" industrial phase, and its current competitor, Airbus is a product of this phase.
In order to deliver its HFF products, Boeing evolved strong functional silos to support its
integrated product and supply chain architectures. It had embarked on a path of developing "sustaining
technologies" to "underserved" markets until Airbus entered the game. Conversely, in order for Airbus
to deliver its BFC products, it chose the "race to the bottom" (line) by commoditizing its products. This
called for a modular product and supply chain architecture.
Boeing, therefore has a choice, to enter the race to the bottom, by transitioning from its "niche
performance" strategy towards a "cost leadership" strategy, or it can maintain its "niche performance"
strategy, but march to the top of the economic offering away from manufacturing and toward services. In
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this example, Boeing is like the classic computer powerhouse, IBM, which had a similar HFF DNA and
transitioned successfully in their new march to the top. Airbus is like the new computer powerhouse, Dell
which has the same BFC DNA and is committed to the race to the bottom. See figure 7.26 below.
Figure 7.26: "Race to the Bottom" vs. "March to the Top" Corporate Strategies
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7.8 Chapter Summary
This chapter discussed the corporate and product strategy dynamics for the aerospace industry.
We began by demonstrating how an exogenous shock in the markets reveals the underlying market
differences of commercial and military aerospace products.
We then explored the 10-year dynamics of customer profitability and how it might affect the
timing of new product introductions, particularly in the highly capital intensive, long lead-time world of
commercial aviation.
We then explored the 100-year dynamics of industry innovation and consolidation, recognizing
the industrial evolution from "higher, faster, farther" to "better, faster, cheaper" products is based on the
emergence of a dominant design in an industry, which occurred in aerospace approximately 50 years ago.
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We complemented this analysis with observations that disruptive technologies in commercial
aviation are likely to continue to dissolve the network hub and spokes model toward more point-to-point,
possibly even radically over time.
Finally, we discussed the notion of game theory as applied in the commercial aviation duopoly.
We noted that there is an argument of subsidized new product introduction by Airbus is an effective
strategy, due to the nature of their social enterprise.
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Chapter 8: The Architecture of Corporate Financial Dynamics
8.1 Product Markets vs. Capital Markets
We began in chapter 2 discussing a model of an enterprise where the dynamics of customer
demand drives the dynamics of the corporation, as a wave of customer order information propagates up
the value system and a wave of products is reflected back down the value system towards the customer as
shown on the left side of figure 8.1 below.
In this chapter, we will examine another dynamic demand, this time not from customers
demanding products, but from shareholders demanding profits (and growth), as a wave of shareholder
expectations propagates up the value system and a wave of earnings is reflected back down the value
system towards the shareholders as shown on the right side of figure 8.1 below
2 9
.
Figure 8.1: Structural Dynamics in the Product Markets as well as in the Capital Markets
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Although one might conjecture that the two dynamics are the same (as fulfilling product orders
should equate to profitability), there is "dynamic complexity" embedded in this system, where cause and
2 5 9 M.F.M. Osborne contentiously investigates whether or not a capital market is in fact a market for capital and just
how important it is as a source of capital in The Stock Market and Finance from a Physicist's Viewpoint, 1977, pg.
6.
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effect are distant in space and time. One of the many examples of this for durable goods like airplanes is
that while demand for product is inherently very cyclical, the shareholder valuation of these cyclical
companies is not. We shall discuss this next.
8.2 Valuing Cyclical Companies
Managers of cyclical companies who are focused primarily on shareholder value creation have a
very difficult job, as McKinsey & Company 60 notes that Wall Street forecasts of cyclical companies do
not even acknowledge the existence of a cycle. Figure 8.2 below compares the actual earnings per share
with the forecasted earnings per share. No matter where the company is in its cycle, the analyst's
forward projections are the same. It is no wonder that it is so difficult to manage a cyclical company,
when the stock markets can't even value it correctly. One must ask therefore, whether basing
management decisions on metrics tied to poor valuation techniques is the right thing to do.
Figure 8.2: Valuing Cyclical Companies
Actual Forecast
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260 McKinsey Quarterly, "Valuing Cyclical Companies", Marco de Heer and Timothy Koller, 1998.
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The question of how to get investors to prevent cyclicality relies first on understanding the causes
as show in figure 8.3 below. 261
Figure 8.3: Four Causes of Cyclicality
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8.3 Expectations Clockspeed
This leaves us with the question, what metrics do the capital markets use to establish
expectations?
Total Returns to Shareholders (TRS) that is the share price appreciation plus dividends is one of
the cleanest ways to measure corporate performance. However, it does not cut through the noise of the
market to articulate exactly how a corporation is creating value. It is the delivery of "surprises" that
produces higher or lower total shareholder returns compared to the market. McKinsey & Company 262
notes that Wall Street resets it expectations in line with past performance - they have called it the
"expectations treadmill". Therefore the speed of the expectations treadmill - i.e. the market's
"expectations clockspeed" greatly defines a corporation's TRS. I liken TRS therefore to a "rate" of value,
which does not describe the whole picture of a corporation's value. We must look for a complementary
concept - a "stock" of value.
261 "Wooing Investors to Prevent Cyclicality", Paul Butler, Panos Ninios, Hendrik Sabert and John Morecroft,
McKinsey Quarterly, 1998, Number 1.
2 62 McKinsey Quarterly, "The Expectations Treadmill", Richaid Dobbs and Timothy Koller, 1998.
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Market Value-Added, (MVA), i.e. the difference between the market value of a company's debt
and equity and the amount of capital invested can be thought of as the current speed of the treadmill, or
the current level of the stock of value. Together TRS and MVA combine to give a more holistic view of
the dynamics of corporate valuation.
8.4 Value Metrics
This leaves us with the question, "what metric(s) do managers use to drive shareholder value in
cyclic companies?" Copeland et al. propose that there should be a comprehensive value metrics
framework as shown in figure 8.4 below.263
Figure 8.4: Comprehensive Value Metrics Framework
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8.5 The Profit-Growth Dynamic
As with the generic structure of the oscillating pendulum, we saw trade-offs
displacement, workforce and inventory, product innovation and process innovation.
the area of financial metrics. The value that the financial markets assign to a
between velocity and
The same is true in
company reflects its
263 Copeland, Koller, and Murrin, Valuation, pg. 56.
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prospects for growth and profitability - but as with most things there is a dynamic interaction between the
two.
A simple metric that is used by many companies which attempts to capture both quantities is
Economic Value Added (EVA), or Economic Profit (EP) as shown in figure 8.5 below. Economic profit
is simply the spread between the Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) minus the Weighted Average Cost of
Capital (WACC) times the capital employed. If we considered the sustainability of the spread between
ROIC and WACC, we would have a measure of the value of growth for the company.
Figure 8.5: Economic Value Added or Economic Profit
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economic profit rewards harvesting or anti-growth behavior. The preferred way to run a business is to
invest at rates of return that exceed the cost of capital. However it is often easier to improve economic
264 "Economic Value Added", Eric E. Olsen, Boston Consulting Group's Perspectives on Strategy, 1996.
2615bd p.12
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profit (at least in the short term) by reducing assets faster than earnings, otherwise known as "milking the
business". Short-term and long-term profit objectives must be considered.
This leads to the question of the value of market share in the quest for profitability. This profit-
growth dynamic has caused a great deal of discussion and research over the past 30 years, particularly
regarding the relationship between market share and profitability. One of the more well-known, extensive
and controversial studies on this topic is the PIMS or Profit Impact ofMarket Strategy initiative266 . The
findings of this multi-company, multi-year research was that market share can be an important
determinant of profitability, particularly in companies or firms which exhibit the positive feedback
behavior of economies of scale, positive network externalities, etc.
A simple analysis of Boeing's profitability and market share (vis a vis Airbus) over the past 25
years shows that there appears to be some correlation between market share and profitability (net income)
in the commercial aircraft industry (see figure 8.6 below).
Figure 8.6: Boeing's Market-Share and Profitability Relationship
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266 Buzzell & Gale, The PIMS Principles, 1987.
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8.6 Optimum Rate of Growth
In balancing the growth and profitability dynamic, there is an optimum (or sustainable, or
balanced) rate of growth for an enterprise that is significantly slower than the maximum possible rate of
growth. This leads to the observation that sales growth is not necessarily something to be maximized - a
topic which we will discuss in the next chapter.
Higgins examines this optimum rate of growth as being dependent on financial resources.
2 67 As
increased sales requires more assets, retained profits and the accompanying new borrowing may generate
some new cash, but unless the company is willing and able to sell new equity, there is a limit on growth.
Higgins demonstrates that the growth rate in sales is limited by the rate at which owners' equity expands
which can be expressed in the simple equation shown in figure 8.7 below. Note that Profit Margin and
Asset Turnover are operating performance measures, while Retention Ratio and Financial Leverage are
financial policies.
Figure 8.7: Equation for Sustainable Growth Rate
Balanced Growth =
Profit Margin * Retention Ratio * Asset Turnover * Financial Leverage
When this type of financial analysis is applied to The Boeing Compan/ 68 over the past 4 years, it
is clear that Boeing's actual growth rate is well below its sustainable growth, as can be seen from figure
8.8 below.
267 Analyisfor Financial Management, Robert C. Higgins, 7' edition, McGraw-Hill, 2004, pgs. 115-138.
268 This analysis refers to The Boeing Company in ful, and not just the Boeing Commercial Airplanes Group.
235
. ... . ... . .... . ... 
25
20
15
10
('0U) 5
0
.~-5
o -10
(-15
Figure 8.8: Boeing's Sustainable Growth Rate (1999-2002)
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The diagonal lines represent Boeing's balanced growth rate. If above and to the left of these
lines, a company is operating with cash deficits, that is the company is growing too quickly, while if
below and to the right of the lines, a company is operating with cash surpluses and is growing more
slowly than is balanced. Boeing, like many mature companies is faced with the dilemma of generating
excess cash generated than is needed to run the business efficiently. From the equation above, it is clear
that the solutions include returning more cash back to the shareholders in the form of greater dividends or
buying growth, that is diversifying into other businesses, which is exactly what Boeing has done in the
past 5-6 years with the acquisition of McDonnell Douglas aircraft and other space-related businesses. It
is important to note that "buying growth" delivers shareholder value if and only if it is "good growth" that
is the returns on invested capital exceed the cost of capital. And finally as Higgins points out, although
diversified acquisitions appear to be logical, the financial evidence indicates that if shareholders wanted
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the risk reduction benefits of a conglomerate merger, they could achieve them much more simply by
owning shares of the two independent companies in their own portfolios.
269
It is interesting to compare qualitatively Boeing and Airbus' relative positions with respect to
sustainable growth. As was shown previously in figure 8.9, Boeing maintains relatively stable returns on
assets, with more variable growth rates which largely reflect the demands in the market place. Airbus on
the other hand is closer to balanced growth as it accepts lower returns on assets in exchange for
consistent, positive sales growth. I will return to this topic in the next chapter under the topic of stability.
Figure 8.9: Qualitative Assessment of Boeing and Airbus' Sustainable Growth Rates
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In order to qualitatively estimate the relationships between Boeing and Airbus' relative
clockspeeds, we could map their respective growth rates onto a general enterprise response spectrum as
shown in figure 8.10 below. Boeing's relatively large dynamic amplification of the underlying demand
signal indicates that they are in the resonance range having a fast-to-medium clockspeed. Airbus'
relatively small dynamic amplification of the underlying demand signal indicates that they likely have a
269 Analysisfor Financial Management, Robert C. Higgins, 7t edition, McGraw-Hill, 2004, pgs. 312-313.
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slower clockspeed (i.e. to the right of Boeing), and or they have more enterprise damping (i.e. on a lower
curve than Boeing).
Figure 8.10: The Physics of Boeing and Airbus' Sustainable Growth Rates
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World-class companies like Southwest Airlines understand the simple dynamics of financial
growth and profitability, and use more systemic metrics to drive long-term performance. Figure 8.11
below shows the extremes of the fastest and slowest balanced growth rates for Southwest from the years
of 1993 - 2001.
There are a number of observations to make. First, the range of balanced growth rates is very
small, demonstrating a stable metric. Second, Southwest's actual performance points are very close to the
balanced targets. Third, the range of actual performance points from 1993-2001 ha a greater horizontal
scatter than vertical scatter (as shown by the dotted ellipse). This indicates that stable growth seems to
be sought at the expense of more variable returns.
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Figure 8.11: Southwest Airline's Sustainable Growth Rates (1993-2001)
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8.7 Financial Architecture
Finally, the relationship of the capital structure of firms (i.e. its strategic choice of debt and equity
financing) and the competitive capabilities of firms has been observed in recent years.270 271 Simerly et al.
present empirical evidence that firms in stable, static environments that exhibit high-performance have a
relatively high leverage ratio, while firms in dynamic environments that exhibit high-performance have
relative low leverage ratios. 72 In a development of Modigliani and Miller's Nobel prize-winning work2
73
it appears that financial architecture (i.e. capital structure) does in fact drive firm performance.
Stalk et al. note that the use of debt as a strategic weapon remains a powerful influence on
competition. They state that, "Many North American companies are yielding an unfair competitive
270 Simerly (2000), pg. 32.
21 Porter (1992).
272 It is interesting to note that there is a positive reinforcing loop working as high leverage creates a more stable
environment for the firm which leads to higher firm performance, which leads to sustained debt load. Conversely,
low leverage creates a less stable environment for the firm which leads to higher firm performance, which leads to
low sustained debt levels.
273 Modigliani and Miller, (1958).
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advantage to their Japanese and European competitors by refusing to remove the debt umbrella they hold
over their less-strong competitors".2 7 4 Their colleague Bruce Henderson provocatively warns, "use more
debt than your competition or get out of the business."7
On a macro-level, the MIT Commission on Industrial Productivity noted that "Japanese firms
have been willing to take on high levels of debt in order to invest in new production capacity and
marketing infrastructure... in effect they have been investing to grow demand. U.S. companies are
usually reluctant to adopt such policies, because they entail a sacrifice of short-term profits and higher
risks to shareholders. This concern with short-term profitability undermined or inhibited cooperative
relationships." 2 76
More interestingly was their hypothesis for the explanation of the short-term bias in American
industry, which they noted was due to a higher cost of capital in the US than in Japan. This was a
function of Japanese (and European) desire to raise capital in the debt markets and less from the open
sales of securities in the capital markets. Finally, this can be attributed from a macro-economic point of
view to the relatively low rate of personal savings and high rate of government deficit spending in the US.
In fact the differences in financial architecture and corporate strategy can be seen in the following
rankings of corporate objectives in both the US and Japan (see figure 8.12 below).7
274 Stalk et al., pg. 21.
275 Ibid.
2 76 Dertouzos et al. pp. 53-63.
277 Dertouzos et al. (1989) pg. 63.
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Figure 8.12: U.S. and Japanese Ranking of Corporate Objectives
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This ranking is particularly telling of the industrial strategies of Japanese and European firms
pursuing slow growth, market share based strategies, particularly when one views market share as a proxy
for long-term investment as proposed by Henderson. 278
8.8 Chapter Summary
This chapter introduced the dynamics of corporate finance. First, I introduced the oscillatory
dynamic nature of revenue growth and profit or earnings growth. This uncovered the need for a unified
metric, Economic Profit, which is an important integrative measure, but taken by itself can lead to short-
term company harvesting.
Then, we explored the dynamics of shareholder value as represented by the stock and flow
analogy of Market Value Added (MVA) and Total Return to Shareholders (TRS), finally noting that the
markets do not explicitly value the cyclicality of cyclic companies, making it very difficult to manage
these companies.
278 Bruce Henderson, (1979).
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Finally, we looked at the financial architecture of a corporation, recognizing that an equity-
weighted architecture is an excellent structure for high-growth companies, while a high-leverage
architecture ensure financial discipline in older, more mature companies, particularly in industries with
slow project growth rates, like aerospace.
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Chapter 9: Architecting Innovative Enterprise Solutions
Having put in place some simple analytical frameworks to define the dynamic characteristics of
enterprises, I now turn briefly to explore some possibly innovative and counterintuitive enterprise design
solutions. In fact, I will propose a definition of "Lean" based on the principles of enterprise physics that
were derived in Part I.
9.1 What is Lean?
The Toyota Production System (a.k.a. "Lean") has been studied extensively since the 1980S.279
One of the easiest ways to picture complex phenomena is via a metaphor. A lean enterprise is a difficult
and often counterintuitive way to conceive a business. One way to visualize it and compare it to the
traditional mass enterprise is via the metaphor shown in figure 9.1 below.
Figure 9.1: Mass vs. Lean Enterprise Metaphor
Integrated "Lean" Enterprise:
- In maturelsaturated markets, with reducedivarlable
customer in-flows...
Construct a right-sized, Integrated, flexible enterprise
to capture value so that..
- Waste is eliminated and flexibility is maximized,
Traditional "Mass" Enterprise
- In a rapidly growing homogenous market,
with large customer in-flows..-
- Construct a large, expensive, inflexible monument
to capture value, but
Poor Integration creates holes through which value
leaks out (waste!)
The traditional "mass enterprise" grew out of rapidly-growing homogenous markets with large
customer inflows (e.g. Henry Ford's Model T). The optimum solution in such an environment is to
construct a large, expensive inflexible monument to capture all the value. In such an environment,
specialization of tasks into vertical functional silos tends to mean poor integration along the value stream,
279 See Appendix H for a chronology of research on Lean.
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leaving many opportunities for holes in the infrastructure through which value leaks out (i.e. waste). The
"lean enterprise" on the other hand grew out of mature, saturated markets with reduced and variable
customer in-flows. The optimum solution in such an environment is to construct a right-sized, integrated
flexible enterprise to capture the value so that waste is eliminated and flexibility is maximized.
9.2 Lean and the "Three Evils"
The architect of the Toyota Production System, Taiichi Ohno, identified the "three evils" of lean:
muda, muri and mura2 10 . These define "what" is lean, while the sequence of: flow, takt and pull, define
the "how" to achieve lean. Figure 9.2 below shows how a lean enterprise maps to eliminate the "three
evils". Step 1 is to plug up the holes or the sources of waste (muda). One important way to do this from
an architectural level is to redesign the enterprise to be less vertical functional siloed and more horizontal
customer flow focused. The second step is to make the rigid monument more flexible (to eliminate muri),
like the water balloon that expands and contracts to capture the value of the customer. Finally, the value
chain leader needs to control variability (mura) of flow into the enterprise via controlling the faucet
spigot.
Figure 9.2: Lean Enterprise and the "Three Evils"
1. Remove Waste (Muda)
2. Flexible Enterprise (Muri)
3. Control Variability of Input (Mura)
3
20 T2
280 Toyota Production System, Taiichi Ohino, Productivity Press, 1978, pg. 41.
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Finally Figure 9.3 below ties this metaphor back to the enterprise dynamics methodology, in
which the lean enterprise is compared to a pendulum. Stability or elimination of mura is the first and
most necessary step. Various researchers have noted that most process improvement methodologies
mandate the establishment of stability prior to the implementation of "flow" and "pull".
28
' In the
pendulum this is achieved through damping or "base isolating" the enterprise from the input signal. The
achievement of "flow", "takt" and "pull" are subsequent steps to focus on speeding up the enterprise
clockspeed, matching it to "resonate" with the customer clockspeed (or "takt"), which in the pendulum
analogy consists of shortening the length of the pendulum and decreasing the size of the inertial mass.
Figure 9.3: Lean Enterprise and Enterprise Physics
1. Remove Waste (Muda) 1. Inertia (Size,Density & Complexity)
2. Flexible Enterprise (Muri) 2. Flexibility (Length of Pendulum)
3. Control Variability of Input (Mura) 3. Damping (Customer Responsiveness)
"Flow" Model Pendulum Model
3 T- Stability M0
I 2
Flw, Takt & Pull
Before we leave this topic, it is interesting to note that the above achievement of a lean enterprise
via the elimination of the three evils of muda, muri and mura is very similar to the design of a servo-
feedback control system. As Graham and McRuer noted in 1961, "any useful feedback control system is
designed to secure, usually in turn: stability, accuracy and speed of response. Unfortunately, the same
factors which tend to improve speed and accuracy often produce instability, and if the system oscillates
281 Cutcher-Gershenfeld, J. and Rebentisch, E., "The Impact of Instability on Complex Social and Technical
Systems", Proceedings of the ESD Internal Symposium, May 29-30, 2002, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Engineering Systems Division, Cambridge, Massachusetts, pp. 69-90.
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wildly, it is useless." 2 2 Although many corporations have noted this apparent tradeoff, I will describe
below three generic enterprise architectural solutions, with some being more capable of delivering a more
robust enterprise with stability, accuracy and speed of response.
9.3 The Industrial Evolution
The mass and lean models can be seen as industrial archetypes which were born out of the
economic conditions of their time. Industries, like all growing organisms and organizations, have an S-
shaped growth profile. One can therefore conceptually map the industrial archetypes to the evolutionary
growth patterns of an industry as is shown in figure 9.4 below.
Figure 9.4: The Industrial Evolution
Industrial Output
A
I
Phase: Better, Faster, Cheaper
Market: Saturated, Customer-Pull
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Supply Chain: Modular
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Aerospace Examples: Airbus
Auto Examples: Toyota, Honda
Computer Examples: Dell
Phase: Higher, Faster, Farther
Market: Growing, Producer-Push
Products: High-Perform. features, Integral Arch.
Production: Mass (segmented operations)
Supply Chain: Integral
Organization: Vertical Functional (Type II)
Aerospace Examples: Boeing
Auto Examples: Ford, GM, Chrysler
Computer Examples: IBM
Time
Dominant
Design
While an enterprise experiences many types of exogenous shocks during its lifetime, there are
undoubtedly primary drivers which govern the dynamics of the enterprise. As shown in figure 9.5 below,
the governing dynamics of each industrial archetype are different.
282 Analysis ofNonlinear Control Systems, Dunstan Graham and Duane McRuer, John Wiley and Sons, 1961. pg. 3.
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Figure 9.5: Dynamic Drivers of the Industrial Evolution
IndustrialIutit Market-Driven Customer-DrivenOutput Profit Dynamics Product Dynamics
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Purchasers of Stock Purchasers of Product
Time
For the mass enterprise, growth is an important driver, and with growth comes risk. As a result,
mass enterprises find themselves subject to the dynamic demands of the capital markets. Once an
industry matures beyond its dominant design, growth becomes overtaken by the need for stability as 
the
power in an industry shifts from the producer to the consumer.
Noting the different drivers of the different industrial phases, (i.e. growth dominating the
higher-faster-farther world and stability dominating the better-faster-cheaper world.) we can now see how
firms in these industries are "hardwired" to respond to changing environments, using the principles of
enterprise physics that we laid out in Part I.
As seen in figure 9.6 below, mass-oriented enterprises possess architectures that are built for
rapid growth, they are hard-wired to move without delays in the higher-faster-farther world because they
can and because they must. Uninhibited exponential growth defines the dynamic behavior of such
enterprises. Once a dominant design emerges followed by a consolidation and shakeout of the industry,
the better-faster-cheaper world begins, giving birth to lean enterprises that possess architectures that are
built for stability (i.e. restrained growth), while mass enterprises overshoot & oscillate.
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Figure 9.6: HFF Architecture: Built For Growth; BFC Architecture: Built for Stability
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In order to test the above hypothesis about the dynamic nature of the different architectures, we
return to the dataset of a dynamically complex industry: the international automotive industry.
2 3
When one looks at the growth of an industry like the automotive industry for example, one can
see the underlying dynamic modes of the mass model (as typified by the U.S. producers who were "born"
in the pre-dominant design era) and the lean model (as typified by the Japanese producers who were
"born" in the post-dominant-design era). As can be seen in figure 9.7 below, the mass producers are
locked into an oscillating mode characterized by a balancing loop with delays, while the lean producers
are still on an exponential growth pattern characterized by a reinforcing loop.
283 Again, data is taken from Womack, Jones & Roos, The Machine that Changed the World, 1990.
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Figure 9.7: Dynamic Modes of Mass and Lean Enterprises in the Automotive Industry
Mass: Lean:
Balancing Loop Reinforcing Loop
with Delays with Delays
Lean
20 --
0 15 -- Mass
0
00-
0 I--
1947 1954 1961 1968 1975 1982 1989
Year
A more careful examination of the above dynamic response of the two architectures reveals
something deeper in the dynamic structure and behavior. As shown in figure 9.8 below, the mass
enterprise transitions from reinforcing behavior without delays to balancing behavior with delays
(causing oscillation) after the dominant design. Conversely, the lean enterprise (which begins its life near
the emergence of a dominant design) begins its life with reinforcing behavior with delays (i.e. restrained
growth), and transitions to balancing behavior without delays (suppressing oscillation).
As both types of architectures each begin to grow (separated in time by almost 50 years), one can
see the effects of delays on positive, reinforcing (exponential) growth in the form of "flatter" growth
curves in the case of the lean architecture.
Note also that it appears that the lean enterprises in the automotive industry have reached an
inflection point in their growth trajectory around 1980, beyond which balancing (or goal-seeking)
behavior has taken hold.
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Figure 9.8: The Structures Behind the Architectures
Mass:
Reinforcing Loop
without Delays
Dominant
15-+
10
5
1947
Mass:
Bafancyn Loop ........
with Delays ...--
Dominant Lean:Design Reirftocing Loop
Lean:
Balancing Loop
M-1 LeanwitH Liays wItu IUU eays
B
- B
Mass
1954 1961 1968 1975 1982 1989
In order to understand and apply the archetypal models of mass and lean, let us next study the
case of military and commercial airplane production. As can be seen in figure 9.9 below, the total output
of commercial airplanes over the past 100 years has been growing relatively slowly with total annual
production today varying between of around between 500 and 1,000 aircraft. This is in response to a
steady growth in demand of passenger-kilometers of around 5% per year.
The total output of military airplanes exhibits wildly varying behavior, as annual output in
between wars averages around 5,000, while wartime production can range from a doubling to more than a
ten-fold increase. Such variable conditions are not well-suited for the elastic balloon of the lean
metaphor, which is designed to control and accommodate slow, incremental growth. Any doubling (let
alone quadrupling) in annual output will simply exceed the breaking strength of the fabric of the
enterprise, as human capital is not only stretched beyond its limits, but more importantly, there is the
inevitable downsizing which is unwanted in the lean world.
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Figure 9.9: Lean vs. Mass Strategies in the Aircraft Industry
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It is clear therefore that different strategies for the commercial and military sectors may be
warranted. As the military sector must be prepared for punctuated periods of extremely rapid growth
(both in terms of technology development and production rates), followed by significant downsizing and
longer periods of relatively stable growth, the mass archetype may be the most effective. The commercial
sector on the other hand has much less volatile production and technology needs, and therefore, a lean
archetype may prove to be more suitable.
One could argue that in the military sector, the optimum strategy is actually a mass archetype
during war followed by a lean archetype in times of peace. One should consider however the incredibly
long time it took for true mass producers like Ford, GM and Boeing to program their mass DNA as well
as for the very long time that it took lean producers like Toyota and Southwest to grow their lean DNA.
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9.4 Enterprise Goal #1: Stability
The primary importance of stability or the elimination of mura was famously noted by Deming in
the well-known principle of statistical process control (SPC). 2 4 As shown in figure 9.10 below, the
proverbial marksman with a stable but off-center shot has an easier path to improvement than the less
stable, but higher scoring marksman.
Figure 9.10: Deming's Stability-Requirement in Improvement Processes
Harder to Improve Easier to Improve
Unstable Processes Stable Processes
Cutcher-Gershenfeld and Rebentisch conducted empirical research in the aerospace industry that
pointed to the existence of three classes of instability: technological, organizational and economic (as
shown superimposed on the inverted cantilever value chain in figure 9.11 below).2 5  They have also
identified three different solution archetypes ranging from adding system buffers in the simplest case, to
making the system more flexible to finally redefining the boundaries of the system or "co-opting the
environment". These solution strategies (and others) will be discussed further later in this chapter.
284 Deming, W. Edwards, Out ofthe Crisis, Cambridge: MIT CAES, 1986.
285 Cutcher-Gershenfeld, J., and Rebentisch, E. "The Impact of Instability on Complex Social and Technical
Systems", MIT Engineering Systems Division Internal Symposium, April 2002.
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Figure 9.11: Three Sources of Enterprise Instability
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Cutcher-Gershenfeld and Rebentisch have also begun to capture the costs of these instabilities.
As shown in figure 9.12 below, instability has been demonstrated to cause 7-8% annual cost growth and
21-24% overall schedule slippage in the aerospace industry2 6 . These instabilities are caused by a number
of sources, including changes in product demand and changes in customer requirements. It is well-
documented 2 17 for example that changes in customer requirements causes an expensive feedback rework
cycle that extends planned schedules and cost estimates.
Figure 9.12: Effects of Instability on Cost and Schedule
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(Schedule)
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Schedule
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286 Cutcher-Gershenfeld, J., and Rebentisch, E. "The Impact of Instability on Complex Social and Technical
Systems", MIT Engineering Systems Division Internal Symposium, April 2002.
287 Sterman, Business Dynamics (2001) and Lyneis et al., "Strategic Management of Complex Projects", 2001.
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The effects of instability can be thought of using the metaphor of building castles in the sand.
The challenge in business can be thought to be building the largest sand castle that is located the closest to
the shoreline (with the waves being customer demand) as shown in figure 9.13 below.
Figure 9.13: Building Castles in the Sand
Those who build too close to the tide, find their enterprise periodically destroyed, only to have to
rebuild. Those who build too far from the tide are too far from the customer. However, those few
companies (like Toyota) who invest in stability first, build a dam near the shoreline, which
simultaneously puts them as close as possible to the customer, while protecting them from the damage of
market cycles. Even if they start with lower enterprise capabilities, over time they are given the chance to
learn and improve.
9.5 Three Generic Enterprise Architectural Solutions
If a lean enterprise is characterized by the elimination of waste, inflexibility and variability, and it
is achieved through the sequenced creation of stability, flow, takt and pull, then we can create a suite of
architectural solutions which begin this process. I begin by defining three generic enterprise architectures
which ensure stability in a dynamic environment. As shown in figure 9.14 below, these are: Stiffening,
Damping and Base Isolating.
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Figure 9.14: Three Generic Enterprise Architectural Solutions
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From the theory of structural dynamics, stiffening acts to increase an enterprise's clockspeed (i.e.
decrease its natural period of vibration) and move its dynamic response away from the resonant energy of
the dynamic input. This is usually appropriate for relatively short period, fast clockspeed enterprises. In
the "building as enterprise" metaphor, this is like adding a vertical brace between floors.
From the theory of system dynamics, stiffening is the addition of cross-links between subsystems.
As Graham points out, "this increases the ability of one subsystem to communicate with another by
adding a direct link between them." 288
From the theory of structural dynamics, damping acts not to (significantly) modify an enterprise's
clockspeed, but to increase the amount of energy dissipative capacity of the enterprise. This is usually
appropriate for intermediate period enterprises at or near resonance. In the "building as enterprise"
metaphor, this is like adding a vertical damper between floors.
From the theory of system dynamics, damping is the addition of a minor positive loop with a
delay. As Graham points out, "If a minor positive loop with a delay is added around a level already on an
oscillatory loop, the added loop forms another pathway through which disturbances in the level can
288 "Principles on the Relationship Between Structure and Behavior of Dynamic Systems", Alan K. Graham, MIT
PhD thesis, 1977, pg. 161.
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propagate back to the level. When the additional disturbance returns to the level, it retards the movement
of the level towards its steady-state value, which results in a longer period and more stable
oscillations. " 28 9
From the theory of structural dynamics, base isolation acts to decrease an enterprise's clockspeed
and move its dynamic response away from the resonant energy of the dynamic input. This is usually
appropriate for relatively long period, medium clockspeed enterprises. In the "building as enterprise"
metaphor, this is like inserting a flexible, highly dissipative element at the base of the building. We will
discuss this in detail in the next sections.
From the theory of system dynamics, base isolation is the reduction to an effectively-first-order
system. As Graham points out, "An oscillatory system can be made not to oscillate by changing it to an
effectively-first-order system, so that when the remaining effective level passes through its equilibrium
value, the entire system does so, and no further movement occurs., 2 90
9.6 From Physical Enterprises to Human Enterprises
In chapter one, I began with an assertion about the earthquake survival of such physical
enterprises as the Japanese pagodas. The secret to their excellent performance when subjected to dynamic
input lies in the structural design and dynamics of the pagoda itself. Most buildings are comprised of
columns which are supported on the ground via foundations and which rise up through the structure
supporting all of the floors. As can be seen from a cross-section of a pagoda in figure 9.15 below, the
central column, known as a "shinbashira" appears to serve this function.
289 "Principles on the Relationship Between Structure and Behavior of Dynamic Systems", Alan K. Graham, MIT
PhD thesis, 1977, pg. 322.
290 Ibid, pg. 321.
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Figure 9.15: The Secret to the Survival of the Pagoda as a Physical Enterprise
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However what the ancient master builders intuitively understood was that in order to withstand
powerful earthquakes, the trick is not to try to be strong in the face of oncoming vibrations, with the
central column rigidly attached to the ground. The secret lies in the exact opposite solution: allow the
earth to shake below the building, and let the superstructure flex and bend. In this way, the shinbashira
was actually a massive central "column" that was not connected to the ground at its base, but in fact was
hung from the roof of the pagoda, and the weight of the shinbashira and the rest of the pagoda was in fact
supported by the perimeter columns.
This counter-intuitive solution allows the dynamics of the physical enterprise to work with, not
against the dynamics of the earthquake. When the earth begins to shake from side to side, the shinbashira
acts as a large pendulum changing the dynamic characteristics of the structure, making it more flexible
(i.e. giving it a slower clockspeed). In this way, the pagoda's fundamental period of vibration was shifted
away from the damaging frequencies of vibration of the earthquake ground motion.
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Next, I shall explore other ways to transform the dynamics of a physical enterprise like a
building, in order to protect it from the potentially damaging dynamics of the environment, before we
move onto translating these principles to human enterprises.
9.7 Enterprise "Base Isolation"
The goal of Base Isolation is to significantly modify the key dynamics of the enterprise, by
driving the fundamental modes of vibration (or dominant feedback loops) away from the energy in the
input signal. Graham noted that, "An oscillatory system can be made not to oscillate by changing it to an
effectively first-order system, so that when the remaining effective level passes through its equilibrium
value, the entire system does so, and no further movement occurs". 29' An effectively first-order system
is, "A system in which the response time of one level significantly exceeds (perhaps by a factor of ten)
those of other phase-lag subsystems in the system, which thus effectively become gain elements with
respect to the movements of the remaining level."292
As can be seen from figure 9.16 below, a conventional multistory building (enterprise), rigidly
attached to the ground (i.e. rigidly linked to the customer demand) will attract and amplify the motions of
the earthquake (customer demand signal). As you can never know with certainty, the maximum customer
demand, if you want to capture market share, you have to provide a building strong enough to survive the
"maximum credible earthquake" (i.e. have the enterprise capacity available to survive the maximum
customer demand). But as one can imagine, this is both expensive and wasteful.
291 "Principles on the Relationship Between Structure and Behavior of Dynamic Systems", Alan K. Graham, MIT
PhD thesis, 1977, pg. 150.
292 Thid, pg. 149
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Figure 9.16: Base Isolation
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Enterprise designers must design two separate components to work together as a coherent system:
the "substructure" (or base isolator level), and the "superstructure" level. Designers can take out the
demand uncertainty by installing a base isolator under the building (i.e. at the interface with the
customer). This limits and controls the amount of demand that can enter the enterprise, making it
possible to take out wasted structure and capacity in the superstructure of the enterprise (i.e. define the
weakest link and subordinate all others to it). A building on a base isolator in its substructure will greatly
reduce the damaging oscillations in the superstructure.
Recall from chapter one that General Systems Theory notes that all higher-ordered (e.g. human)
systems or enterprises have the concurrent goals of stability and growth. This architecture of substructure
providing stability and superstructure providing growth potential is seen in various physical enterprise
architectures as shown in figure 9.17 below.
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Figure 9.17: Physical Enterprise Architectures
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Although the isolator could in theory be located anywhere in the enterprise, the greatest benefit to
the largest portions of the enterprise occurs when the isolator is located at the source of the vibration - at
the customer interface with the enterprise. Within a functional organization, the location of this isolator
would lie in the Marketing/Sales organization - a key to achievement of enterprise stability. In fact from
an enterprise process point of view, the enterprise substructure is actually the underlying and enabling
enterprise leadership processes which support the enabling infrastructure and lifecycle processes as shown
in figure 9.18 below. 293
Figure 9.18: Enterprise Process Architecture & the Leadership Substructure
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293 Lean Enterprise Value, Murman et al.
260
- __ 11111-Nelb - - - - __ - - _.." ...... ....
Let us observe that the fixed-base enterprise is analogous to the a mass-production enterprise, in
that it tries to win the "Strength Game", by providing all the capacity it takes to withstand the largest
earthquake shocks. It takes the incoming oscillations and amplifies them. The base-isolated enterprise on
the other hand is analogous to the lean-production enterprise, in that it limits that capacity to grow,
thereby decoupling itself from the uncertainties of the marketplace. This is shown in figure 9.19 below.
Figure 9.19: Fixed-Base (Mass) and Base-Isolated (Lean)
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Before we begin to define the characteristics of a human enterprise isolation system, it would be
instructive to quickly examine those of a physical isolation system. The system in question is known as
the "Friction Pendulum System" (FPS)294 and it is used to protect buildings from earthquake ground
shaking. As shown in figure 9.18 below, the FPS 'tricks" the superstructure that it is "hanging from the
clouds", so that it is isolated from the damaging ground motion. In reality, the kinematics of being hung
from the clouds can be achieved more cost-effectively by resting the building in special curved "dishes"
that simulate the dynamic motions of a pendulum as also shown in figure 9.20. As the superstructure
gently swings from side to side, a small amount of friction absorbs or dissipates some of the earthquake
energy.
294 From Earthquake Protection Systems Inc., a system the author helped develop while a graduate student and
researcher at the University of California at Berkeley.
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Figure 9.20: Friction Pendulum Base Isolation System (source: EPS Inc.)
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The enterprise designer (or structural engineer in this case) only has to select two simple design
parameters: the length of the pendulum (or equivalently, the curvature of the dish) and the amount of
friction to completely alter and control the dynamic characteristics of the enterprise. The pendulum
length defines the natural period of vibration of the supported superstructure, and the friction defines how
much damping the enterprise contains. With this simple architecture, enterprise designers can therefore
control and alter their enterprise's clockspeed to significantly reduce the dynamic demands on the
enterprise superstructure therefore take costs out of the enterprise.
These two design quantities can be plotted on a graph representing the enterprise' hysteresis, or
ability to absorb dynamic demand inputs without being damaged. Corporate hysteresis is therefore a
good thing. As shown in figure 9.21 below, the horizontal axis is displacement of the isolator (or backlog
of customer orders) and the vertical axis shows the force entering the superstructure (or the production
requirements of the enterprise).
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Figure 9.21: Enterprise Hysteresis
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As we begin away from the physical parameters of structural dynamics and move closer toward
organizational parameters, it may be instructive to map base isolation onto its equivalent metaphor in
system dynamics: the bathtub. The bathtub represents a stock which accumulates things like orders,
finished goods, etc. The enterprise architect using system dynamics therefore also has two design
parameters to consider: the size of the bathtub (that is the amount of time the water is in the tub) and the
size of the drain. As shown in figure 9.22 below there are many physical metaphors for creating stability
in the "upstream" superstructure.
Figure 9.22: Base Isolation Metaphors
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As shown in the pendulum analogy in figure 9.23 below, the base isolator is the entity closest to
the customer that absorbs all of the variability and protects the rest of the enterprise from the variable
demands of the market.
Figure 9.23: Base Isolation in Structural and System Dynamics
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It is interesting to note that the "optimum" isolation system completely protects the superstructure
ensuring that there is not oscillation. In the case of the FPS, this means having no friction and an
infinitely long pendulum length (or zero curvature flat plate). In the case of the bathtub or dam, this
means having an infinitely large bathtub without a drain. Note how stability is maximized in these cases,
which is the goal of a closed system. However, open systems like corporate enterprises seek growth as a
goal, therefore some optimum amount of earthquake shaking or bathtub drain flow is vital.
Note that although I have presented a structural/mechanical analogue for base isolation, there are
other successful and equally-insightful applications from electronics, notably the field of control theory
and the use of filters (high-pass, low-pass, etc.) 291
295 Bose Amar G. and Stevens Kenneth N., Introductory Network Theory, 1965.
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9.8 Base Isolation and the Theory of Constraints
Recall from chapter 3 (figure 3.10) the potentially interesting behavior that resulted from limiting
the capacity of the enterprise. The "theory of constraints"296 argues that every enterprise has a constraint,
and it is up to the enterprise designer to carefully select where and why she would like to position the
constraint to control the behavior of the entire enterprise.
In the field of earthquake engineering, building designers can reduce the governing load case by
an order of magnitude by introducing a "constraint" or fuse or isolator at the base of the building. When
located at the base of the building, it is called base isolation. The base isolator acts to decrease the
stiffness and increase the damping of the entire enterprise. In essence it significantly slows down the
clockspeed of the enterprise - which may sound counter-intuitive and counter-productive. But this is a
necessary condition that allows an enterprise to speed-up the clockspeed of the isolated superstructure.
As shown in figure 9.24 below, the theory of constraints well describes how to design an
enterprise base isolation system. I will argue later that a lean enterprise in fact utilizes the theory of
constraints philosophy in order to achieve sustainable business results
2 97
.
Figure 9.24: Enterprise Design and the Theory of Constraints
Identify the system's constraint.
Decide how to exploit the system's constraint.
Subordinate everything else to the above
decisions.
Elevate the system's constraint.
Don't allow inertia to become the system's
constraint. When a constraint is broken, go back to
step one.
296 The Goal, Eliyahu M. Goldratt and Jeff Cox, 1993.
297 "The Theory of Constraints and Lean Manufacturing: Friends or Foes?", Richard Moore and Lisa Schienkopf,
1998.
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9.9 Little's Law and Enterprise Design
Metaphorically, the isolator can be thought of as a bathtub that collects the variable flows of the
customers and allows a constant trickle to go through the drain at a rate (defined by the enterprise "gate-
keeper"). If the flow throughout the entire isolated enterprise is constant, then the system is in
equilibrium and Little's Law applies. Little's Law298 states that the time the water is in the tub (i.e. the
Cycle Time) equals the amount of water in the tub (WIP) divided by the rate at which water is draining
out (Throughput). Mathematically:
CT=WIP/TH
From Little's Law, we know that when constant rate of flow enters an enterprise, there will be no
shaking of the bullwhip - i.e. the value chain cannot oscillate. If this is the case, there is considerable cost
that can be taken of the entire superstructure. Sizing this enterprise's capacity then becomes trivial, as the
size of the bathtubs (WIP) equal the time delay the water is in the tub (or in pendulum-speak, the length
of the pendulum) times the throughput (which is constant in this case). The pendulum does not shake, the
design of the enterprise is then governed by known, static forces as shown in figure 9.25 below.
Figure 9.25: Enterprise Equilibrium
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2 9 8 Factory Physics, Wallace J. Hopp and Mark L. Spearman, 2000, pg. 223-226.
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9.10 Managing to the Signal, not the Noise
What is noise to the CEO is signal to the day trader.299 A high-performance enterprise must
distinguish between the two, and smooth out the noise using the appropriate techniques. Another way to
describe this "base isolation" technique, is simply applying a filter to the "base" of the enterprise, i.e.
between the customer demand and the chain of supply. This is actually an exponential smoothing
300
technique that describes the decision maker's tendency to gradually react to changes in information .
Decisions based on smoothed information do two things: actions are delayed, and fluctuations are filtered
out. This allows people to manage to the signal, not to the noise. As Jay Forrester once noted, "people
usually react too quickly and do too much. They forget that often the right advice is, "Don't just do
something, stand there,,
301
From an emotional point of view however, filtering out the noise is not easy to do. Turning away
customer orders that exceed the planned growth limit of the signal requires long-term focus, courage and
confidence. The opposite situation, i.e. continuing production in a downturn possibly requires even more
courage. But the important ingredient that makes such "courageous" decisions easier is deep knowledge
of the long-term market dynamics - which is why chapter 3 was so important. If it is known with great
confidence that the market will return in 18 months for example, the intense short-term pressures to
rapidly reduce variable costs will diminish, and the whole notion of "variable" costs will take on a new
meaning.302
As shown in figure 9.26 below, when an enterprise is subjected to a step input, there is a spectrum
of ways to react and respond. If one stock is added, the first order dynamics govern and the enterprise is
quick to react, but slow to respond.
299 Foster, Richard and Kaplan, Sarah, Creative Destruction: Why Companies That are Built to Last Underperform
the Market - and How to Successfully Transform Them, Currency, 2001, pg. 326.
300 "Generic Structures: Exponential Smoothing", Kevin M. Stange, MIT System Dynamics in Education Project,
document D-4782, 1999.
301 Keough, Mark and Doman, Andrew, "The CEO as Organization Designer: An Interview with Prof. Jay W.
Forrester", The McKinsey Quarterly, 1992 Number 2, pp. 3-30.
302 Thanks to Noel Nightingale of MIT's Lean Aerospace Initiative, who brought this insight.
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Figure 9.26: Decisions to React-Respond
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Companies like Toyota and Southwest Airlines have this type of decision architecture. The
physics of the architecture produces a pendulum having fast clockspeed with damping - ideal for
managing to the signal. On the other hand, if infmite stocks are added, multi-ordered dynamics govern
the enterprise. This is known as a "pipeline delay", in which the enterprise is slow to react but quick to
respond.
9.11 The Fable of the Lean Enterprise: Tortoise vs. Hare
Controlling the dynamic response of an enterprise is essential in achieving excellent performance.
World-class "lean" companies like Toyota and Southwest Airlines achieve this through enterprise base
isolation. Base Isolation's "going slow to go fast" philosophy is illustrated in figure 9.27 below.
Again, we are looking at an Enterprise Response Spectrum, this time for the automotive industry.
As we can see, most automotive companies have clockspeeds that cluster around the medium clockspeed
range. Therefore, if the customer demand increases, there is an opportunity for significant amplification
(i.e. growth). In response to this potential for high growth, Ford, GM and Chrysler have all constructed
massive, non-reactive enterprises that define their clockspeed.
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Figure 9.27: Ideal Enterprise Architecture - the idea
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Toyota, on the other hand has taken the dynamic design into their own hands as an endogenous
variable that they control. Their approach is two fold. First, introduce a flexible, damped substructure
that significantly reduces the clockspeed of the enterprise. This pushes them far out to the right of the
response spectrum, where the growth potential is lower. Their enterprise base isolator therefore delivers
much lower and less variable demands into their value chain. Second, this allows them to reduce the
waste and over-capacity in their superstructure, making it much faster clockspeed and more responsive to
the customers. In this way, they are attacking the three evils of Muri (variability), Mura (inflexibility) and
Muda (waste)303 . They are simultaneously slow and "insensitive" to growth opportunities, so that they
can make themselves fast and hypersensitive to the immediate demands of customers.
McKinsey and Company recently published a document defining "lean" in which it identifies the
sequential activities of how to achieve lean: Stability, Flow, Takt and Pull3 04. It is clear from this
dynamics-based definition of Lean, that the achievement of a flexible, damped substructure, is
303 Toyota Production System, Tafichi Ohno, 1978.304 McKinsey & Company, Operations Strategy and Effectiveness Practice document, August 2002.
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fundamental in achieving a lean enterprise - it provides the stability. The following step of achieving a
stiff, responsive superstructure corresponds to the final three tasks of flow-takt and pull.
Figure 9.28 below summarizes the strategies. For Ford & GM, build a stiff un-damped
substructure supporting a flexible superstructure. For Toyota, it is a flexible damped substructure,
supporting a stiff reactive superstructure.
Figure 9.28: Ideal Enterprise Architecture - the mechanics
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We are now in a position to compare the literary metaphor of the tortoise and the hare with the
physics-based metaphor of the pendulum analogs for the tortoise and the hare. As shown in figure 9.29
below, the winning strategy exhibited by world-class enterprises like Toyota seems to be a counter-
intuitive combination of tortoise and hare - explaining why such organizations seem to defy the laws of
physics. The answer seems to be, that like the ancient master builders of pagodas, theses enterprises
master dynamic complexity explicitly through their architectural design.
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Figure 9.29: The Structure of the Tortoise and the Hare
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9.12 Enterprise Goal #2: Growth
Finally, the results of these automotive strategies are illustrated in figure 9.30 below. Like the
proverbial hare, US automotive companies chase the fastest possible growth, which is faster than the
optimum rate of growth. Their enterprise architectures therefore lack stability, creating boom & bust, hire
& fire, unstable learning cycles.
Like the proverbial tortoise however, the Japanese automotive companies first define their
optimum growth rate that maximizes the long-term learning within their value system. They base isolate
beyond this level, which allows them to continuously improve, remove waste, and generally increase their
speed, so that they "go slow to go fast". They are practicing the simultaneous yin and yang of being both
tortoise and hare by defeating the tyranny of the "or".0 5 The long-term results demonstrate the
effectiveness of this strategy of controlling the dynamics of your enterprise for maximum competitive
advantage.
305 Collins, James C. and Porras, Jerry I., Built To Last: Successful Habits of Visionary Companies, Harper Business
Essentials, 1994.
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Figure 9.30: The Behavior of the Tortoise and The Hare
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The notion of an optimum growth rate is discussed in the literature3 06 ,3 07, and is well-documented
in business simulations, like the "People Express" flight simulator 0 8 . People Express essentially
demonstrates that an airline's rapid growth strategy can lead to excessive long-term strains in its human
capital leading to reduced service quality, loss of market share, inability to fund rapid capital expenditure
expansions leading to the collapse of its share price and its eventual downfall (see figure 9.31 below).
Figure 9.31: Optimum Growth Rate
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306 Competitive Strategy Dynamics, Kim Warren, 2002.
307 PRAT methodology from: R.C. Higgins, Analysisfor Financial Management, 7h edition, Irvin, McGraw-Hill.
308 People Express Management Flight Simulator: simulation game, briefing book, and simulator guide. J.D.
Sterman, 1988.
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Enterprises which grow fast must have commensurately fast adjustment or control times to ensure
that they do no exceed their organizational "carrying capacity" (i.e. their "breaking strength"), otherwise
instabilities will ensue as shown in figure 9.32 below.
Figure 9.32: Demand-Capacity Reference Modes
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As shown in figure 9.33 below, companies that grow too slowly typically operate in an
environment with too much order, making them susceptible to acquisition or takeover. Companies that
grow too quickly, typically operate in an environment with too much chaos, making their survival
difficult. The optimum growth rate occupies a relatively narrow band of successful growth - an area that
some researchers have called "The Edge of Chaos".309
309 Waldrop, M. Mitchell, Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos, Simon & Schuster,
New York, 1992.
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Economist, Kenneth Boulding, in his proposals for a General Systems Theory postulated the
existence of "equilibrium rates of growth such that higher (or lower) growth rates may seriously disturb
the functioning of the system even to the point of its collapse and death."3 10 In fact, he points out
evidence from the plant world that too rapid growth rate kills the organism - some very effective weed
killers have been developed based on this principle, using growth hormones.
Other economists Harrrod and Domar suggest that there are "appropriate" rates of growth for a
system which will yield continuous full employment. They go on to suggest that such continuous
equilibrium rate of growth may be impossible because consumption, for example, does not keep pace
with the rise in capacity which causes accelerated growth on other elements of the economy like
investment.311,312
310 Boulding, Kenneth E. "Towards a General Theory of Growth", The Canadian Journal ofEconomics and
Political Science, Vol. 19, No. 3, (Aug. 1953), pg. 339.
31 1Harrod, R. F., "An Essay in Dynamic Theory", The Economic Journal, Vol. 49 (March, 1939), pp. 14-33.
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Finally, there is a body of research in the system dynamics community which postulates that
harmful effects occur when growth exceeds the "carrying capacity" or organizational "breaking strength".
Jay Forrester noted in Urban Dynamics that a city might choose to limit its own growth and preserve the
quality of life for its residents. 3 13 Later, Forrester points out in World Dynamics that neither population
growth nor pollution growth per se is the problem for global sustainability, but rather economic growth or
the incessant increase in consumption per person.31 4
9.13 Corporate Eating Disorders: Bulimic Lean and Anorexic Lean
As we have seen, the optimum enterprise growth rate is less than the maximum possible growth
rate. Those enterprises that chase the fastest possible growth rate (i.e. the "hare" mentality) suffer from
what I refer to as a corporate consumption disorder, known as bulimia or the binge and purge (e.g. hire
and fire) cycle. What is the purpose of negative growth - you cannot shrink your way to greatness. There
is no lean without learning, and there is no learning without stability. In fact, there are direct dis-
incentives towards lean continuous improvement in an environment of pending mass-layoffs. People
resist improvement if the results will be loss of their own jobs.
In another "base-isolated" enterprise, we see in figure 9.34 below that Southwest Airlines grew at
a rate much slower than the maximum possible, which enabled it to protect its employees to learn slowly
and steadily and apply this to customer satisfaction and low costs.
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3 Domar, Evsey D., Essays in the Theory ofEconomic Growth, Oxford University Press, 1957.
313 Forrester, Jay, Urban Dynamics, 1969.
314 Forrester, Jay, World Dynamics, 1971. Observation made by Peter Senge in class discussion, Fall 2003.
Figure 9.34: Southwest Airlines' Slow Rise to the Top
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Figure 9.35 below shows how this slow steady growth maps onto the airline profitability figure
that we saw in chapter 7. As we will later see, Southwest, which ignores the stock market demands for
insatiable growth is greatly rewarded with market capitalization equal to the next ten largest competitors.
Figure 9.35: Profitability of Southwest Airlines' vs. the Competitors
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The other type of corporate consumption disorder is "anorexic lean", in which companies starve
themselves of critical nourishment, driven by measures like Economic Profit, which as previously
discussed, encourage harvesting behavior or "milking" the business.
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9.14 Enterprise Goal #3: Interaction (Learn to Lean, Lean to Learn)
In fact, we can now discover what sort of enterprise can exist downstream of a smooth,
predictable flow of in information and product throughout the enterprise at the optimum rate (i.e. that
which maximizes the building of capabilities).
Recall from chapter 4 that one of the drivers of capabilities, which in turn drives resources, which
in turn drives sustained competitive advantage is learning. Senge notes that over the long run, superior
performance depends on superior learning.3 1 The base isolation metaphor that helps understand this is a
dam upstream of a city as shown in figure 9.36 below. Note that the dam, (the base isolator) that
decouples the highly variable customer demand does not allow the city downstream to be overwhelmed or
under whelmed (starved) of the ability to generate electricity - a metaphor for learning.
Figure 9.36: Damming Demand to Create an Optimum Learning Environment
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9.15 Architecting Boeing's Enterprise
Having established some of the principles and heuristics of the Lean Enterprise, we can now
begin to understand how they are applied at Boeing. First, it is important to recognize where Boeing has
made significant steps in achieving this vision. As shown in figure 9.37 below, Boeing's Working
Together philosophy, together with its Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) illustrate how the design-build
process can integrate across the three core business processes 16 or internal functions of marketing, define
and produce.
315 Senge, Peter, "The Leader's New Work: Building Learning Organizations", MIT Sloan Management Review, 7
Fall 1990.
316 Hagel III, John and Singer Marc, "Unbundling the Corporation", Harvard Business Review, August 2000.
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Figure 9.37: Boeing's Integrated Product Teams
Program 5 Working Together" & IPTs
Beyond this, the 777 airplane program of the 1990's extended the range of the Working Together
philosophy to reach out into the extended enterprise to include both Customers and Suppliers as shown in
figure 9.38 below. Additional efforts have been made to attempt to integrate across product platforms in
all three primary functional areas: Product Commonality in the marketing offering, Knowledge Reuse
(e.g. 3-Dimensional Model-Based Definition and Knowledge-Based Engineering) in the define
organization, and Agile Production Lines (with multi-product moving lines) in the produce organization.
Figure 9.38: Boeing's Product-Focused Integrated Enterprise Teams
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Further efforts in this direction can be made to leverage the success of Working Together and
IPTs in breaking down the barriers between the historically-disparate functions not just at the product
level, but at the leadership or executive level. As shown in figure 9.39 below, a further evolution can be
made by extending the Working Together philosophy to more explicitly engage more of the important
stakeholders, including "the Hill" (i.e. Government and Labor Unions) and "The Street" (i.e. Investors) to
form Integrated Enterprise Teams which attempt to break down the barriers between historically-disparate
functions of capital suppliers or investors and value suppliers or the corporation.
Figure 9.39: Boeing's Integrated Enterprise Teams
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This evolution can be depicted in figure 9.40 below which describes the architecture required to
solve the class of "wicked problems" that was introduced at the beginning of this thesis. Given the
dynamic complexity inherent in the industry, a lean or "systemic" enterprise architecture offers
competitive advantage over traditional architectural forms which emphasize "divide and conquer"
functional optimization and is characterized by "boundedly rational" of its management. As Russell
Ackoff noted, "If each part of a system, considered separately, is made to operate as efficiently as
possible, the system as a whole, will not operate as effectively as possible".3 17
317 Russell Ackoff, Ackoff's Best: His Classic Writings on Management, 1999, pg. 18.
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Figure 9.40: Integrated Enterprise Teams, the Solution to "Wicked" Problems
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9.16 World-Class Enterprises: Defying the Laws of Organizational Physics
In an attempt to demonstrate the viability of such organizational architectures, I briefly draw a
comparison to two world-class lean enterprises, one (Toyota) representing manufacturing and one
(Southwest Airlines) representing services sector enterprise as shown below in figure 9.41.
Figure 9.41: World-Class Examples of Integrated Enterprise Teams
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It is clear that uncommon corporate performance can be achieved through the counter-intuitive
enterprise designs. Toyota and Southwest Airlines have both achieved stock market capitalizations greater
than the sum of all of their major competitors in recent years through the adoption of lean enterprise
architecture.
Their success lies in the counter-intuitive notions of extending the boundaries of their respective
enterprises to include the those stakeholders which can influence shareholder value, and then work to
build long-term win-win relationships with them. As such, they have taken the counterintuitive steps to
ensure no layoffs in the 50 and 30 year corporate histories of their companies amidst industry norms quite
to the contrary. They have also demonstrated the courageous restraint by growing (largely) organically at
the rate which can sustain learning within their core strategic assets, their people. This rate, which has
been approximately constant at 10% over the lives of their corporations is substantially lower than the
maximum possible growth rate that the markets demand. They have designed into their "integrated
enterprise teams" (IETs) a base isolation fuse which mandates that they manage to the signal of the
customer markets and not the noise of the capital markets. The irony is that they are highly valued by
those same capital markets, that it is in their enterprise architecture to ignore. They recognize that
maximization of shareholder value is achieved via management of stakeholder value. For Southwest
Airlines this has been achieved via the establishment of "relational coordination" 318 across the enterprise,
as shown in figure 9.42 below.
Figure 9.42: Southwest Airline 's "Relational Coordination"
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318 Gittel, Jody Hoffer, The Southwest Airlines Way: Using the Power of Relationships to Achieve High
Performance, McGraw-Hill, 2003.
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As can be seen, the elements of this "relational coordination" do not appear to be significantly
different from Boeing's "Working Together" principles. In fact, the prime difference is that Southwest
has been successful in leveraging its "relational coordination" outside its corporate boundaries to its key
stakeholders (e.g. labor unions).
For Boeing to engage in a continued evolution toward a lean enterprise, the potential benefits to
the enterprise and therefore to the shareholders could be significant. A first order approximation of the
reversal of market share slippage of around 2% per year (which was cited in figure 1.13 as the raison
d'etre for this thesis) could result in net revenue increases of $500 million per year. The elusive, yet
crucial property of Stability, would allow Boeing to reap the benefits of its world-class Flow, Takt and
Pull successes. Although the work presented herein relies on understanding dynamic complexity and
using systems thinking to arrive at insights into the nature of the structural problem, the real challenge lies
in the translation of such insights into actions, via systems action in the way that Toyota and Southwest
Airlines have built their respective world-class enterprises
9.17 Enterprise Retrofitting
As the principles of enterprise design allow us to "predictively architect enterprises", this is
obviously useful for new or "green field" enterprises. The reality however is that the majority of such
design will take place on existing or "brown field" enterprises. 19 In the realm of physical enterprises, this
is analogous to the principles of earthquake-resistant design of buildings. While command of such
knowledge allows designers to create sophisticated, elegant or merely robust buildings, the vast majority
of work for earthquake engineers lies in the seismic retrofitting of existing buildings, as these are the most
deficient enterprises. As in human enterprises, this is far more challenging than working with a blank
sheet of paper, as human inertia (like its physical counterpart) resists such changes.
319 In the Lean Aerospace Initiative's recent "Transition to Lean" work, I note that the operative word is "transition",
implying that existing enterprises need to be "retrofitted" to meet the demands of a new environment.
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In fact, it is in the area of "retrofitting" that some of the more sophisticated enterprise design
solutions (like base isolation) first emerged. It seems that necessity is truly the mother of invention.
9.18 "Active" Control Solutions
The enterprise design solutions discussed so far have been "passive" control systems. This means
that once they are designed they the same structural characteristics throughout the life of the enterprise.
In addition, they sit passively awaiting the incoming dynamic disturbance and respond as designed to it.
There is a more sophisticated class of enterprise design solutions known as "active" control as
shown in figure 9.43 below. In this case the system participates actively in its own design as information
about the incoming dynamic disturbance (or about the structural response) is sensed and feedback
controllers modify the dynamic properties of the enterprise in real time to minimize or control the effect
of the input disturbance. Such active control systems require an energy source to run the enterprise's
"brain, nervous system and muscles".
Figure 9.43: Actively Controlled Enterprise
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An active system is typically much more expensive than its passive cousin and there are heuristic
rules of thumb for relative performance levels of physical enterprises like earthquake-resistant buildings.
Typically, the benefit of going from a conventional physical enterprise to a passively controlled enterprise
is a ten-fold reduction in demand with an associated 10% increase in initial enterprise costs. The benefit
of going from a passively controlled enterprise to an actively controlled enterprise is an additional two-
fold reduction in demand with an additional 10% increase in initial enterprise costs. Therefore, due to
lower initial costs, simplicity, reliability and diminishing marginal performance returns, most passively-
controlled enterprises win the cost-benefit analysis over active control.
9.19 Complex Adaptive Enterprises
We began this work with a discussion of General Systems Theory of the 1950s, and we shall end
it with a brief discussion of its successor, Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) of the 2 1' century. The
hallmark of complex systems is adaptability and emergence, self-organization and continuous
improvement.2  While this work has focused on developing the science of enterprise design, one of the
remaining topics touches on the lifeblood of the design process - that is the art of enterprise design.
When faced with the question: "Is enterprise design a top-down or a bottom-up activity?" "Is it a self-
conscious or unselfconscious activity?" Is it rigid and deterministic or flexible and emergent?" I offer
that in each of these questions, it is both.
As is seen in the archetypal cases of Toyota and Southwest, the "enterprise architects" were not
self-conscious, top-down, command-and-control, deterministic, designers - but neither did these
successful enterprises arise spontaneously from a pure bottom-up environment. It is the premise of this
thesis that such complex adaptive enterprises are the result a feedback in which very strong leadership (or
effective architecting) designed how the enterprise would design itself. In a sense, "powerful" leadership
empowers leadership. This leads to distributed decision-making.
320 Amaral and Ottino, "Complex Systems and Networks: Challenges and Opportunities for Chemical and Biological
Engineers," Elsevier Science, 17 September 2003.
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In addition, enterprise architects establish another important feedback - namely the ability for the
enterprise to define how the environment defines the enterprise. This "loose coupling" or "cooption of
the environment" demonstrates one of the most important design activities of the architect - namely the
definition of the boundaries of the system. The example illustrated throughout this chapter is the
optimum growth rate for the enterprise, which for Toyota was defined by the rate at which its workers
could experiment, learn and improve and for Southwest, was defined by the rate at which they could hire
the best people who could maintain the culture of "fun" and customer service. In both of these cases, the
vision of the enterprise lead to growth rates that were constraints on the growth opportunities that were
available in the market. Both feedbacks are shown in figure 9.44 below.
Figure 9.44: The Role of Design Leadership in Complex Adaptive Enterprises
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As socio-technical researchers observed when decoding the DNA of the Toyota Production
System321 and biological researchers observed when decoding the DNA of complex biological and
engineered systems,32 2 architects used very simple "rules" or protocols which allowed the enterprise to
evolve and adapt itself at the lowest levels. A strong analogy can be made with the "inventor" of the
321 Spear and Bowen, "Decoding the DNA of the Toyota Production System", Harvard Business Review,
September-October, 1999.
322 Csete, Marie & Doyle John, "Reverse Engineering of Biological Complexity," Science, Vol. 295, 1 March 2002.
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Lego toys who defined a simple but powerful "snap" protocol along with the bricks as basic modules
which allowed generations of physical enterprises to be designed as shown in figure 9.45 below.
Figure 9.45: Enterprise Protocols and Modules (Rules and Tools)
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9.20 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, I introduced the concept of "enterprise base isolation" as a potentially highly
effective means to control the dynamics of an enterprise to its benefit. The physics of base isolation is
rooted in the theory of constraints, whereby the enterprise leader explicitly defines and designs the
bottleneck policy, to achieve stability in the enterprise. I then explain how to define this policy, which
entails injecting flexibility and damping into the enterprise at its "substructure" which allows the
"superstructure" of the enterprise to be made more efficient.
From this, I argue that this physics-based policy can be seen as a scientific definition of a "Lean
Enterprise". Using the laws of enterprise physics, I describe "lean" as the eradication of waste,
inflexibility and variability and I note that the way to implement lean is through stability, flow, takt and
pull. I observe that world-class lean enterprises like Toyota and Southwest Airlines expertly utilize
enterprise base isolation to their great benefit.
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Chapter 10: Conclusion
10.1 Lessons & Generalizations
The purpose of this thesis was to consider enterprise design in conditions where dynamic
complexity was important. As such, the commercial aerospace industry has provided a good source of
research, and specifically The Boeing Company, as a dominant leader for many years has provided a rich
platform to study. This thesis argued that Boeing's enterprise architecture, which has been responsible for
its near-century long dominance is markedly different that the enterprise architecture of its current
competitor Airbus. This thesis attempted to compare and contrast these two architectures and how each
deal with dynamic complexity. While the emphasis of this thesis was not on which architecture is better
in absolute terms, the focus was more on exploring the structural differences between architectures and
acknowledging that structure drives behavior, making relative enterprise performance contextual and
understandable.
More generally, this thesis attempted to explore and explain how enterprise archetypes that grew
out the "higher, faster, farther" environments in any industry (but particularly those with higher dynamic
complexity) are different from those that evolve in a "better, faster, cheaper" environment. The
significant successes and the challenges going forward are not necessarily unique to Boeing, but it is
hypothesized common to firms of common architectural archetypes.
10.2 Recommendations for Future Research
The scope of this project was intended to be very broad, covering the important aspects of various
functional disciplines within a typical enterprise. In order to create the high-level heuristics that arise
from this purposefully interdisciplinary approach, this work could best be described as "a mile wide, and
an inch deep". As this work was admittedly focused on synthesis as opposed to analysis, the most fruitful
extension of this work therefore would probably lie in more in-depth analyses to prove the laws and
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develop the heuristics created herein. I offer some recommendations for future research from each of the
two parts of this thesis:
In "Enterprise Engineering", further work could be done to define, develop and verify the
appropriate enterprise structural quantities of: inertia, responsiveness and reactivity. That is, use further
empirical case-based field data from enterprises having different clockspeeds (e.g. fast-clockspeed
computer industry, the medium-clockspeed automotive industry and the slow-clockspeed aerospace or
construction industry) to determine what operational variables and metrics more accurately define
enterprise inertia, responsiveness and reactivity. Then calculate the enterprise's clockspeed and finally
estimate the enterprise's key response quantities of sales/production, throughput and growth.
In "Enterprise Architecting", further work could be done to: define successful enterprise design
archetypes3233 2 4 ,325, define how to implement them, and define what financial (and non-financial) metrics
accurately monitor their successful operation.
10.3 Final Thoughts
Having articulated the "laws" of enterprise dynamics so that we could engineer the enterprise, we
then articulated the "heuristics" of enterprise architecture, which allowed us "to create more successful
management policies and organizational structures" as Jay Forrester had articulated over 40 years ago.
As we have seen, although it can be analyzed using the principles of science, the design and delivery is
very much rooted in art.
From the hard "laws" of enterprise physics, we end our journey with the "soft" unquantifiable
heuristics of enterprise leadership. The best I can do is to point out the obvious: courage is required on
the part of the isolator (enterprise champion), while trust is required on the part of the isolated enterprise.
323 Collins, James C. and Porras, Jerry I., Built To Last: Successful Habits of Visionary Companies, Harper Business
Essentials, 1994.
324 Collins, James C. Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make the Leap.. .and Others Don't, Harper Business
Essentials, 2001.
325 Foster, Richard and Kaplan, Sarah, Creative Destruction: Why Companies That are Built to Last Underperform
the Market - and How to Successfully Transform Them, Currency, 2001.
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It is not impossible - recall just as a decade ago, that US companies thought that stopping the production
line for a quality problem was not possible. The bad news is that it is hard to do - the good news is that it
is hard to imitate. This is therefore a source of true sustained advantage for value chain leaders like
Toyota and Southwest Airlines who earn supernormal profits over the long term and dominate industries.
The methodologies presented herein (namely, system and structural dynamics) are not intended to
give an organization or enterprise yet another tool to predict or optimize, but it is meant as a means for its
leaders to share mental models about their perceptions of how their enterprise works, and to collectively
change their way of thinking about the dynamic complexity of their organization. Some enterprises, like
those in commercial aerospace, are so dynamically complex that they require a complete rethinking of
how to design effective solutions. As Albert Einstein noted: "We won't solve our problems with the
same kind of thinking that we used when we created them."326
As Arie deGeus of head of strategic planning at Shell noted, "the ability to learn faster than your
competitors may be the only sustainable competitive advantage." 32 7 DeGeus also believed in the process
not the product of strategic planning, when he noted that "planning means changing minds, not making
plans",32 8 or as President Eisenhower noted: "Its not the plans but the planning that matters." 329 At Shell,
like the world-class companies discusses herein, the use of these methodologies leads to better decision-
making.
Finally, I end with two quotes. The first is from Russell Ackoff, one of the greatest systems
thinkers of the 20h century, which seems to sum up what this thesis has aspired to deliver 330 :
"Wisdom is the ability to see the long-run consequences of current actions, the
willingness to sacrifice short-run gains for long-run benefits, and the ability to control
what is controllable and not to fret over what is not. Therefore the essence of wisdom is
concern for the future. It is not the type of concern with the future that the fortune teller
has; he only tries to predict it. The wise man tries to control it."
326 Competitive Strategy Dynamics, Kim Warren, 2002.
321 "Planning as Learning", Arie P. deGeus, Harvard Business Review, March-April 1988.
328 "Planning as Learning", Arie P. deGeus, Harvard Business Review, March-April 1988.
329 Analysisfor Financial Management, Robert C. Higgins, 7h edition, McGraw-Hill, 2004, pg. 100.
330 Ackoff, Russell L., Ackoff's Best: His Classic Writings on Management, 1999, pg. 99.
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Ackoffs words echo those attributed to the 5th century Roman philosopher, Boethius who gives
inspiration to those brave (and humble) enough to endeavor to architect social enterprises:
"Grant me the serenity to accept the things I can not change, the courage to change the things I
can, and the wisdom to know the difference ".
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Appendix A: Glossary
Architecting: The design process of mapping form onto function. [Rechtin: The process of creating and
building architectures, including those of organizations, especially during the conceptual and certification
phases. Generally synthesis-based, insightful, and inductive.]3 3 1
Architectonics: The science of architecture.
Architecture, Organizational: The structure - in terms of organizational units, reporting and directing
channels, factors or features, constraints an rationale - of an organization. Includes technical tasks,
context, and outputs, as well as structure, people, strategy, processes, managerial, culture, and goals.332
Base Isolation: A device located in the substructure of a system or enterprise that acts to decouple the
superstructure from the input motions at the base of the system or enterprise. The base isolation system
typically acts to lengthen the period of vibration and damping of the supported superstructure. Synonyms
include: filter, fuse, decoupling device.
Bounded Rationality: A principle originated at the Carnegie School in the 1950s and 1960s by H. A.
Simon which states that: "The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex
problems is very small compared with the size of the problems whose solution is required for objectively
rational behavior in the real world or even for a reasonable approximation to such objective
rationality."333
Capacity: A property of a system that describes its ability to withstand inputs. Synonyms include:
strength.
Chaos: A science of complexity theory focusing on deterministic non-linear dynamics. [Rechtin:
Complex but structured behavior now known to result from nonlinearities, fixed time delays, memory,
and interconnections. Found in such organizational contexts as stock markets, inventory, and business
cycles and communication networking.] 334
Clockspeed: A property of a socio-technical enterprise. It is the time it takes for the enterprise to
complete one full cycle of oscillation. Clockspeed is the organizational equivalent of "Natural (or
Fundamental) Period of Vibration" for physical enterprises.
Contingency Theory: The fundamental dogma of modern organization theory that the structure of
organizations depends on the environments that they have to relate to, thus emphasizing the uniqueness of
each situation.
Cooptation: The process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining structure
of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence.3
331 Rechtin (2000), pg. 235.
332 Rechtin, (2000), pg. 236.
33 Simon, (1957).
334 Rechtin (2000), pg. 236.
331 Selznick, (1984), pg. 13.
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Cybernetics: c. 1945. Literally, "the science of government". The science constituted of theories
relative to communications and to the regulation within the living being and the machine. (Linear
theory).
Damping: A property of a system that describes its ability to absorb energy. Antonyms include:
responsiveness. The damping force is proportional to velocity.
Design Spectrum: A graph depicting a smoothed response spectrum. (see Response Spectrum).
Dynamic Amplification Factor: The ratio between the peak input quantity and the peak response
quantity in a response spectrum. Synonyms include: gain.
Effectiveness: A measure of a system's ability to meet the objectives of its stakeholders. It has therefore
an architectural or outward-focus or external view as contrasted with "efficiency".3
3 6 [The ratio of
function(s) achieved to the totality of functions desired.]3 3 7
Efficiency: A measure of a system's ability to achieve its objectives with the least amount of waste or
non-value-added effort. It has therefore an engineering or internal-focus as contrasted with
"effectiveness". [The ratio of function(s) achieved to resources used.] 338
Engineering: The design process of mapping structure onto form. [Rechtin: The process of applying
science and mathematics to practical ends.]3 39
Engineering Systems: A system designed by humans having some purpose; large scale and complex
engineering systems, which are of most interest to the Engineering Systems Division, will have a
management or social dimension as well as a technical one.34
Enterprise: A defined scope of economic organization or activity, which will return value to the
participants through their interaction and contribution.34 1
Entrainment: The coupling of modes of vibration due the presence of large amounts of damping (i.e.
beyond critical damping).
Gain: The ratio of the amplitude of the output sinusoid to the amplitude of the disturbance sinusoid.
Gain measures amplification or attenuation of the disturbance as it propagates through the system to the
output variable.3 42 Synonyms include: dynamic amplification factor.
Heijunka: Japanese word meaning "production smoothing" or "level scheduling".
Hysteresis: A property of a system that describes its force-deflection history. It is a measure of the
amount of nonlinear damping.
336 See Miller & Lessard (2000).
33 MIT Engineering Systems Division (ESD) "ESD Terms and Definitions", ESD Working Paper 2002-0 1.
338 Ibid.
339 Rechtin (2000), pg. 237.
3 4 0 MIT Engineering Systems Division (ESD) "ESD Terms and Definitions", ESD Working Paper 2002-01.
341 ESD Symposium Committee, "ESD Symposium Committee Overview: Engineering Systems Research and
Practice", May 29-30, 2002, pg. 24.
342 See Nathan B. Forrester's 1982 PhD dissertation, pp. 41-42.
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Inertia: A property of a system that describes its resistance to change. Synonyms include: mass.
Antonyms include: agility. The inertial force is proportional to acceleration.
Momentum: In physics, momentum equals mass (a property of the system) times velocity (a response
quantity or state variable). In enterprise physics, organizational momentum equals inertia times speed.
Muda: Japanese word meaning "waste", used in the definition of the Toyota Production System.
Mura: Japanese word meaning "inconsistency" or variability, used in the definition of the Toyota
Production System.
Muri: Japanese word meaning "unreasonableness" or inflexibility, used in the definition of the Toyota
Production System.
Planning: A formalized procedure to produce an articulated result, in the form of an integrated system of
decisions. 43 Uses analysis, as opposed to the synthesis of strategy.
Reasoning, Deductive: Proceeding from an established principle to its application. Characteristic of
applied sciences and engineering and based on the principles of mathematics and science. Contrasts with
inductive reasoning.3 4
Reasoning, Inductive: Extrapolating the results of examples to a more general insight or principle.
Characteristic of most of the arts and, in particular, the art of organizational architecting. 345
Response Spectrum: A graph depicting the response of an infinite series of single degree of freedom
systems to a given dynamic input signal.
Stability: A dynamic pattern of stimulus and response in which events become successively less
predictable or controllable.3 4
Stiffness: A property of a system that describes it resistance to movement. Synonyms include: rigidity,
reactivity. Antonyms include: flexibility. The stiffness force is proportional to displacement.
Takt: German word for "heartbeat". Used in the Toyota Production System to define the velocity of
production. Equals the customer demand divided by the available production time.
Theory of Constraints (TOC): TOC applies to human-based systems (individuals and organizations),
the definitions, beliefs and methods that are used by the physical sciences to understand and manage the
material world.347
Toughness: A property of a system that describes its ability to deform without failure. Synonyms
include: ductility. Antonyms include: brittleness.
343 Mintzberg, Henry, The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning: Reconceiving Rolesfor Planning, Plans and
Planners, The Free Press, 1994, pg. 12.
344 Rechtin (2000), pg. 236.
341 Rechtin (2000), pg. 237.
346 Cutcher-Gershenfeld and Rebentisch, 2002, pg. 3
347 From the A. Goldratt Institute.
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Appendix B: Equivalence of Hydro-Electro-Mechanical Systems
The engineering dynamics can be represented in a number of different physical systems ranging
from electrical circuits to mechanical/structures to hydraulics as shown in figure B 1 below.34 In each,
the three basic forces of inertia (inductance), damping (resistance) and stiffhess (capacitance) apply.
Figure Bi: Equivalence of Hydro-Electro-Mechanical Systems
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It is instructive to compare these different analog representations of dynamic systems (known as
"isomorphic structures" 49) within the context of their respective scientific fields of endeavor as shown in
figure B2 below." Note particularly the relationship between System Dynamics and Structural
Dynamics, the two primary fields used in this work.
34 See Introduction to System Dynamics, Shearer, Murphy & Richardson, 1967.
349 Ashby, An Introduction to Cybernetics, pp. 94-97, 1956.3 5 0Introduction to System Dynamics, Shearer, Murphy & Richardson, 1967, pg. 9.
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Figure B2: Comparison of the fields of Dynamic Systems
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Appendix C: Basics of System Dynamics
System dynamics was founded in the late 1950's by Jay Forrester at MIT. It is a discipline which
quantifies the dynamic behavior of complex socio-technical systems. System dynamics is characterized
by four components: causal loop diagrams (which indicate feedback structures), stock and flow diagrams
(which indicate state variables), time delays and nonlinear behavior.
As shown in figure CI below, the structure of system dynamics models is formalized by two
components: a stock & flow network and an information network. Stocks capture the inertia of a system.
The flow rates are determined by the information network and depend on the various stocks in the system.
The rates can be interpreted as the output of policies or decision-making processes."'
Figure Cl: Basic Structure of a System Dynamics Model
Posito Flow
Gap Change in
Velocity
Infor
Desired Gravity Length of
Position (constant) Pendulum Rod
(constant) (constant)
The simplest example that demonstrates many aspects of system dynamics is shown in figure C2
below. Stocks (like bathtubs) are variables that accumulate flows. If one were to float a boat in the tub,
which was attached via a lever to the faucet handle, we can intuit the response of the system.
351 Smith, Peter C. and van Ackere, Ann, "A Note on the Integration of System Dynamics and Economic Models,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol. 26, No.1, 2002, pp. 1-10.
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Figure C2: Fundamental (linear) Reference Modes
too000o
TI.. Time
Reinforcing Dynamic Balancing Dynamic
As the water level rises in the figure on the left, the boat and its lever rise, causing the faucet to be
opened further, which causes "reinforcing" behavior. Mathematically, this is equivalent to "high
exponent" behavior (e.g. x = y2). Conversely, if as the water level rises in the figure on the right, the boat
and its lever rise causing the faucet to be closed, which causes balancing behavior. Mathematically, this
is equivalent to "low exponent" behavior (e.g. x = 4y). A more complete set of reference modes are
shown in figure C3 below.
Figure C3: Fundamental Reference Modes (source: Sterman).
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From the three basic linear reference modes one can construct other three more complex
nonlinear reference modes including S-shaped growth, S-shaped growth with overshoot and oscillation,
and overshoot and collapse as shown in figure C3 above. They are nonlinear in that they exhibit "mode
switching" as demonstrated in the population example (an associated physical analog) in figure C4 below.
Figure C4: The Mechanics of Nonlinear "Mode Switching"
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One can begin to better understand the basic dynamics of complex nonlinear social systems (i.e.
their governing "modes of vibration" or "loop dominance") by exploring their response under small
perturbations where the system remains in its linear state. Instead of solving the equations of motion in
the time domain for nonlinear systems, one can linearize the system and solving the eigen-problem in the
frequency domain to take the "dynamic pulse" of the system in the absence of dynamic inputs. 2  As is
shown in figure C5 below, one can plot the behaviors in the complex plane for one- and two-stock (i.e.
single- and multi-degree of freedom systems). 353
352 See for example Alan K. Graham (1977) and Nathan B Forrester's (1982) MIT PhD dissertations.
353 Taken from J.H. Muslim, Positive Feedback, Pergamon Press, 1968, pg. 55.
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Figure C5: Response in the Complex Plane
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Other than stocks & flows and feedback, another important component of system dynamics is the
effect of delays on the system. Essentially, delays are a special class of stocks that decouple inputs from
outputs. They can be decomposed into two types: material and information - the formulation of each is
summarized in figure C6 below. Delays tend to give systems inertia. 4 They can be either bad (when
they cause oscillation) or good when they filter out unwanted and distracting noise. Delays can be
modeled using from one stock (first order) to multiple stocks. Although the more stocks used, the less
damping of high frequency oscillations, Forrester notes that "systems will usually not be very sensitive to
the time response of the delay representation." 355
35 Sterman, John, Business Dynamics, 2000, pp. 423.
35 Forrester, Jay, Industrial Dynamics, 1961, pp. 419.
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Figure C6: Summary of Delays
Delays are stocks that de-couple inputs from outputs
" They can be bad because they can cause oscillation (flexibility).
- They can be good because they smooth information and limit over-reaction (damping).
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Finally, a brief comment on model complexity is worth making. To paraphrase Albert Einstein:
"The best analysis is the simplest that will do the job". In any nonlinear dynamic analysis of technical or
social systems, it is important to capture the most salient features of behavior in the simplest way. Using
the Workforce-Inventory model from chapter 2, one can see that a two-stock, single loop (single degree of
freedom) model will produce the salient dynamics of oscillation. However a much more detailed model
of this enterprise containing greater disaggregation, releasing more dynamic degrees of freedom can be
developed.356
356 From John D. Sterman's Business Dynamics.
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As is shown in figure C7 below, the two models are compared with stylized response histories.
Intuitively, one would expect the more detailed model to capture higher mode oscillations and typically
have a longer fundamental mode of vibration (as more detailed modeling frequently captures more inertia
and flexibility).
Figure C7: Comparing Single Degree of Freedom vs. Multi-Degree of Freedom Models
SDOF
Workforce+Inventory
- Longer Period
(i e. captures more Inertia & Flexibility)
- More High Frequency Oscillation
There is an important point to make here. In order to be sure that one has actually
captured the relevant dynamic modes of behavior, one must "challenge the clouds" (i.e. expand
the boundaries of the model) as well as disaggregate the model and test for robustness by using
extreme values of the variables. Once done, the modeler can (via eigenvalue analysis or via
removing pieces of the model) determine the simplest structure that captures the dynamics of the
system, commensurate with the purposes of the model.
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Appendix D: Clockspeed Formula
The formula for clockspeed given in chapter 2 (shown in figure Dl below) assumes that the
enterprise is undamped.
Figure D1: Undamped Formula for Clockspeed
Tn = 2n Enterprise Inertia
Enterpnse Reactivity
Although not derived here, the general form of the clockspeed formula that includes damping is
shown in figure D2 below. Note that enterprise damping is expressed on a scale of 0 to 1 with 1 being
known as "critical damping". As discussed in chapter 3, typical values of damping in physical enterprises
range from 0.01 to 0.10 , while typical values of damping in organizations lie in the range of 0.10 to 0.50.
Figure D2: Damped Formula for Clockspeed
Tn = 2n Enterprise Inertia
Enterprise Reactivity
1 - Enterprise Damping2
As can be seen from the equation above, the effects of damping are small and in fact negligible
for values in the range of interest for human organizations. Figure D3 below shows how much the
clockspeed slows down as the amount of damping increases. For the production-distribution enterprise
studied in chapter 3 which had a damped clockspeed of approximately 26 weeks and approximately 30%
damping, ignoring the effects of damping in the estimation of clockspeed would result in a clockspeed of
25 weeks - an "error" of less than 5%. For the purposes of enterprise design, the undamped
approximation is satisfactory.
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Figure D3: Relationship Between Damping and Clockspeed
In summary therefore, there are three ways to increase an enterprise's clockspeed (or velocity):
0
S
Reduce the Inertia
Increase the Stiffness
Reduce the Viscosity
Of these three, Inertia and Stiffness have the most significant effect.
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Appendix E: Enterprise Response Spectra
There are three different but related response spectra as shown in figure El below: acceleration,
velocity and displacement.
Figure El: Acceleration, Velocity and Displacement Response Spectra
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Each quantity is related to another via the relationships shown in figure E2 below.
Figure E2: Response Relationships
A =o 2 D
V = oD
where:
A = Acceleration
V = Velocity
D = Displacement
) = 2n / T
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Appendix F: Vensim Industrial Dynamics Model
:MACRO: CLIP(xl,x2,yl,y2)
CLIP=IF THEN ELSE(xl>x2,yl,y2)
~ y1
:END OF MACRO:
.Retail
UOR=lNTEG(RRR-SSR,RRI*(DHR+DUR))
~ units
~ unfilled orders at retail
IAR=lNTEG(SRR-SSR,AIR*RRI)
units
~ inventory actual at retail
STR=UOR/DFR
units/week
~ shipping rate to be tried at retail
NIR=IAR/DT
~ units/week
~ negative inventory limit rate at retail
SSR=CLIP(STR,NIR,NIR,STR)
~ units/week
~ shipments sent from retail
DFR=(MNR/IAR)+DHR
~ weeks
~ delay in filling orders at retail
MNR=DUR*IDR
~ unit*weeks
IDR=AIR*RSR
~ units
~ inventory desired at retail
RSR=INTEG((1/DRR)*(RRR-RSR),RRR)
~ units/week
requisitions smoothed at retail
PDR=RRR+(1/DIR)*(IDR-IAR+LDR-LAR+UOR-UNR)
~ units/week
~ purchasing rate decision at retail
LDR=RSR*DCR+RSR*DMR+RSR*DFD+RSR*DTR
~ units
~ pipeline orders desired in transit to supply retail
LAR=CPR+PMR+UOD+MTR
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~ units
~ pipeline orders actually in transit to retail
UNR=RSR*(DHR+DUR)
~ units
~ normal unfilled orders at retail
CPR=lNTEG(PDR-PSR,DCR*RRI)
~ units
~ clerical in-process orders at retail
PSR=DELAY3(PDR,DCR)
~ units/week
purchase orders sent from retail
PMR=INTEG(PSR-RRD,DMR*RRI)
~ units
~ purchase orders in mail from retail
RRD=DELAY3(PSR,DMR)
~ units/week
~ requisitions received at distributor
MTR=lNTEG(SSD-SRR,DTR*RRI)
units
~ material in transit to retail
SRR=DELAY3(SSD,DTR)
~ units/week
~ shipments received at retail
.Retail.Noise
Implements the noise input from Section 15.7.3, not found
in Appendix B
NSE=SAMPLE IF TRUE(
Time-INTEGER(Time)<TIME STEP,NSN,NSN)
~ units/week
- sampled noise input
NSH=
0
~ units/week [-100,100,10]
~ noise amplitude
NSN=
NSH*RANDOM NORMAL(-6,6,0,1,seed)
~ units/week
- normally distributed noise
seed=
7459
- dmnI
~ random number seed for noise
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.Distributor
UOD=INTEG(RRD-SSD,RRI*(DHD+DUD))
~ units
~ unfilled orders at distributor
IAD=lNTEG(SRD-SSD,AID*RRI)
~ units
~ inventory actual at distributor
STD=UOD/DFD
~~ units/week
~ shipping rate to be tried at distributor
NID=IAD/DT
~ units/week
negative inventory limit rate at distributor
SSD=CLIP(STD,NID,NID,STD)
~ units/week
~ shipments sent from distributor
DFD=(MOD/IAD)+DHD
~ weeks
~ delay in filling orders at distributor
MOD=DUD*IDD
~ unit*weeks
IDD=AID*RSD
~ units
~~ inventory desired at distributor
RSD=INTEG((1/DRD)*(RRD-RSD),RRI)
~ units/week
~ requisitions smoothed at distributor
PDD=RRD+(/DID)*(IDD-IAD+LDD-LAD+UOD-UND)
~ units/week
~ purchasing rate decision at distributor
LDD=RSD*DCD+RSD*DMD+RSD*DFF+RSD*DTD
~ units
~ pipeline orders desired in transit to supply distributor
LAD=CPD+PMD+UOF+MTD
~ units
~ pipeline orders actually in transit to distributor
UND=RSD*(DHD+DUD)
~ units
~ normal unfilled orders at distributor
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CPD=lNTEG(PDD-PSD,DCD*RRI)
~ units
~ clerical in-process orders at distributor
PSD=DELAY3(PDD,DCD)
units/week
~ purchase orders sent from distributor
PMD=INTEG(PSD-RRF,DMD*RRI)
~ units
~ purchase orders in mail from distributor
RRF=DELAY3(PSD,DMD)
~ units/week
~ requisitions received at factory
MTD=INTEG(SSF-SRD,DTD*RRI)
~ units
material in transit to distributor
SRD=DELAY3(SSF,DTD)
units/week
~ shipments received at distributor
.Factory
UOF=INTEG(RRF-SSF,RRI*(DHF+DUF))
~ units
~ unfilled orders at factory
IAF=lNTEG(SRF-SSF,AIF*RRI)
~ units
~ inventory actual at factory
STF=UOF/DFF
units/week
shipping rate to be tried at factory
NIF=IAF/DT
~ units/week
~ negative inventory limit rate at factory
SSF=CLIP(STF,NIF,NIF,STF)
~ units/week
~ shipments sent from factory
DFF=(MPF/IAF)+DHF
~ weeks
~ delay in filling orders at factory
MPF=DUF*IDF
~ weeks*unit
IDF=AIF*RSF
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~ units
~ inventory desired at factory
RSF=lNTEG((1/DRF)*(RRF-RSF),RRI)
~ units/week
~ requisitions smoothed at factory
MWF=RRF+(1/DIF)*(IDF-IAF+LDF-LAF+UOF-UNF)
~ units/week
~ manufacturing rate wanted at factory
MDF=CLIP(MWF,ALF,ALF,MWF)
~ units/week
~ manufacturing decision rate at factory
LDF=RSF*(DCF+DPF)
~ units
~~ pipeline orders desired in transit to supply factory
LAF=CPF+OPF
~ units
~ pipeline orders actually in transit to factory
UNF=RSF*(DHF+DUF)
~ units
~ normal unfilled orders at factory
CPF=lNTEG(MDF-MOF,DCF*RRI)
~ units
~ clerical in-process orders at factory
MOF=DELAY3(MDF,DCF)
~ units/week
~~ manufacturing orders into factory
OPF=INTEG(MOF-SRF,DPF*RRI)
~ units
~ orers in production at factory
SRF=DELAY3(MOF,DPF)
~ units/week
~~ shipments received at factory
.Parameters
AID=6
~ weeks
~ desired inventory coverage at distributor
AIF=4
~ weeks
~ desired inventory coverage at factory
AIR=8
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~ weeks
~ desired inventory coverage at retail
ALF=1 000*RRI
units/week
manufacturing capacity limit at factory
~ weeks
~ delay in clerical order processing at distributor
~ weeks
~ delay in clerical order processing at factory
~ weeks
~ delay in clerical order processing at retail
week
~ delay due to minimum
~ week
delay due to minimum
~ week
~ delay due to minimum
handling time at distributor
handling time at factory
handling time at retail
weeks
delay in inventory (and pipeline) adjustment at distributor
DIF=4
DIR=4
DMD=0.5
DMR=0.5
DRD=8
- weeks
- delay in inventory (and pipeline)
- weeks
~ delay in inventory (and pipeline)
adjustment at factory
adjustment at retail
week
delay in order mailing from distributor
week
delay in order mailing from retai
~ weeks
~ delay in smoothing requisitions at distributor
DRF=8
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DCD=2
DCF=1
DCR=3
DHD=1
DHF=1
DHR=1
DID=4
~ weeks
~ delay in smoothing requisitions at factory
DRR=8
~ weeks
~ delay in smoothing requisitions at retail
DPF=6
weeks
~ delay in production lead time at factory
DTD=2
~ weeks
~ delay in transportation of goods to distributor
DTR=1
~ week
~ delay in transportation of goods to retail
DUD=0.6
~~ week
~~ delay in unfilled orders due to out-of-stock items with normal inventory \
at distributor
DUF=1
~ week
~ delay in unfilled orders due to out-of-stock items with normal inventory \
at factory
DUR=0.4
~ week
delay in unfilled orders due to out-of-stock items with normal inventory \
at retail
.Test
RRR=RRI+RCR
~ units/week
requisitions received at retail
RCR=
STP+SNE
{Note: the following term adds the noise in Section 15.7.3, which is not included in
the model listing in Appendix B}
+NSE
~ units/week
requisition change at retail
STP=STEP(STH,STT)
~ units/week
~ step test input
SNE=SIH*SIN(2*PI*Time/PER)
~ units/week
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~ sinusoidal test input
PER=52
RRI=1000
SIH=0
STH=0
STT=4
weeks [0,400,10]
period
units/week
retail requisitions, initial rate
~units/week [-100,100,10]
~ sinusoidal input amplitude
~ units/week [-100,100,10]
~ week [0,52,1]
~ step input time
P1=3.14159
dmnl
.Supplementary
TIS=IAR+IAD+IAF
~ units
~ total system inventory
~ :SUPPLEMENTARY
.Control
Simulation Control Paramaters
DT= TIME STEP
~ week
delta time (same as time step)
FINAL TIME = 100
~ week
~ The final time for the simulation.
INITIAL TIME = 0
~ week
The initial time for the simulation.
SAVEPER =
TIME STEP
~ week
~ The frequency with which output is stored.
TIME STEP = 0.05
332
~ week
~ The time step for the simulation.
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Appendix G: Vensim Commodity Dynamics Model
Average Life of Capacity=
200
- months
Capacity in Transit= INTEG (
+Transit Initiation Rate-Transit Completion Rate,
Transit Delay*(Desired Production Capacity-Production Capacity)
/(Transit Delay+Transit Initiation Delay))
~ Units/Month
Capacity Utilization Factor=
Capacity Utilization Lookup(Desired to Actual Capacity Ratio)
dmnI
Capacity Utilization Lookup(
[(0,0)-(2,2)1,(0,1),(0.25,1),(0.5,1),(0.75,1),(1,1),(1.25,1),(1.5,1),(1.75,1),(2,1))
~ dmnI
Commodity Price=
Commodity Price Lookup(Relative Inventory Coverage)
~ $/unit
Commodity Price Lookup(
[(0,0)-(2,100)],(0,100),(0.25,95.5),(0.5,87),(0.75,72.5),(1,50),(1.25,27),(1.5,15),(\
1.75,7.5),(2,0))
~ $/unit
Consumer Population=
200
~ people
Consumption Adjustment Delay=
3
~ Month
Consumption Rate=
Consumer Population*Per Capita Consumption*Test Input
~ Units/Month
Depreciation Rate=
Production Capacity/Average Life of Capacity
~ (Units/Month)/Month
Desired Capacity Lookup(
[(0,0)-(100,2000)],(0,0),(20,10),(40,50),(60,1150),(80,1500),(100,1600))
~ Units/Month
Desired Inventory Coverage=
10
- months
Desired Production Capacity=
Desired Capacity Lookup(Expected Price)
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~ Units/Month
Desired to Actual Capacity Ratio=
Desired Production Capacity/Production Capacity
dmnI
Equilibrium Per Capita Consumption=
Per Capita Consumption Lookup(Commodity Price)
~ Units/Month/person
Expected Cons Adjustment Delay=
100
- months
Expected Consumption Change Rate=
(Consumption Rate-Expected Consumption Rate)/Expected Cons Adjustment Delay
~ (Units/Month)/Month
Expected Consumption Rate= INTEG (
Expected Consumption Change Rate,
591)
~ Units/Month
Expected Price= INTEG (
Expected Price Change Rate,
50.22)
~ $/unit
Expected Price Adjustment Delay=
3
- months
Expected Price Change Rate=
(Commodity Price-Expected Price)/Expected Price Adjustment Delay
~ ($/unit)/Month
Inventory= INTEG (
+Production Rate-Consumption Rate,
5900)
Units
Inventory Coverage=
Inventory/Expected Consumption Rate
~ months
Noise=
0
dmnI
Per Capita Consumption= INTEG (
Per Capita Consumption Change Rate,
2.96)
~ Units/Month/person
Per Capita Consumption Change Rate=
(Equilibrium Per Capita Consumption-Per Capita Consumption)/Consumption Adjustment Delay
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~ (Units/Month/person)/Month
Per Capita Consumption Lookup(
[(O,0)-(1 00,10)],(0,7),(20,6.5),(40,5),(60,1),(80,0.3),(100,0))
~ Units/person/Month
Production Capacity= INTEG (
+Transit Completion Rate-Depreciation Rate,
591)
~ Units/Month
Production Delay=
6
~ months
Production Initiation Rate=
Production Capacity*Capacity Utilization Factor
~ Units/Month
Production Rate=
DELAY3(Production Initiation Rate, Production Delay )*PUF
~ Units/Month
PUF=
PUF Lookup(Desired to Actual Capacity Ratio)
~ dmnl
PUF Lookup(
[(0,0)-(2,2)],(0,1),(0.25,1),(0.5,1),(0.75,1),(1,1),(1.25,1),(1.5,1),(1.75,1),(2,1))
~ dmnl
Relative Inventory Coverage=
Inventory Coverage/Desired Inventory Coverage
~ dmnl
StepSize=
0.15
~ dmnl
Test Input=
1 +STEP(StepSize,0)-STEP(StepSize, 1 0)+Noise
~ dmnl
Transit Completion Rate=
DELAY3(Transit Initiation Rate, Transit Delay)
~ (Units/Month)/Month
Transit Delay=
4
~ months
Transit Initiation Delay=
3
~ months
Transit Initiation Rate=
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(Desired Production Capacity-Production Capacity-Capacity in Transit)
/Transit Initiation Delay
~ (Units/Month)/Month
.Control
Simulation Control Paramaters
FINAL TIME = 200
~ Month
The final time for the simulation.
INITIAL TIME = 0
~ Month
~ The initial time for the simulation.
SAVEPER =
TIME STEP
~ Month
~ The frequency with which output is stored.
TIME STEP = 0.5
~ Month
~ The time step for the simulation.
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Appendix H: Research Chronology of Lean
A chronology of research on Lean is broken down into functions and is shown below in figure
G1. The body of literature began in 1978 with a description of the Toyota Production System by its
architect, Taiichi Ohno. As can be seen, subsequent to this work (and its 1988 translation) the vast
majority of the research was undertaken in the automobile industry as part of MIT's International Motor
Vehicle Program. Much of this focused (though not exclusively) on manufacturing. In addition, research
at the Harvard Business School (shown in blue) covered the Japanese automotive industry, and had more
of a focus on the product development side.
Figure GI: Research Chronology of Lean
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